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SUMMARY
This study is concerned with the possibility and characterisation of
poststructural ethics and the ethics of general theories. It contains a review
of selected readings on Modernity and provides a "snapshot" of an ethical
system that is essentially rule based and privileges rationality. Some of the
problems with such a system, such as inflexibility, tolerance based on
superiority and force and the privileging of male gender is explored.
It proceeds by perusing some literature on postmodernity as an open ethical
system in which values are free floating and lists of rules are constantly
produced and disregarded in a dizzying ethical free for all in which "anything
goes". No value is considered more worthwhile than personal survival.
As a starting point for reading Modernity and postmodernity together, Levinas
introduces a radical perspective on ethics that can be read as a
condemnation of postmodern morality. He relates an ethics in which the
survival of the "other" is more important than the survival of the self.
However, he does not ground the metaphysics of such a privilege in
rationality or knowledge and hence does not turn it into an ethical rule, but
rather, subtly shifts the responsibility for the other person to an ultimate
responsibility for the Other as God.
This radical responsibility is rejected by deconstruction which does not reject
either postmodernity or Modernity but is an attempt to think through the limits
of rule-orientated rationality, free-play and mystical metaphysics to produce
an ethical awareness that has a sensitivity for the complexity of context.
Through the notion of "writing", the peculiarities it displays and the objections
it attracts, Derrida seeks to establish a uniquely ethical writing that is both a
stable manifestation of ethics and a dynamic engagement with those subject
to it.
With these readings in the background the thesis attempts to provide a
framework for poststructural ethics. It is an ethics based in the notion of
friendship but does not ground itself in any guarantees. It re-evaluates
rationality in terms of a sublime struggle for meaning and truth. This sublime
struggle offers a unique perspective on political debates that strive towards
responsible development for multicultural societies and also on a sociological
approach to law and the ability to dispense justice without undue prejudice.
The main contention of the thesis is that although poststructuralism does not
suppose a grounding metaphysics in either rationality or responsibility
towards God it cannot be satisfied with the self-indulgent nihilism of an
"anything goes" postmodernism. Thus, it depends on the notion of a
"complex system" that "self-organises" and produces limits through
spontaneous connections. Through the working of deconstruction complex
systems can take on a more human manifestation as friendships flourish and
decay through the interaction of faces.
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie is gemoeid met die moontlikheid en karakterisering van
poststrukturele etiek en die etiek van algemene teorië. Dit bevat In
geselekteerde oorsig van Moderniteit en verskaf In "kiekie" van In etiese
sisteem wat essentieël op reëls gebasseer is en rationaliteit privilegieer.
Sommige probleme met so In sisteem, soos byvoorbeeld onbuigsaamheid,
verdraagsaamheid gegrond in superioriteit, geweld en die privilegieering van
manlikheid, word ondersoek.
Die studie sit voort deur sommige literatuur oor postmoderniteit as In oop
etiese sisteem onder oë te neem. So In sisteem veronderstel vryvloeiende
waardes en lyste van reëls wat gedurig geproduseer en geabandoneer word
in In duisligwekkende etiese vryspel wat beskryf kan word as "anything goes".
Geen waarde word hoër geag as persoonlike oorlewing nie.
As die beginpunt van In lesing wat Moderniteit en postmoderniteit met mekaar
in verband bring verskaf Levinas In radikale perspektief op etiek wat
verdoemend staan teenoor die moraliteit van postmoderniteit. Hy beskryf In
etiek waarin die oorlewing van die "ander" meer belangrik geag word as die
oorlewing van die self. Hy grond egter nie die metafisieka van so In voorreg
in rationaliteit of kennis nie, en lê dit dus nie neer as In etiese reël nie, maar
verskuif eerder op subtitle wyse verantwoordelikheid vir die ander persoon na
In uiteindelike verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander as God.
Laasgenoemde radikale verantwoordelikheid word deur dekonstruksie
verwerp in In poging om postmoderniteit en Moderniteit saam te snoer en die
limiete van reël-georiënteerde rationaliteit, vry-spel en mistiese metafisieka
deur te dink. Hierdeur word 'n etiese gewaarwording geproduseer wat
sensitiviteit vir die kompleksiteite van konteks vertoon. Deur die nosie van
"skryf', die eienaardighede en teenkanting daaraan verbonde, is Derrida op
soek na die neerlegging van In unike etiese skryf wat beide In stabille
manifestasie van etiek is en 'n dinamiese betrokkenheid by die wat daaraan
onderhewig staan.
Met hierdie leeswerk in die agtergrond poog die tesis om 'n raamwerk vir
poststrukturele etiek daar te stel. Dit is In etiek wat as basis die nosie van
vriendskap aanvaar sonder om enige waarborge uit te deel. Rationaliteit
word gere-evalueer in terme van In sublime stryd vir betekenis en waarheid.
Hierdie sublime stryd bring 'n unieke perspektief na politieke debatte wat
volhoubare ontwikkeling in multikulturele samelewings ten doel het en vir In
sosiologiese benadering tot die reg en regsvaardigheid.
Alhoewel poststrukturele etiek nie In metanarratief veronderstel, soos die
etiek van Moderniteit, nie kan dit egter ook nie tevrede wees met die
destabiliserende nihilisme van 'n "anything goes" postmodernisme nie.
Poststrukturele etiek steun dus swaar op die idee van 'n "komplekse sisteem"
wat self-organiseer en llrniette stel deur middel van spontane
konneksievorming. Deur die werking van dekonstruksie kan so In komplekse
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sisteem ook in meer menslike terme verwoord word as vriendskappe wat
groei en vergaan in die interaksie tussen "gesigte".
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Forgive me the violence just now, in the end I did not call you for that and we
succeeded (true duelists) in listening to each other at length while avoiding
murder, making the blows deviate, without going back down into hell, without
going over the same confession (Derrida, 1987a: 45).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 THE POSSIBILITYOF A GENERALETHICS
The aim of this thesis is to examine the possibility of poststructural ethics as
an attempt for a general theory of ethics.
The assumption underlying the thesis is that poststructural ethics does not
exclude the possibility of a general theory, although the nature of such a
theory differs from the nature of what would be called "Modern" theories.
Modern theories are generally understood to entail metanarratives. A
general theory of poststructural ethics, on the other hand, would favour a
complex of narratives in an essayistic style 1.
The "strategy" followed in this thesis will be to draw rigorously on the
philosophical aspects inscribed in deconstruction. This will entail a double
process of discovering these inscribed philosophical aspects and
concurrently, of applying them" The "double gesture" (Caputo, 1997; 81) of
simultaneous discovery (of opening up) and application (of acting decisively
and disciplined), characteristic of deconstruction, will mark the movement
towards a break through the oppressive and ultimately deterministic projects
of Modernity and Structuralism.
Hence, the engagement with a poststructural ethics will allow for a tracing of
the arnbiquous" "oscillation" of a "playful" (Critchley, 1993; 42) double
movement between uncertainty and certainty, or impossibility and possibility,
in other words, for an exploration of nothing less than the possibility or
impossibility of ethics itself.
1
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1.2 THE LOVE OF WISDOM
In this study "poststructural" refers both to an attempt to discover some limits
to what is ethically possible, and to the transgression of these limits in the
name of a justice yet to come".
I will argue that poststructural ethics is an attempt to get out of an impossible
situation that is, the acceptance that ethics is impossible, by thinking and
acting on this impossibility. I will use the word "morality" to designate that
stubborn impulse, which drives the pursuit of ethics. The word "ethics" will
signify a porous distinction between moral action, and reflection. The power
of poststructural morality, so I will argue, resides in the vigorous and pre-
rational refusal to accept the task of contemporary ethics as permanently
overwhelming or non-sense".
It must be stressed from the outset that this exploration of a deconstructive or
poststructuralist ethics will differ substantially from the "history of ethics"
considered as an atrophied branch in the trident shaped (Physics - Logic -
Ethics) tree of philosophy. No lists of virtues will be deduced for the eager
moralist to flaunt at will. It is exactly the structure and politics of lists, always
and infinitely deconstructable, that is at stake.
The force of the poststructural argument is contained in the claim that "ethics
is first philosophy" (Levinas, 1994a; 75). In other words, ethics is what makes
philosophy possible. If we accept the impossibility of ethics it follows that the
whole of philosophy will be in jeopardy. This position is in direct opposition
with the history of philosophy in the West, also called "Platonism", in which
rationality and knowledge (Levinas, 1994a; 76) has always been regarded as
the cornerstones of philo-sophia, "the love of wisdom".
The theory put forward here is a tentative offering, or entering into a debate
that has not been settled and shows few signs of ever doing so. The
extensive literature and jargon that has already accumulated is daunting
enough without mentioning the actual problems this body of work is supposed
to address. I am respectfully aware of the precarious position held by
someone who does not yet know the rules by which a specific game is played
2
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and of the formidable language used by many of the theorists who are taking
part in the debate. But, I will endeavor to translate the words and concepts
into plain English. Since English is not my native tongue and many of the
works cited have already been translated from other languages (French,
German, etc.), my version can be expected to differ from the one intended by
the original authors".
This difference is not only an indication of the impossible task any translator
faces when confronted with a text, but is also an indication of the ethical
problematic to be confronted. Ethics based on a notion of mutual
understanding, an understanding brought about by the generation and
manipulation of concepts, the production of knowledge, expressed and
received as words in language, will always be inadequate. This inadequacy
of words to express their meaning fully, enhanced when they are incorporated
(translated or wholly taken over) into the alien context of another language,
illustrates the necessity for ethics to find its feet elsewhere.
But, finding one's feet in a world from which the ground seemed to have
disappeared is no easy matter? On the one hand, the attempt to engage a
poststructural ethics has the implication of criticizing, to the point of
destruction, some of the most cherished assumptions of Western
metaphysics. The main target is rationality and specifically the form of
Rationality brought to full extension during the Enlightenment. Rationality
dominated by the "word" or logos as the privileged place of meaninq". The
carrier and natural inheritor of Rationality namely man (as distinct from
animal) and more specifically the male gender's (as distinct from the female
gender's) natural and sovereign right to claim superiority on the basis of
greater Rational ability, is placed under fatal suspicion by poststructuralism.
On the other hand, the study also aims at placing poststructuralism in context
as a strategy that attempts to address the ethical challenges of
postmodernity, most notably the postmodern notion that "anything goes"
(Cilliers, 1995; 127). There are many objections to using the term
postmodernity and little agreement can be reached between commentators
about what postmodernity, or postmodernism, is or that it even exists (Sarup,
3
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1993; 129). Use of the term here, however, provides a vital theoretical tool
for thinking about the contemporary environment. Furthermore, it designates
Modernity as a precursor providing a much-needed historical distance that
can be effectively employed to frame the excesses of Enlightenment
Rationality as the pinnacle of what is considered Modern.
1.3 A PECULIAR REALITY
One of the reasons for the ephemeral existence of postmodernity is the
peculiar quality of reality that pervades it. Postmodern reality seems to exist
only as the product of information technologies. It is easily manipulated by a
powerful media concealing its own agendas and the interests of its powerful
owners amongst outrageous yet infinitely desirable images of instant wealth,
leisure, luxury and, above all, Truth. Postmodern reality holds out the
promise of total access to everything, however fragmented the resulting
picture, with nothing hidden from view9.
Such a total fragmentation of reality has the effect of annihilating specific
identities of individuals and groups while at the same time appropriating
these identities and offering them for sale as "lifestyles". Baudrillard (1993b;
133) describes the postmodern individual as follows: "It is the end of
interiority and intimacy, the overexposure and transparence of the world [ ]
traverse him without obstacle. He can no longer produce the limits of his own
being ... He is ... a switching centre for all the networks of influence".
The moral impulse to interact ethically is numbed by the oversupply of
possible choices. Different identities either react by competing mercilessly to
establish the authority of their interpretations (Bauman, 1994a; xx) or sink into
a catatonic indifference towards ethics. There seems to be no middle ground
between fanatically clinging to one's own identity or drifting on the current of
an "anything goes" relativism. As Bauman (1995; 66) has it: "The Scylla of
indifference, of the responsibility abandoned, and the Charybdis of the
autonomy stolen, of the responsibility degenerating into coercion - seem too
close to each other for safe sailing".
4
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
To make postmodern reality seem even bleaker politics also disappears into
the promise of total transparency. Postmodern politics has no specific
domain; everything is "politicized". No-thing can "avoid involvement with
social and political relations and apparatuses" (Hutcheon, 1991; 3). No
strategy seems to be effective against the co-opting powers of the total gaze
of politicised information technologies. Able to neutralize even the most virile
opposition into the bland cynicism of a been there, seen that culture, it
regards everything as "so very five minutes ago!". Only political irony still
fascinates the postmodern "watcher".
Into this context, I will argue poststructuralism inserts a refreshing new
approach that not only re-enchants the world, but also encounters and re-
vitalizes the encounter through an ethical discovery of otherness.
Poststructuralism is by no means an a-historical endeavour. History is an
integral part of the re-enchantment of a world that is constantly driven to
amnesia by new developments. Poststructuralism, however, does not regard
history as a master key that can open all the doors of perception and much
less a single story with absolute truth value.
1.4 THE WISDOM OF LOVE
The articulation of a poststructural investigation opens onto the radical ethics
proposed by Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas' ethics finds a unique trajectory
between the Ancient Greek world of philosophy and the jewish tradition of
the Old Testament. He seeks to bring about awareness of a pre-rational
reality that is already immediately ethical, which is the origin of all ethics.
This is best explained by the inversion of philosophy, "the love of wisdom" to
express something much older, "the wisdom of love" (Levinas, 1981; 161).
In Totality and Infinity Levinas (1994b; 68) articulates an ethics able to
accommodate the excessive claims of individuality. He writes that "[t]he face
to face both announces a society, and permits the maintaining of a separated
I". He describes the notion of il y a as merely the "there is" of Being. Being's
unbearable solitude, the unhappy, undifferentiated horror of merely "being
5
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there," inevitably opens onto a confrontation with the other as an "I" or ego
that has to take into account the radical exteriority of the other as Other.
According to Levinas exteriority manifests in the appearance of a "face". The
proximity of the individual face that transcends appearance is the mark of a
place that is infinite and precedes all claims to grasp it as knowledge or to
understand it. The account or regard to be paid to this exteriority as "face" is
like the answer to a call that places the ego's existence into question.
Hence, for Levinas, the question of ethics par excellence is not the question
of an ego asking itself, "to be or not to be?" but, one that, accepting that it
already exists, is obliged to ask, "how is my being justified?" (Levinas; 1994a;
86). As Lyotard (1989; 299) puts it: " ... what is at stake in the discourse of
Levinas is the power to speak of obligation without ever transforming it into a
norm".
The fault line cutting through Levinasian ethics, allowing a certain correction
of this otherwise wholly acceptable thought, is the blatant attempt to introduce
an all-encompassing metaphysics of the "absolutely Other" itself "understood
as the alterity of the Other and of the Most-High" (Levinas, 1994b; 34). This,
after claiming to have destabilized every form of metaphysics through the
"idea of infinity . . . which is the common source of activity and theory"
(Levinas, 1994b; 27).
In the attempt to introduce a metaphysics of the Other, Levinas falls into the
age old philosophical and Old Testament trap of privileging the male gender.
He does so to the extent that it is not clear whether or not the category
"feminine" could be articulated as individual "woman" and hence as having a
face. As Luce Irigaray (1991; 114) explains: "To go beyond the face of
metaphysics would mean precisely to leave the woman her face, and even to
assist her to discover it and to keep it".
This implicates Levinasian ethics in a certain kind of violence, identified by
the philosopher Jacques Derrida 10, that cannot be easily escaped. Not only
is it the violence of the speaking (rational) male subject answering the call to
6
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responsibility but also the violence of a metaphysics, a totality, attempting to
establish itself as a no-name-brand religion.
Levinas attempts to foresee and respond to these objections, which he
regards as merely "philosophical", in a discussion of "scepticism" and the
concepts of "said" and "saying". Thus, the language of Otherwise than Being
(Levinas, 1981) "is the performative enactment of ethical writing" provoking a
disturbance within philosophical discourse that "performs a kind of spiralling
movement ... between the inevitable language of the ontological Said and
the attempt to unsay that Said in order to locate the ethical saying within it"
(Critchley, 1993; 8).
The attempt to escape the violence inherent to his philosophy brings
Levinas's ethics into a strange, and for Levinas a difficult, complicity with art.
The style of writing he develops to express the ambiguity of love's wisdom
draws strongly on the repetitive character of poetry and musical composition.
He also refers regularly to the novels of great Russian writers such as
Dostoyevski and Tolstoy to illustrate his point.
The strangeness of this strategy lies in the fact that Levinas holds a very
traditional philosophical and Biblical view of art as reality's shadow (Levinas,
1994a; 129 -143). But, unlike Plato, for example, Levinas seems to regard art
as a necessary evil that opens up the possibility of access to the "ethical
infinitude" of the other (Hand, 1996; 66).
1.5 THE COMPLICITYOF ETHICSWITH ART
This complicity of ethics with art steers the thesis into the vicinity of Jacques
Derrida's rigorous philosophical development of deconstruction as an
"exorbitant method" (Derrida; 1976, 162) that constitutes thinking
(consciousness) as the "scene of writing" (Derrida, 1976; xxxix).
Deconstruction is a thorough investigation of Western metaphysics and the
privilege it accords to rationality.
Tearing down and building on the structural theory of language developed by
Ferdinand de Saussure, Derrida proposes a theory of language in which
wor(l)ds do not refer to anything other than different wor(l)ds. These "words"
7
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are held together by a playful referentiality in a network or "text". Derrida
makes the radical claim, often misunderstood by both his defenders and
detractors, that "there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida,1976; 158).
Much of the misunderstanding, I will argue, stems from a misinterpretation of
the function that "word" and "text" retains in deconstruction. Deconstructive
"writing" operates as a de-organizing of privileged, or conventional, static
semantic forms of knowledge and meaning in a performance of
"parergonality", also called "framing". The movement of "writing"
contextualises semantic meaning within a "double-bind", simultaneously
affirming and placing under "erasure" the privilege of semantic meaning by
introducing the writer, creator of meaning, to the reader, the interpreter of
meaning.
As an example of how deconstruction proceeds Derrida (1993b; 223) turns to
an example, the "mystic writing pad" used by Sigmund Freud to illustrate the
way in which memory comes to be inscribed on the brain. This "writing pad"
is a child's toy, still available today, with which it is possible to write legibly,
using a stick or other stylus, onto a clear film covering a dark wax tablet
underneath. To remove the writing from the film the latter needs only to be
lifted away from the wax. "Traces" of the writing is left in the soft body of the
wax, however, and can influence the legibility of subsequent writing on the
film.
In this thesis I will not engage with Freud to any substantial degree. His
thought deserves an essay that deals with psychoanalysis exclusively, a
responsibility that I cannot fulfill in the space allowed here. In other words,
Derrida, thoroughly informed by Freud, engages in the exorbitant method of
deconstruction to illustrate the formation of memory as the generation of
meaning over a period of time by focusing on the play of "différance" in a
"text".
Derrida's strategy consists in stimulating "différance", spelt with an "a", in the
reading of certain philosophical and literary texts. By discovering the unique
"binary oppositions" of the conceptual structures belonging to each text, it is
8
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possible to establish the identity of the privileged term in each binary pair.
The privileged term is always used in a "positive" form against the "negative"
of its relative. Derrida produces a reading that "mimics" the innate "logic"
established in each text by these privileged terms. In the process the
privileged term is reversed taking the place of its marginalised partner. The
marginal term, now operating in the privileged place, allows for a different
reading that displaces the dominant or privileged reading.
"Différance" is inherent to any text and makes reading possible. It carries
both the meaning of "to differ", to take an opposing position and also "to
defer", to place elsewhere in space and time (Culler, 1994; 97). Hence, it has
the third active feature of opening up a space for the new text that is
inevitably generated through reading (Cilliers, 1998a; 45).
This place that is opened up, I will argue, is the position of the "subject". The
writing that takes place there, and the signature placed there, is not an
unproblematic identity (Critchley, 1996; 22) that can claim an absolute
presence as "being here where I sign and nowhere else". Rather, the place
of the "subject" is itself subject to deconstruction.
1.6 AN ETHICS TO COME
By tracing the strategy of deconstruction through the work of Drucilla Cornell
(1992), Linda Hutcheon (1995) and Paul Cilliers (1998), I hope to show the
value of Levinas and Derrida's poststructuralist approach, engaging both law
and politics through ethics seen as a complex system. In doing so, I hope to
address any claim that poststructuralism is unable to contribute meaningfully
to the establishment and protection of a just democracy because it is merely
the aesthetic indulgence of an elitist few who enjoy reading in luxury.
Poststructuralism, I will conclude to the contrary, can never indulge in
truimphalist rhetoric and self-satisfied backslapping. It can never be satisfied
with justice dispensed or democracy claimed.
In South Africa, where our fledgling democracy still struggles to find its way
towards a practical notion of justice for all its citizens, regardless of cultural
heritage, race or gender, it is necessary to be clear about ethical values.
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This does not mean, however, that the desired clarity on values must take the
form of a blinding epiphany presenting the one and only true path of ethics at
last. The value of this study lies not in deducing hard and fast rules to be
followed, but rather in laying bare or clearing a space for the acceptance of
the difficult road each individual has to travel, often alone, towards ethics,
justice and doing right. This acceptance is beset on all sides with the
temptation to abandon the overwhelming weight of this task.
1.7 SUMMARY
Chapter Two contains a review of selected readings on Modernity and
provides a "snapshot" of an ethical system that is essentially rule based and
privileges rationality. Some of the problems with such a system, such as
inflexibility, tolerance based on superiority and force and the privileging of
male gender is explored.
Chapter Three peruses some literature on postmodernism and explores the
notion of an open ethical system in which values are free floating and lists of
rules are constantly produced and disregarded in a dizzying ethical free for
all in which "anything goes". No value is considered more worthwhile than
personal survival.
In Chapter Four Levinas is used to introduce a radical perspective on ethics
that can be read as a condemnation of postmodern morality. He relates an
ethics in which the survival of the "other" is more important than the survival
of the self. However, he does not ground the metaphysics of such a privilege
in rationality or knowledge and hence does not turn it into an ethical rule, but
rather, subtly shifts the responsibility for the other person to an ultimate
responsibility for the Other as God.
This radical responsibility is rejected by deconstruction and is explored in
Chapter Five. Derrida's deconstructive turn is an attempt to think through the
limits of rule-orientated rationality, free-play and mystical metaphysics to
produce an ethical awareness that has a sensitivity for the complexity of
context. Through the notion of "writing", the peculiarities it displays and the
objections it attracts, Derrida seeks to establish a uniquely ethical writing that
10
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is both a stable manifestation of ethics and a dynamic engagement with those
subject to it.
Chapter Six sets out to establish a framework for poststructural ethics. It is
an ethics based in the notion of friendship but does not ground itself in any
guarantees. It re-evaluates rationality in terms of a sublime struggle for
meaning and truth. This sublime struggle offers a unique perspective on
political debates that strive towards responsible development for multicultural
societies and also on a sociological approach to law and the ability to
dispense justice without undue prejudice.
Poststructuralism does not suppose a grounding metaphysics in either
rationality or responsibility towards God. However, its moral ambition cannot
be satisfied by a self-indulgent nihilism or "anything goes" postmodernism.
Thus, it depends on the notion of a "complex system" that "self-organises"
and produces limits through spontaneous connections. Through the working
of deconstruction complex systems and the apparent arbitrariness of self-
organisation takes on a more human manifestation as a politics of friendship
that has at its heart the notion of ethics.
NOTES
In order to develop a poststructural ethics I will draw on the connectionist
approach to complex systems developed by Paul Cilliers (1998) in his book
Complexity and Postmodemism. As he (Cilliers, 1998; 141) explains:
It [a connectionist approach] focuses on the behaviour of collections
of many interconnected, similar elements that do not have (atomistic)
significance by themselves, but that obtain significance through a
complex set of non-linear, asymmetrical relationships in a network.
Important characteristics of these networks include distributedness,
self-organisation and the operation on local information without
central control.
2 Jacques Derrida (1976; 158) explains the double movement of deconstruction in of
Grammatology
[The] moment of doubling commentary [based on a close or faithful
reading] should no doubt have its place in a critical reading. To
recognise and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and
requires all the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this
11
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recognition and this respect, critical production would risk
developing in any direction at all and authorise itself to say almost
anything. But this indispensable guardrail has always only
protected, it has never opened, a reading.
3Simon Critchley (1993; 42) calls this ambiguity in deconstruction a "philosophy of
hesitation" and "the 'experience' of undecideability".
4 Drucilla Cornell writes in Philosophy of the Limit (Cornell, 1992; 110 - 111): "The
Good is beyond any of its current justifications. As a result, when we appeal 'back'
to what has been established, we must look forward to what 'might be' ".
S As Zygmunt Bauman (1995; 7) explains: "What this new condition [(heralded by)
the demise of the allegedly unified and ostensibly unique ethical code] does spell
out, however, is a prospect of greater awareness of the moral character of choices;
of our facing our choices more consciously and seeing their moral contents more
clearly".
61n this matter I have turned for solace to the words of Walter Benjamin as regards
The Task of the Translator (Benjamin, 1992b; 71 - 72): "It is plausible that no
translation, however good it may be, can have any significance as regards the
original. Yet, by virtue of its translatability the original is closely connected with the
translation; in fact, this connection is all the closer since it is no longer of importance
to the original".
7 "The awesome truth about morality is that it is not inevitable, not determined in any
sense which would be considered valid from the ontological perspective; it does not
have 'foundations' in the sense that perspective would recognise" (Bauman, 1994b;
75).
8 "Privileging the philosophy of Plato is what Derrida means by 'Iogocentrism,'
making the logic of the argument, the demonstrably true or false claims, the centre,
while sending everything else off to the periphery as mere rhetoric or
ornamentation, letting the logic lead the letter" (Caputo; 1997; 83).
9 Jean Baudrillard (1993b; 130) notices that the transparency of postmodern reality
has a paradoxical effect that he calls "disappearance" or "obscenity". As he writes
"Obscenity begins precisely when there is no more spectacle, no more scene, when
all becomes transparence and immediate visibility, when everything is exposed to
the harsh and inexorable light of information and communication".
10 Derrida asks in the final footnote to Violence and Metaphysics (Derrida, 1993f;
320-321):
On this subject, let us note in passing that Totality and Infinity
pushes the respect for dissymetry so far that it seems to us
impossible, essentially impossible, that it could have been written
by a woman. Its philosophical subject is man . . . Is not this
principled impossibility for a book to have been written by a woman
unique in the history of metaphysical writing?
12
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CHAPTER TWO
MODERNITY
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Initially at least, the word modern may indicate any historical event that has
changed conventional perceptions and beliefs. If this change has also led
people to regard themselves as better off than before, the term modern gains
connotations of progressiveness. The lasting effects of such a change give
rise to a contemporary modernity. Contemporary, because throughout history
examples of modernities can be identified. The discovery of how to harness
fire, the replacement of human sacrifice by animal sacrifice, the invention of
the wheel, the invention of writing, serve as examples. The French Modernist
writer Baudelaire, using the example of portraiture, instructs the would-be
student of modernity thus:
Every old master has had his own modernity; the great majority of
fine portraits that have come down to us from former generations
are clothed in the costume of their own period. They are perfectly
harmonious, because everything - from costume and coiffure down
to gesture, glance and smile (for each age has a deportment, a
glance and a smile of its own) - everything, I say, combines to form
a completely viable whole. This transitory, fugitive element [my
emphasis], whose metamorphoses are so rapid, must on no
account be despised or dispersed with. By neglecting it, you
cannot fail to tumble into the abyss of an abstract and
indeterminate beauty... (Baudelaire, 1996: 142).
From these words, I deduce, at the outset of this study on ethics, that any
new argument about ethics must take into account the fugitive element that
allows a modernity not only to be rejuvenated, but also to remain relevant. If
this can be accepted, a further implication can be drawn namely, that no
13
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modernity can claim to be the final or ultimate Modernity' even if, initially, it
does so in order to establish itself.
Today a battle rages over what exactly modernity has come to mean for
people living at the close of the twentieth century. We regard ourselves
mostly as Modern because of what we see as a civilization that has
developed superior technology.
The use andlor abuse of our technology challenges the ethical principles of
our civilization on a daily basis. Often, and I will argue mistakenly, we regard
technology and the promises and problems it brings as an effect of the last
one hundred years. I believe, but will not explicitly argue the point, that the
psychological force of the birth of photography, mechanical flight, the
motorcar, anti-bioties, the atom bomb and, more recently, the personal and
network computer, has the ongoing effect of erasing from memory all the
technologies of previous modernities and their possible significance for
evaluating our own age. Hence, scholars may disagree about the exact
incept date of our modern times, but my view is supported by Toulmin (1990;
6) when he argues that "whatever else is or is not clear, the Modernity around
which controversy rages today clearly started long before 1890".
2.2 THE RECEIVEDVIEW OF MODERNITY
Toulmin (1990; 13) identifies what he calls the standard account or received
view of Modernity. This account or view brackets the general belief system,
which the late twentieth century has come to accept as the trutn' about
Modernity and which sets the scene for most of the debate about the so-
called "end of Modernity". Hence, the standard account or received view is
not only a "story" about Modernity but is itself a Modern story. As we shall
see, it tells the story of Modernity by seeking to temporalize it, in other words,
by identifying a single notion and placing it somewhere on a calendar without
due consideration of the timing of the events. Thus, it tells the story of when
and what but considers the how and why as intolerable or self-evident. The
notions to be considered as possible keys in the story about Modernity, says
Toulmin (1990: 7-8), are:
14
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• the political claims of the modern nation-state,
• the end of Modernity linked with the eclipse of national sovereignty, and
• the Industrial Revolution, and the rise of industry.
On the one hand, the notion of the nation-state finds its roots in the
seventeenth century. In this view, "the [M]odern era began with the creation
of separate, independent sovereign states, each of them organized around a
particular nation, with its own language and culture, maintaining a
government that was legitimated as expressing the national will, or national
traditions, or interests" (Toulmin, 1990; 7). If we accept that this is the start of
a Modernity under which we still live today, the greatest threat to the
continued existence of this Modern world order is globalization. The rise of
multinational corporations and powerful wealthy individuals that are able to
operate with efficiency, and often with impunity, anywhere in the world is
creating great difficulty for the notion of a representative government ruling a
country with well-defined and controlled borders.
On the other hand, the rise of industry does not take us back in time all that
far, and if this is used as the benchmark for the Modern age, its beginning
lies on either side of the year 1800 (Toulmin, 1990; 8). Modernity, from this
point of view, has been battling, often against the power of the state, to
establish itself for at least 150 years. The opponents of industrial society
focused on the mechanistic "inhumanity" of Newtonian Science that regards
the universe as a gigantic clock whose parts needed to be determined and
made to run smoothly. One of the main opponents to the deterministic view
was William Blake in Enqland". With the invention of the atomic bomb and
the following Cold War this anti-determinist view again grew popular during
the 1960's and 1970's (Toulmin, 1990; 7), forming the basis for many counter
cultures, such as the "beat" and "hippie" sub-cultures, spreading from
America, to seek alternative ways of living and experiencing. More recently
"liberal" and "Luddite" critiques of the so-called "post-industrial" and
"information" society has continued this opposition.
15
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Toulmin admits that deciding on how to date and which notion to use for
constituting Modernity leaves the verdict far from unanimous and brings to
bear numerous objections. But, for most compilers of chronology the starting
point eventually reaches back to the early decades of the "seventeenth
century" (Toulmin, 1990; 8) and the rise of the nation state. The specific
significance of this period resides in the philosophical ingenuity of Rene
Descartes' Meditations and Discourse on Method (Descartes, 1960), and the
discoveries of Galileo, regarded as the founder of Modern physics (Toulmin,
1990; 8).
According to standard account, the intellectual originality of both these
thinkers makes the 1630s the most plausible starting date for Modernity. The
originality of this time lay in the fact that scientific inquiries became "rational"
thanks to Galileo's astronomy and mechanics, Descartes' logic and
epistemology (Toulmin, 1990; 9) and Thomas Hobbes' political philosophy.
The conception of "rationality" that was established in the seventeenth
century promised intellectual certainty and harmony (Toulmin, 1990; 9). This
rational approach to the world of things and forces provided the engine that
generated an unsurpassed optimism about the ability of science and industry
to set human beings free from the bonds of ignorance. The feeling of the
time was that:
[e]verything that is possible is permitted. In this way the
experience of Nature and Society would gradually get the better of
anyexteriority. A miracle of modern Western freedom unhindered
by any memory or remorse, and opening onto a 'glittering future'
where everything can be rectified. Only by death is this freedom
thwarted (Levinas, 1994a; 78).
So, the received view will have us believe that no significant influences
shaped the "Modern" commitment to rationality in human affairs other than
the intellectual changes in the mid-seventeenth century. Toulmin argues that
this is probably the result of a reluctance amongst scholars to strike a
balance between the costs and benefits of the new optimism. There seems to
be agreement that the self-styled "new philosophers" of the seventeenth
16
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century, with Descartes as favoured example, were responsible for new ways
of thinking about nature and society. They committed the modern world to
thinking about nature in a new, "scientific" way, and to the use of "rational"
methods to deal with the problems of human life and society (Toulmin, 1990;
9).
What is rarely questioned, Toulmin maintains, is the timing of these significant
changes. Why did these changes occur at this specific time and not sooner
or later? The chronology is usually marked off between the prime of Galileo
in the early 1600s, and the appearance of Newton's Principia in 1687. But,
the fact that most earlier historians agreed with each other, it seems, has
been the result of their borrowing from each other's narratives instead of
returning to the original texts (Toulmin, 1990; 13).
Hence, for much of the twentieth century, people in Western Europe and
North America have genE?rallyaccepted two statements about the origins of
Modernity:
• that the Modern age began in the seventeenth century, and
• that the transition from medieval to Modern modes of thought and practice
rested on the overnight adoption of rational methods in all serious fields of
intellectual inquiry (Toulmin, 1990; 13).
2.3 CHALLENGES TO THE RECEIVED VIEW
If we are to understand something of the late twentieth century, both these
assumptions should be challenged. The traditional picture of a medieval
world dominated by theology that suddenly yields to the Modern world, which
is committed to rationality, must be reconsidered (Toulmin, 1990; 12). When
the pre-occupations of "Modern philosophers" is contrasted with earlier
intellectual endeavour, it becomes apparent that the changes were neither
sudden, nor devoid of contact with what it tried to "leave behind". Rather,
transformation was subtle and insidious.
2.3.1 The Seventeenth Century
17
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
One aim of seventeenth century philosophers was to frame all their questions
in terms that rendered them independent of context (Toulmin, 1990; 21). So,
instead of expanding the scope for rational or reasonable debate,
seventeenth century scientists actually narrowed it. This development
contrasts sharply with the view held by Aristotle for instance.
The latter considered rationality to include both Theory and Practice in an
ongoing search for eudaimonia6 and phronese'. For him rationality had to
devise different strategies for inquiry in each different field of study. He
recognized that the kinds of argument relevant to different issues depend on
the nature of those issues, and differ in degrees of formality or certainty so
that what is considered "reasonable" in law or ethics, for instance, is judged
in different terms from what is "logical" in geometrical theory.
Following Plato instead, seventeenth-century philosophers and scientists
limited "rationality" to theoretical arguments only that achieve a quasi-
geometrical, logical, certainty or necessity. Instead of pursuing a concern
with "reasonable" procedures of all kinds, Descartes and his successors
hoped eventually to bring all subjects, including ethics and law, into the ambit
of some formal "scientific" theory with universal truth value. As a result, being
impressed only by formally valid demonstrations, they ended by changing the
very language of Reason - notably, key words like "reason", "rational", and
"rationality" - in subtle but influential ways (Toulmin, 1990; 20). They could
achieve this by removing any concern for the influence that the practical
implication, or effect, of the theory might have held for the theory itself.
Hence, whatever was unknown was forced to adhere to a theory that would
make its features explicit by forcing it to conform to pre-established
parameters held by the theory to be unchanging. In this way everything was
considered knowable.
2.3.2 Feminist "Insight"
Luce Irigary (1996) argues, that the "unknowable" is systematically
repressed and dominated by a myth of formal rationality that reduces
everything to what is seen in the clear light of understanding. For her, what is
18
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seen is identified with the "phallus", which she equates with the penis. To
contrast her idea of a more "fluid" (Gallop, 1986; 127) thinking, she uses
female genitalia to demonstrate'? the site of the "irrational" or "unknowable".
She (Irigary, 1996; 462) writes:
Woman's desire most likely does not speak the same language as
man's desire, and it probably has been covered over by the logic
that has dominated the West since the Greeks. In this logic, the
prevalence of the gaze, discrimination of form, and
individualization of form is particularly foreign to female eroticism.
Woman finds pleasure more in touch than in sight and her
entrance into a dominant scopic economy signifies, once again,
her relegation to passivity: she will be the beautiful object.
Although her body is in this way eroticized and solicited to a
double movement between exhibition and pudic 11 retreat in order
to excite the instincts of the "subject", her sex organ represents the
horror of having nothing to see. In this system of representation
and desire, the vagina is a flaw, a hole in the representation's
scoptophilic objective.
Hence, according to Irigary, this logic of the gaze cannot tolerate what it
cannot see. Everything in nature that remains hidden is regarded as in some
way flawed and lacking the light and spirit of understanding. As Susan Bordo
(1996; 643) writes in The Cartesian Masculinization of Thought: "By
Descartes' brilliant stroke, nature (res extensa) became defined by its lack of
affiliation with divinity, with spirit. All that which is God-like or spiritual -
freedom, will, and sentience - belong entirely and exclusively to res
coqnens". All else - the earth, the heavens, animals, the human body - is
merely mechanically interacting matter". In this, she shows that Man's
Reason has literally become the measure of all things. For Descartes this
meant that he had stopped speaking like a child, and if we follow Bordo, had
become a god. To be a reasonable adult, a reasonable god, means that one
has to be a reasonable man. In this regard Bordo (1996; 639) maintains that:
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... childhood was commonly associated, as Descartes associated
it, with sensuality, animality, and the mystifications of the body.
For Descartes, happily, the state of childhood can be revoked,
through a deliberate and methodical reversal of all the prejudices
acquired within it, and a beginning anew with reason as one's only
parent. This is exactly what the Meditations attempts to do. The
mind is emptied of all that it has been taught. The body of infancy,
preoccupied with appetite and sense-experience, is transcended.
The clear and distinct ideas are released from their obscuring
material prison. The end-result is a philosophical reconstruction to
secure all the boundaries that, in childhood (and at the start of the
Meditations), are so fragile: those between the "inner" and the
"outer", between the subjective and the objective, between self and
world.
This insight provided by feminist critique sets the scene for the problems
faced in confronting the Modern project from an ethical vantage point. The
change brought about in the language of reason providing the opportunity for
a divine masculine science of rationality to take root is so subtle that no
amount of clear-minded analysis will ever be able to provide a full inventory
of the slippages that make up the dynamic of this change.
2.3.3 Modern Optimism
The change in the language of reason facilitated the view that the political,
economic, social, and intellectual condition of Western Europe radically
improved from 1600 in ways that encouraged the development of new
political institutions (Toulmin, 1990; 16). For the European, Modernity has
unquestionably been a "Good Thing". To be able to throw off the debilitating
irrationality of "feminine" and "childlike" obsessions with the body, with the
grand gesture of a self-confident rationality, which would allow nothing to
thwart its plans, has been very appealing in the light of European history. For
the sake of the rest of humanity, the Moderns hoped - and actively laboured
at the Imperial civilizing duty - that the whole world would soon become as
"Modern" as themselves (Toulmin, 1990; 13).
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2.4 SHIFTING THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE RECEIVED VIEW
2.4.1 Doubling the Origin
The standard account is, in many respects, still correct. As Toulmin (1990;
17) argues, however, it needs to be drawn away from the preoccupation with
the beginning of the seventeenth century in order to question more directly
why, at this time, it became so lucrative to be born again in one's own rational
male image. Hence, when we compare the spirit of seventeenth century
thinkers and the content of their ideas with the emancipatory ideas of
sixteenth century writers, we find seventeenth century innovations in science
and philosophy beginning to look less like revolutionary advances, and more
like a "defensive counter-revolution".
The received view has always carried inside of it the subtext of prosperity and
leisure, in a word, progress. The notion that Modernity is a "Good Thing" has
led many interpreters to believe that it is also indicative of "Good Times".
However, Toulmin (1990; 19) seeks to expose the contrary. He argues that
the narrowing of the focus of rationality that took place at the start of the
seventeenth century can be seen as a reaction aimed at curbing the
"Apocalyptic" visions that were part of everyday existence during the
sixteenth century.
Toulmin's broadening of the received view hinges on identifying a double
origin. He (Toulmin, 1990; 43) argues that Modernity had the following two
distinct starting points, chronologically 100 years apart, which were in effect
the parental couple of what has become known as Modernity or the
Enlightenment (Aufklarung). These are:
• a humanistic beginning grounded in classical sixteenth century
Renaissance literature, and
• a scientific beginning rooted in seventeenth century philosophy.
At the outset this may not seem like a very radical diversion from the received
view, but it does open onto a more unpredictable horizon. Literature, by its
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very nature, has a much larger tolerance for the free play of the imagination
than a calculating rationality that seeks universal laws.
2.4.2 An Uncanny Congruence between Medieval Scholars and Modern
Thinkers
For medieval, pre-Renaissance scholars the diversity of human affairs
conducted in all their fallible and sinful ways were not worth writing about.
These human frailties were considered uninteresting compared to the
theological contemplation of the glory of God. The different theological
conceptions were based on the premise of being perfect, and encountering
the perfect beinq". "In Christianity, the most personalized of the three
[religions: Jewish, Christian, Muslim], the relationship with God is
characterized by love" (Armstrong, 1995; 244). For Christians, this insistence
on perfect love went hand in hand with the need for exclusivity, perpetuating
the "religious warfare that was gathering intensity throughout the sixteenth
century, as antagonism between the two branches of Christianity,
Reformation and Catholic, deepened (Toulmin, 1990; 25).
This need of medieval religious scholars for certainty about the nature of God
is strangely congruent with seventeenth century philosophers' need for
certainty about universally valid Laws. While the first claimed to have found
certainty in the demonstrable existence of the one true God, the latter sought
it in the secular realm of indubitable thought.
In contrast with scholars and philosophers in Medieval and Modern times,
writers of the Renaissance were informed by a feeling for the limits to the
practical and intellectual powers of human beings. They therefore
discouraged the intellectual dogmatism of Christianity, arguing that human
modesty alone should teach reflective Christians how limited their ability to
reach unquestioned Truth and unqualified Certainty over all matters of
doctrine was (Toulmin, 1990; 25). Thus, the novelists and writers of the
Renaissance saw in the peculiarities of the human condition the very stuff
that their readers would find fascinating and enjoyable. In the eyes of
Renaissance scholars, who were greatly influenced by Aristotle's Ethics,
22
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Politics, and Rhetoric (Toulmin, 1990; 26), the "circumstantial" character of
practical issues, as they figure in the problems of medical diagnosis, legal
liability or moral responsibility, were much more important than identifying an
eternal or universal Truth.
2.5 RENAISSANCEATTITUDE
2.5.1 The Renaissance as Broad-Mindedness
For writers of the renaissance the rhetorical analysis of arguments, the
presentation of cases and the character of audiences were as philosophical
as the formal analysis of the logic involved. Rhetoric and Logic were
considered complementary disciplines. Hence, writers who fed the appetite
of a vast lay readership characterized the Renaissance. This appetite
consisted of theoretical speculations with overtones of neo-Platonism, or
"natural magic", abstract issues of ethical theory, descriptions of concrete
experience, empirical studies of natural phenomena, and the branches of
natural history (Toulmin, 1990; 27). In her book Worldly Goods - A New
History of the Renaissance Lisa Jardine (1996; 179 - 180) gives an
exhaustive analysis of the environment which fed this appetite and at the
same time made it possible. She argues that:
The book was ... first and foremost a piece of merchandise,
produced to earn its manufacturer a living, even when he was a
scholar and intellectual ... [T]he impact of book culture on the
Renaissance depended upon the fact that the staggering
escalation in book production in the course of the sixteenth century
was consistently driven by commercial pressures. It was market
demand as understood by the printer and his backers which
determined choices of texts and strategies for distributing them.
2.5.2 Montaigne and Renaissance Literature
One of the most prolific writers of this time Michel de Montaigne, encouraged
the accumulation of a rich perspective both on the natural world and on
human affairs as we encounter them in actual experience for "[a]1Iuniversal
judgments are lax and dangerous" (De Montaigne, 1991; 1069). He
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encouraged a respect for the rational possibilities of human experience but
also had an, often humorous, intuition about the limits of personal knowledge.
As he playfully warns, "Stercus cuique suum bene 01ef'14 (De Montaigne,
1991; 1053). This is a worldly point of view devoid of the bitterness that
follows on the heels of utopian disappointment and its hypocritical
vicissitudes. Montaigne counsels that we should not regard our
disappointments too seriously and that:
...we must live among the living and let each man follow his
fashion without our worrying or without making ourselves ill about
it. A hundred times a day when we go mocking our neighbor we
are really mocking ourselves; we abominate in others those faults
which are most manifestly our own, and, with a miraculous lack of
shame and perspicacity, are astonished by them (De Montaigne,
1991; 1053).
The Renaissance saw an explosion in taste for the exotic and alternative
ways of life that acted as the counterpoint to much of the later philosophical
argument about national identity (Toulmin, 1990; 27). Montaigne argued that
"included among public events are popular rumors and opinions. [The role of
all good "historians"] is to give an account of popular beliefs, not to account
for them." (De Montaigne, 1991; 1068). The latter task he reserved for
Theologians and Philosophers as the "directors of consciences".
Growing access to the diversity of cultures put to the test the commitment of
Renaissance writers to an honest reporting of first-hand experience. Exotic
populations can be viewed, by a mind made up in advance, as primitive,
savage, or marginally human, their ways of thinking and living as heretical,
pagan, or chaotic. Instead the Renaissance writers endeavoured to open
their minds and add these fresh and exotic discoveries to the pool of
testimony about Humanity and human life and so enlarge our sympathy and
framework of understanding (Toulmin, 1990; 28).
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2.5.3 Skepticism: Renaissance and Modernity
While the Renaissance writers and their readers were celebrating the
complexity and diversity of human life, philosophers, like religious thinkers
before them, found themselves in a difficult position. Confronted with the
profusion of difference the prospects for constructing comprehensive systems
of physical theory in human experience faced disappointment. Philosophers
of this time, like Socrates before them, adopted attitudes of outright
skepticism (Toulmin, 1990; 28). In his book, Truth - A History and a Guide for
the Perplexed, Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (1997; 215) contrasts the Western
skeptical tradition with the "value quietness" of Zen Buddhism "in which one
has no wandering desires at all but simply performs the acts of ... life without
desire ... [achieved by] ... just sitting, a meditative practice in which the
idea of a duality of self and object does not dominate one's consciousness".
The difference between the Western skeptic and the desireless indifference
of Zen Buddhism he contends lies in the "Western skeptic's professed
contentment with things as they seemed, on the grounds that appearances
could do duty for truths no one can know" (Fernandez-Armesto, 1997; 216).
Renaissance humanist writers saw philosophical questions as reaching
beyond the scope of experience in an indefensible way. Faced with abstract,
universal, timeless theoretical propositions, they saw no sufficient basis in
experience, either for asserting, denying (Toulmin, 1990; 29) or ignoring
them. From their point of view tolerating the resulting plurality, ambiguity, or
the lack of certainty is no error, let alone the sin of desire that should be
conquered by "just sitting". "Honest reflection shows that [ambiguity] is part of
the price that we inevitably pay for being human beings, and not gods"
(Toulrnin, 1990; 30).
Since Descartes, however, skepticism has been thought of as destructive
nay-saying, the skeptic denies whatever the philosopher would assert
(Toulmin, 1990; 29) which opens up the problematic of tolerance. In such an
environment, where skepticism is seen as an attack, the practice of tolerance
would depend on the power to tolerate. An attack can only be tolerated (not
taken seriously), if the thesis attacked is strong enough to withstand it.
25
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Hence, 1th century philosophers, the Modern philosophers according to the
standard account, set aside the pre-occupations of Renaissance humanism
and focused on the necessary preconditions for knowledge. In particular they
disclaimed any serious interest in four different kinds of practical knowledge:
• the oral
• the particular
• the local
• the timely (Toulmin, 1990; 30).
2.5.4 The Power to Tolerate
The research program of Modern philosophy, very much like its theological
predecessors, "set aside questions about argumentation - among particular
people in specific situations, dealing with concrete cases, where varied things
were at stake - in favour of proofs that could be set down in writing, and
judged as written" (Toulmin, 1990; 31). This narrowing of focus can be
summed up in four fashion statements:
• formal logic was in, rhetoric was out (Toulmin, 1990; 31).
• general principles were in, particular cases were out (Toulmin, 1990; 32).
• abstract axioms were in, concrete diversity was out (Toulmin, 1990; 33).
• the permanent was in, the transitory was out (Toulmin, 1990; 34).
This change in intellectual fashion reflected a historical shift from practical
philosophy, whose issues arose out of clinical medicine, juridical procedure,
moral case analysis, or the rhetorical force of oral reasoning, to a theoretical
conception of philosophy. In other words, Modern philosophy favoured the
theory-centered idealised approach of Plato over the practical-minded
contextual approach of Aristotle. In practical disciplines, questions of rational
adequacy are timely instead of timeless, concrete instead of abstract, local
instead of general, particular instead of universal. In this dualistic way
Modern philosophers ignored the particular, concrete, timely and local details
of everyday human affairs and instead moved to a more stratospheric plane
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on which nature and ethics conform to abstract, timeless, general, and
universal laws (Toulmin, 1990; 35).
In order to understand this shift from the practical to the theoretical we must,
Toulmin argues, ask a practical question with a rhetorical nature, exactly the
kind of question that Descartes ruled out of Modern philosophy: "Why did
educated people in the mid-1th century find the Quest for rational certainty
so attractive and convincing?" (Toulmin, 1990; 36). This is a question about
the audience for philosophy in that particular context. Further more, did
Descartes commit an error, achieving nothing more than an intellectual "dead
end"? If this is so, why did such an error carry special conviction with readers
from 1640 onwards?
Toulmin argues that exactly this is the philosophers task: to show why we are
tempted into potential intellectual "dead ends" (Toulmin, 1990; 36). So what
did this Cartesian temptation (Meditation) look like? Descartes (1960; 132)
writes:
From the very fact that I know with certainty that I exist, and that I
find that "absolutely" nothing else belongs "necessarily" to my
nature or essence except that I am a thinking being, I readily
conclude that my essence consists solely in being a body which
thinks (or a substance whose whole essence or nature is only to
think). And although perhaps, or rather certainly, as I will soon
show, I have a body with which I am very closely united,
nevertheless, since on the one hand I have a clear and distinct
idea of myself in so far as I am only an extended being which does
not think, it is certain that this "I" (that is to say, my soul, by virtue
of which I am what I am) is entirely (and truly) distinct from my
body and that it can (be or) exist without it.
It is clear that the Cartesian temptation lies in favouring one half of the duality
he imposes between "thought" and the "world", over the other. After
Descartes it was considered incorrect to refer to nature in anthropocentric
terms because it was regarded as totally devoid of mind and thought. For
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Descartes the possibility of a cool, impersonal, distanced cognitive relation to
the world overcomes the specter of infantile subjectivism that projects
intelligence into the world of objects. At the same time, the nightmare
landscape of the infinite universe becomes the well-lighted laboratory of
modern science and philosophy. Hence, the world can be tolerated by a
male subject because of the power gained over it through a superior
consciousness, that of Rationality.
2.6 MODERN POWER AND CULTURAL ANXIETY
Susan Bordo identifies a certain anxiety that infuses the Meditations (Bordo,
1996; 641). This anxiety, she argues, is a cultural anxiety arising from
discoveries, inventions, and events that are major and disorienting.
She ascribes the disorientation to a parturition or separation from the more
organic universe of the Middle Ages and of the Renaissance. From this
separation emerged the Modern categories "self', "Iocatedness" and
"innerness". Initially the separation was experienced as loss, meaning
estrangement, and the opening up of a chasm between self and nature.
Epistemologically this estrangement expresses itself in combative skepticism
and in a pathological anxiety over the possibility of reaching the world as "it"
is. In spiritual, or existential, terms this anxiety is expressed over the
closedness of the individual self and the devastating uniqueness of each
individual in time and space, as well as over the arbitrariness and
incomprehensibility of the individual thrown forth by an alien, indifferent
universe. Bordo prompts us in a psychoanalytical direction by suggesting
that this anxiety is a "cultural separation anxiety" (Bordo, 1996; 641).
She argues, expanding the notion of a feminine logic earlier established by
Irigary, that Cartesian "objectivism" and "mechanism" should be understood
as a reaction-formation, as a denial of the "separation anxiety", facilitated by
an aggressive intellectual flight from the female cosmos 15 and "feminine"
orientation towards the world. That orientation had played a formidable role
in Medieval and Renaissance thought and culture. In the 1yth century it was
decisively purged from the dominant intellectual culture, through the
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Cartesian "rebirthing" and restructuring of knowledge and the world as
masculine.
The Cartesian hierarchy of epistemological values, and its scopic prejudice,
holds as its central values clarity and distinctness. Contrary to this, argues
Bordo, the key term in the pre-separation, Renaissance scheme of things
was, however, sympathy. "Sympathetic" understanding seeks knowledge
through "union" with the object. To merge with that which is to be known
means granting personal or intuitive response a positive epistemological
value, even (perhaps, especially) when such response is contradictory or
fraqrnented".
Bordo uses the notion of "dynamic objectivity" to flesh out further the nature
of sympathetic understanding as a re-visioning of object orientated thought.
She derives this notion from Bergson's 17 "intellectual sympathy". This entails
"placing oneself within the full being of an object", as Bergson puts it, (at
which point it ceases to be an 'object' in the usual sense), and allowing it to
speak . . . the objective and subjective merge, participate in the creation of
meaning" (Bordo, 1996; 644). In contrast to this, Descartes' ideal is to
render any such continuity between subject and object impossible. The
scientific mind must be cleansed of all "sympathies" toward the objects it tries
to understand. It must cultivate absolute detachment. This project generated
a whole cavalcade of binary conceptual hierarchies in which the "feminine"
term was invariably suppressed: head versus heart, domination over/versus
merging with the object, purified versus erotic orientation towards knowledge
etc.
Bordo's psychoanalytic approach urges us to examine that which is denied or
repressed, for the shadow of a loss we mourn. She suggests that Descartes'
masculine "rebirthing" of the world and self (thought) as decisively separate
appears not merely as the articulation of a positive new epistemological ideal,
but as an active repression of the organic female cosmos of the Middle Ages
and Renaissance. She likens the Cartesian reconstruction of the world to a
"fort-da,,18game which aims ultimately at control.
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It is a defiant gesture of independence from the female cosmos, which at the
same time has to compensate for a profound loss. In the Cartesian project
the pain experienced over this loss is brought under control by the
paradoxical movement of a more definitive separation, one that is chosen and
aggressively pursued. Because it is chosen on the basis of rational criteria it
is therefore experienced as autonomy rather than helplessness.
Bordo identifies the mechanism of such self-assertion in the fantasy or dream
of becoming the parent of oneself. This dream-state, or goal orientated
metonymy, envisages the role of active parental figure, possessing an
omnipotence of thought, rather than passive, helpless child plucked this way
and that on the currents of emotion. This is achieved through vicariously
identifying with the parent by means of "transitional objects". These objects
function, symbolically, as the child himself. In cuddling and scolding the
object, the child is actually playing at self-parenting, at being his own baby.
This manifests in the Oedipal desire to sexually possess the mother as a
fantasy of becoming the father of oneself instead of staying the helpless child
of the mother.
The breaking of all organic ties between person and nature, originally
experienced, as we have seen, as epistemological estrangement, as the
opening up of a chasm between self and world, is reenacted, this time with
the human being as the engineer and architect of separation. Descartes as
prime architect envisages a new world, one in which all generativity and
creativity fall to a rational God, the spiritual father, rather than to the female
"flesh" of the world. The formerly female earth becomes inert matter and the
objectivity of science is insured.
Bordo suggests that the anxiety evoked by the success of such a rational
rebirth is not over loss any longer, but over the "memory" or suggestion of
union. "Sympathetic", associational, or bodily response obscures objectivity
and a feeling for nature muddies the clear lake of the mind. For the
reconstructed reasonable man nothing is more frightening than having to
return to an infantile state. The "otherness" of nature, being whatever is not
rational or male, is now what allows it to be known (Bordo, 1996; 649). "She"
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is Other. And "otherness" itself becomes dreadful. Like the infinite universe,
which threatens to swallow the individual "like a speck", the female, with her
strange rhythms, long acknowledged to have their chief affinities with the
rhythms of the natural (now alien) world", becomes a dreaded reminder of
how much lies outside the grasp of man (Bordo, 1996; 652).
The project that fell to both "empirical" science and "rationalism" was to tame
the female universe. Empirical science did this through aggressive assault
and violation of her "secrets". Rationalism tamed the female universe
through the philosophical neutralization of her vitality. The Modern
philosopher progresses more or less as follows: thought may be subject to
many errors of thinking but I cannot doubt that I am thinking. Hence, as long
as I am still thinking I can always correct errant thoughts. This is an optimism
I cannot have about the world. But, that I am thinking assures me that the
world has no necessary principle that cannot be discovered and scrutinized
by my thought and upon which doubt cannot be laid by thought. There is
guaranteed access to thinking but not to the world. Luckily guaranteed
access to the world is unimportant because guaranteed access to thinking
can systematically shape it to what I think it is.
2.7 A MODERNIST ATTEMPT TO RETURN TO RENNAISANCE
LITERATURE
It was this guarantee, this control, that 1th century philosophers facing
infinite skepticism, found irresistible in Descartes' reduction. With such a
guarantee one could face any complex set of circumstances fully motivated
that one will be able to control it. With the correct rational procedures all flux
must inevitably surrender to the understanding. In other words, Cartesian
rationality promised a better future, a future of Rational control made manifest
as an empirical law-abiding universe.
Control, however, comes at a high price. Feelings are the very first
contaminant of solipsistic thought and have to be suppressed in order for the
rational process to remain efficient. Thus, philosophers who are drawn to
dualism are simultaneously drawn into a battle against the discomfort of their
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corporeal natures. The reality the Cartesian cogito finds so hard to face is
"the fact that feelings are not something we do: They are what our bodies do
to us "(Toulmin, 1990; 40). A large part of our humanity consists in accepting
responsibility for our bodies, our feelings and the effects of the things we do,
given those bodies and feelings.
Modernity had a terrible time taking responsibility for bodies and their erratic
influence. The Modernity of Descartes and the rational philosophers
depended on the making of rules and laws of conduct that drew hard and fast
lines between what was acceptable and what unacceptable behavior. The
line always drew the distinction between the bodily process ("material") and
voluntary activities ("mental"). Because the mental was seen as voluntary, it
was also the center of choice. Hence, rational responsibility for behavior
boiled down to thinking correctly and making the choice that proved to be the
best universally. The law had only one function, to ensure correct thinking
procedures, stipulating choice and making sure that the stipulation was
carried out (Toulmin, 1990; 41).
These procedures were regarded as perfect and only those who were
legitimized by internalising the procedures of correct thinking gained the
authority to change these laws or procedures by exercising their proven, in
rational terms, genius. As Baudelaire says:
...genius is nothing more nor less than childhood recovered at will
- a childhood now equipped for self-expression with manhood's
capacities and a power of analysis which enables it to order the
mass of raw material which it has involuntarily accumulated
(Baudelaire, 1996; 139).
Here was the "free" genius of the legitimate, rationally proven, subject who,
armedwith analytic reason "lives very little, if at all, in the world of morals and
politics" and for whom "the mainspring of his genius is curiosity" seeing
everything in a state of childlike "newness", being always and perpetually
drunk (Baudelaire, 1996; 138). For Baudelaire this "new man" needs to feel
no doubt that he can conquer any multiplicity however, "fugitive or infinite".
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He is the perfect example of the ultimate artist/creator for whom the flaneur
acts as a model, "the passionate spectator" for whom it "is an immense joy to
set up house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow of
movement. .. Thus, the lover of universal life enters into the crowd as
though it were an "immense reservoir of electrical energy" himself a
"kaleidoscope gifted with consciousness". There is no doubt that he is an "I"
with an insatiable appetite for the "non- I" who has the undoubted capacity to
"at every instant" render and explain "it in pictures more living than life itself,
which is always unstable and fugitive" (Baudelaire, 1996; 140).
As in Edgar Allan Poe's The Man of the Crowd (Poe, 1986; 187) the belief
that "unstable and fugitive" life, here modeled by that great example of all
modernities the city, can be understood and solved, is the guiding force. The
city is characterized by those who would try to read its history in a "glance".
But, in so, doing they miss the complex web of relations and practices
unfolding there. "The urge to define and fix the city as a single thing, like the
original and eternal desire to plan and control the life of the city, is suggested
here in the actions of the narrator and then rapidly countered by the eruption
of 'the man of the crowd' who presents an insoluble dilemma" (Campbell and
Kean, 1997; 170). Poe describes it as follows:
And here, long, amid the momentary increasing confusion, did I
persist in my pursuit of the stranger. But, as usual, he walked to
and fro, and during the day did not pass from out the turmoil of that
street. And, as the shades of the second evening came on, I grew
wearied unto death, and stopping fully in front of the wanderer,
gazed at him steadfastly in the face. He noticed me not, but
resumed his solemn walk, while I, ceasing to follow, remained
absorbed in contemplation (Poe, 1986; 187 - 188).
Poe's flaneur finds that the man he follows exhibits no recognizable behavior,
making him impossible to classify, and condemns him as "the type and the
genius of deep crime". Because he had been daunted by the
inexplicableness of the man's behavior the rational man knows only one
alternative: judgment and outright condemnation. Thus, he imagines that the
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"worst heart of the world" cannot compare to the grossest book ever written
and praising God for his great mercy concludes that "es tësst sich nicht
lesen,,2o(Poe, 1986; 188).
The conclusion is inevitable from the point of view of the legitimate subject for
he has no way to establish what the stranger desires. And he cannot accept
that the stranger merely desires to keep on walking (planktos) and "not to be
alone" even in his obvious singular loneliness.
2.7.1. The flaneur paradox
The paradox lies in the fact that the flaneur understands that as a citizen he
has to proclaim his desire for justice and the laws that guarantee his freedom
with more commitment than his desire for freedom. The stranger, however,
enjoys his freedom without claiming it. The flaneur has a desire for the
absolute freedom and anonimity of the stranger, but he fails to understand it
because the stranger does not enter into discourse and allows no
interrogation of his secret. The best solution the flaneur, as a participant in
civil society can come up with is freedom that is guaranteed against the
claims of others in society by laws. But, laws do not only entrench rights, like
the right to freedom but also demands responsibility. The flaneur as a citizen
is guaranteed freedom only as long as he remembers his duty to the
community. He thus has to judge the stranger a criminal because he does
not respond, he has no sense of duty and thus no rights. The flaneur's
problem is that he can only have what the stranger has if he compromises
what he most desires in a freedom that only exists where the possibility of its
interruption is excluded by laws and where the citizen willingly consents to
their restrictions. Adhering to the restrictions of the law creates the paradox
with regards freedom and never allows it the absolute reign that is a criminal
desire. Lyotard (1991 b; 35). puts it thus:
The subject is concrete, or supposedly so, and its epic is the story
of its emancipation from everything that prevents it from governing
itself. It is assumed that the laws it makes for itself are just, not
because they conform to some outside nature, but because the
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legislators are, constitutionally, the very citizens who are subject to
the laws. As a result, the legislator's will - the desire that the laws
be just - will always coincide with the will of the citizen, who
desires the law and will therefore obey it.
This is a good description of the Kantian "knower", who like Baudelaire's
flaneur, is transcendental. He is able to transcend the moment by taking
recourse in a universal law. In a similar way a single threefold aspiration
characterized Modernity after 1630:
• "that of deriving everything from an original principle" (corresponding to
scientific activity),
• "that of relating everything to an ideal' (governing ethical and social
practice), and,
• "that of unifying this principle and this ideal in a single Idea" (ensuring that
the scientific search for true causes always coincides with the pursuit of
just ends in moral and political life) (Lyotard, 1991b; 33).
2.7.2 The End of the Metanarrative
Rationality and the philosophy it spurned are to this day known as Platonism.
Philosophy as "speculation" had the task of restoring unity to learning. It
could "only achieve this in a language game that links the sciences together
as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links them in a
rational narration, or rather meta narration" (Lyotard, 1991b; 33).
The rational instruments, metanarratives, developed to ensure correct
thinking, created a narrowing of scope for freedom of discussion and
imagination on the social plane with an insistence on "respectability" in
thought and behavior on the personal plane. This personal respectability
took the form of alienation, familiar to the zo" century, expressing itself as
solipsism in intellectual matters, and as narcissism in emotional life (Toulmin,
1990; 42).
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But, in asserting the activity of the subject a door is opened, paradoxically, to
a more historical and contextual understanding of knowing. The knower, not
the known, can now come under scrutiny.
2.8 Summary
In summary then, Modernity reacted against a world that it regarded as
chaotic and threatening, a world the Renaissance attempted to celebrate
through literature. It did its very best to hide or repress what it had left
behind. But, the fear of complexity represented in literature and femininity
turned, firstly, into anxiety felt over the loss of something very dear and,
secondly, into an anxiety over the inability to return and create union.
Perhaps the contemporary feminist emphasis on the insufficiency of any
ethics or rationality, "feminine" or "masculine", that operates solely in one
mode without drawing on the resources and perspective of the other is a way
through this Modern anxiety. Thus, Bordo suggests that:
Romanticizing "the feminine" within its "own" sphere is no
alternative to Cartesian ism, because it suggests that the feminine
has a "proper" (domestic) place. Only in establishing the scientific
and philosophical legitimacy of alternative modes of knowing in the
public arena (rather than glorifying them in their own special
sphere of family relations) do we present a real alternative to
Cartesianism (Bordo, 1996; 655).
There is a clear connection here with the Renaissance, in the cultural
reawakening to the multiplicity of possible human perspectives, and with the
role of culture in shaping those perspectives. There is a recognition not
merely of the undiscovered (future) "other" but of the repressed (past) other.
However, Modernity is characterised by the drive to rationalise ethics and lay
down strict rules and codes of conduct. In the next chapter we will look at
postmodernism as a contemporary manifestation of the Renaissance
attitude! The question whether a new Modernity is the only response to
postmodernity will occupy us throughout the thesis.
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NOTES
1 The Modernity, in the name of which a universal finality is claimed, will be indicated
in this thesis with a capital M. This measure will have the double function of
indicating the philosophical tradition known as Platonism and narrowing the
philosophical pursuit of the 17'h century to focus exclusively on "rational" means of
inquiry.
2 It is my contention that having a sense of what "truth" is, is what makes us human.
This chapter is throughout concerned with the status and possibility of truth but it will
not explicitly analyze truth as a concept. We can, however, make use of four
signposts to help us on our way.
• The truth you feel - truth understood as registered emotionally or by non-sensory
and non-rational kinds of perception.
• The truth you are told - can succeed or supplement the first from a "truth world"
existing as sources of authority.
• The truth of reason or the truth you think for yourself - this usually originates as a
reaction against earlier-prevailing concepts of truth, and of techniques of
reasoning which are commonly cal1ed logical.
• The truth you perceive through your senses - the belief we have in the reliability
of our sense perception (Fernandez-Armesto, 1997; 6 - 7).
To claim that something is "The Truth" one will have to bring all four the above forms
of truth into alignment. But, even if such a feat is possible, excluding all
contradiction, it will largely depend on the timing of this Truth whether or not it will
have a significant impact on consciousness. One could probably call such a timely
alignment an event. Its significance, however, still largely depends on its being
experienced and correctly reported on for it to become more than just a "something
happened". And this is a matter of mediation via technique and method coupled
with technology, all of which adds or subtracts to a certain degree from "what
happens".
3 The end of Modernity is closely linked to what Heidegger has called the "end of
philosophy" or the "completion of metaphysics". He says that "[m]etaphysics is in all
its forms and historical stages a unique, but perhaps necessary, fate of the West
and the presupposition of its planetary dominance. The will of that planetary
dominance is now in turn affecting the center of the West. Again, only a will meets
a will from this centre" (Heidegger, 1973; 90). It will be fruitful to keep in mind as we
progress through this thesis that "end" in this context is an indicator of de-centering
a thought that has become obsessive, rather than a sign of nihilism.
4 In William Blake's most often recited line of poetry he refers allegorically to the
Church who have begun to produce followers in the same conveyor-belt fashion as
the factories mass producing goods and foaming clouds of smoke, destroying
everything held sacred.
And did the Countenance Divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
And was Jerusalem builded here
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Among these dark Satanic Mills? (Sampson, 1995; 239)
5 The liberal critique is more optimistic and "stresses the importance of choice, and
therefore of value, priorities and democratic participation" but ignores the fact that
technologies are never neutral and always "express [the] particular values and
priorities" of the "dominant interest groups, above all ... the power of capital ... ".
Lyon argues that "the Luddite is correct to temper this by drawing attention to the
ways in which choice is limited, often severely and systematically, by social, political
and economic definition. But, the negative image of Luddism is hard to live down.
Luddism can be as pessimistic as the popular information society pundits are
optimistic. Their future may be similarly foreclosed" (Lyon, 1995, 69 - 70). In
America Neo-Luddite activity has unfortunately become synonymous with Theodore
Kaczynski. He is more widely known as "The Unabomber" because of the letter
bombs he sent to pro-technology academics over a seventeen year period.
Luddism has its roots in England (Pynchon, 1984; 40 - 41) however, and it is
possible that "The Unabomber" has more in common with the "Agrarian" critique
from the American South "which warned of the threat to individualist and humanist
values in a world dominated by the developing power of an economic and political
order which linked centralized government to a productive system based on the
machine and the cash nexus" (Campbell and Kean, 1997; 145).
6 The Greek word mostly translated as "happiness". We must, however, take care
with the connotations that are attached to the word in English. In English the word
"happiness" refers primarily to a psychological state, a state of feeling. Whether
one is happy is then largely a matter of whether one feels happy.
Eudaimonia on the other hand, is more the objective condition of a person, and
there exists room for contrast between feeling happy and genuinely being happy as
expressed by connotations such as "well-being" and "flourishing" (Norman; 1990;
39).
7 Practical wisdom or moral knowledge is what Aristotle calls phronesis, the kind of
knowledge possessed by the phronimos. The essential feature of practical
knowledge is that it is concerned with particulars, not with universals. It is not a
matter of appealing to rules and general principles, not a matter of logical argument
or intellectual ability. It consists simply in knowing, in a particular situation: this 'is
what I should do. One's moral education consists in being told in particular
situations that one's behaviour is appropriate or inappropriate (Norman; 1990; 54 -
55).
8 Jane Gallop relates in a footnote (Gallop, 1986; 127) that Freud often used the
term "dark continent" to refer to female sexuality. Ironically, it seems that the
reference strangely mimics what it refers to for as Gallop admits: "I have not yet
succeeded in locating this term in Freud's text, but that may be my blind spot".
9 Irigary reads Lacan as a representative of the rational male bias and as such her
critique is significant here. There are other feminists, however, who make a strong
case against her connotation of the phallus with the penis. Gallop writes: "Lacan is
at least explicit as to what the phallus is not. Not a fantasy, not an object, but least
of all an organ, least of all the penis. It does ... clearly have a relation to the penis:
the phallus symbolizes the penis. But, even this link does not constitute a special
relation between phallus and penis, for the phallus also symbolizes the clitoris"
(Gallop, 1986; 136).
10 It would be incorrect to think that Irigary is using female genitalia here as a
metaphor to present a stable image of the "unknowable". It is rather a metonymy
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which is closer to the elliptical movement of dreaming that "serve as allusions to
matter that cannot be represented in any other way" (Freud quoted in Gallop, 1986;
119).
11 pude'nd/um n. genitals, esp. of woman, pu'dic, adjectives from classical Latin
pudenda (membra parts), neutral plural of the gerundive (from gerund stem having
the sense of "that should be done") of pudere be ashamed (The Concise Oxford
Dictionary).
12 Res cogitans is a thinking and unextended thing and res extensa is an extended
and unthinking thing.
13 At this time the three religions, Jewish, Christian and Muslim had a profound
influence on each other. Christianity tended to stress the genius of the intuitive
individual on a quest for perfect love. This had the effect of producing an
excessively egotistic search for personal enlightenment culminating in resentment
and intolerance towards others who might discover different revelation. From the
point of view of Muslim clergy at this time, says Armstrong:
[p]eople had forgotten that all true individuality derived from God. The
genius of the individual could be used to dangerous effect if allowed
absolutely free rein. A breed of Supermen who regarded themselves as
Gods, as [later] envisaged by Nietzsche, was a frightening prospect:
people needed the challenge of a norm that transcended the whims and
notions of the moment. It was the mission of Islam to uphold the nature
of true individualism against the Western corruption of the ideal. They
had their Sufi ideal of the Perfect Man, the end of creation and the
purpose of its existence. Unlike the Superman who saw himself as
supreme and despised the rabble, the Perfect Man was characterized by
his total receptivity to the Absolute and would carry the masses along
with him (Armstrong, 1995; 419).
14 "Everyone's shit smells good to himself'. The footnote to this expression credits it
to Erasmus who links it to Aristotle's Nicomachaean Ethics, and to the
complementary adage, "Suum cuique pulchrum" (one's own is beautiful to oneself)
and acts as a condemnation of philautia (self-love).
15 Bordo here uses as the central theme of her argument the notion of "khora" found
in Plato's Timeaus. I will later show that this is also a central nation in
deconstruction. Bordo introduces it as follows: "the formless "receptacle" or "nurse"
provides the substratum of all determinate materiality. (It is also referred to as
"space" - khora - in the dialogue.) The "receptacle" is likened to a mother because
of its receptivity to impression; the father is the "source or spring" - the eternal forms
which "enter" and "stir and inform her". The child is the determinate nature which is
formed through their union: the body of nature" (Bordo, 1996; 642).
16 This is a point that is hardly lost on Freud. In his essay on Femininity his writing
style consciously mimics the subject matter he aims to address and he concludes
the paper thus:
That is all I have to say about femininity. It is certainly incomplete and
fragmentary and does not always sound friendly. But do not forget that I
have only been describing women in so far as their nature is determined
by their sexual function. It is true that that influence extends very far;
but we do not overlook the fact that an individual woman may be a
human being in other respects as well. If you want to know more about
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femininity, inquire from your own experiences of life, or turn to the poets,
or wait until science can give you deeper and more coherent information
(Freud, 1991, 432).
17 Bergson (1910) makes use of two key notions in his philosophy. The first,
relevant here, is élan vital (a sort of life force) that governs the processes of
constant change and uses effort and subtlety to overcome the resistance of matter
but is not directed by some pre-envisaged end. The second, which is more relevant
to Section Two and will be further discussed there, as Levinas draws extensively on
it to establish his notion of "Ethics as First Philosophy" (Levinas, 1994c; 81), is
duration.
18 Freud describes this game in which the young boy tries to gain control over the
appearance and disappearance of his mother in Beyond the Pleasure Principle
(Freud, 1991; 220 - 268). Freudwrites:
This good little boy, however, had an occasional disturbing habit of
taking any small objects he could get hold of and throwing them away
from him into a corner, under the bed, and so on, so that hunting for his
toys and picking them up was often quite a business. As he did this he
gave vent to a loud, long-drawn-out '0-0-0-0', accompanied by an
expression of interest and satisfaction. His mother and the writer of the
present account were agreed in thinking that this was not a mere
interjection but represented the German word 'tort ['gone']. I eventually
realized that it was a game and that the only use he made of any of his
toys was to play 'gone' with them. One day I made an observation
which confirmed my view. The child had a wooden reel with a piece of
string tied around it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor
behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did
was to hold the reel by the string and very skill fully throw it over the
edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time
uttering his expressive '0-0-0-0'. He then pulled the reel out of the cot
again by the string and hailed its reappearance with a joyful 'da' ['there'].
This, then, was the complete game - disappearance and return. As a
rule one only witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly as a
game in itself, though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure was
attached to the second act (Freud, 1991; 225).
19 How much reproductive differences between the sexes influence the way we
reason is not altogether clear. Bordo bases the distinction she makes on a historical
cultural bias that need not hold sway much longer. A change, and change in
general, favours what has traditionally been called feminine logic for it cannot be
adequately predicted or calculated. As Bordo writes:
The association of cognitive style with gender is nothing new. We find it
in ancient mythology, in archetypal psychology, in philosophical and
scientific writings, and in a host of enduring popular stereotypes about
men and woman. For example, that women are more "intuitive", that
men are more "logical", etc. What is new in the recent feminist
exploration of gender and cognitive style is an emphasis on gender as a
social construction, rather than a biological or ontological given (Bordo,
1996, 653) . . . There has perhaps been cultures in which (using our
terms now, not necessarily theirs) men thought more "like women", and
there may be a time in the future when they do so again. In our time,
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many women may be coming to think more and more "like men" (Bordo,
1996,654).
20 "it does not permit itself to be read".
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CHAPTER THREE
POSTMODERNITY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this essay postmodernity will indicate both the notion of a
contemporary modernity as put forward in the previous chapter and a re-
vision of Platonic Modernity and the Cartesian Rational bias. For Lyotard
postmodernism implies an "incredulity toward metanarratives" (Lyotard,
1991b; xxiv), the rational mechanisms developed by Modernity to ensure
"correct" thinking. To avoid becoming a metanarrative itself, postmodernity
resists its own identification as something that has surpassed or supplanted
Modernity. This resistance against attracting any kind of ultimate label has
given rise to a contemporary scene that is in fact rewriting Modernity. For
Lyotard "rewriting means resisting the writing of that .supposed postmodernity"
(Lyotard, 1991a; 35).
Hence, postmodernity is not one theory or world view that is to be brought
under the umbrella of a general theory. Rather, the form of writing most
consistent with the requirements of this scene is that of the essay,
"micrologies" or "passages" (Lyotard, 1991a; 32). Because modernity,
modern temporality', seeks to go beyond itself, to change, and not only to
exceed itself, but to resolve itself into a sort of ultimate stability, the literary
origin of Modernity, as identified by Toulmin, suggests that the "postmodern"
is always implied in what is considered modern. Modernity and
postmodernity are therefore inseparably part of the same thing. While
modernity acts as a historical stabilizer, creating metanarratives,
postmodernity acts as a historical vitalizer producing singular essays. The
straightforward political project implied in the grand narratives of
emancipation, which was driven by a myriad of small narratives, is a case in
point.
A')
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Modernity is constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with postmodernity,
which ensures it against ever reaching its goal of ultimate stability,
equilibrium or death. The postmodern impulse is what keeps Modernity
modern. As soon as the postmodern is identified, it is immediately the
modern that has given birth to the postmodern in its phenomenal ("free form"
given to sensibility) sense.
3.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF REVOLUTION
What I call "The Principle of Revolution" here, is one of the cardinal features
of Modernity with a capital letter, the Modern that oppressively denies its
postmodernity. The latter, unlike the former, has no interest in the
periodisation of its own scene. Historical periodisation belongs to an
obsession that is characteristic of Modernity. It is an attempt to situate events
in a diachrony (Lyotard, 1991a; 25). Diachrony proceeds by claiming and
cleansing the period between two exact dates, one marking the starting point
and one the end point. The period or epoch can be distinguished as
significant, as having nothing in common with what precedes it, and ditto for
what comes after, due to the unique events that transpired on the dates in
question. To surmise: the events are claimed to be unique and can
subsequently be cleansed of all remnants that might detract from the clarity of
its features. It is imperative that the points or dates demarcating such an
epoch are characterized by a quantifiable event. Hence, Modernity's
obsession with revolution. The latter provides a concept by which to think an
event so out of the ordinary that it drives a stake into the "bland" progression
of day to day existence and promises something absolutely new. Hence,
Modernity progresses and reflects on its progress by creating and recording
only extraordinary events, such as "revolutionary" discoveries in science and
technology. The day to day frivolity of life holds no lure for the Modern
historian.
Postmodernity, on the other hand, does not progress along the way of the
Principle of Revolution. Rather, as Lyotard (1991 a; 34) writes, "[p]ost-
modernity is ... the rewriting of some of the features claimed by [M]odernity,
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and first of all [M]odernity's claim to ground its legitimacy on the project of
liberating humanity as a whole through science and technology".
3.3 THE NEWTECHNOLOGIES
In Modern terms science legitimated technology by means of a metanarrative.
Since postmodernity does not legitimate technology in general, each
technology generates its own language game. The spectacular introduction
of "new technologies," otherwise known as Information Technologies, into the
production, diffusion, distribution and consumption of cultural commodities
has sparked the transformation of culture into an industry".
3.3.1 Culture of the Inhuman
The change in culture brought about by Information Technologies is most
vividly characterized by the obsessive remaking of classic stories that erases
all traces of previous connotation in a text by preempting any unexpected and
"fantasy" associations that might be brought to a reading by an audience. A
good example would be the efforts of the Walt Disney empire to retell the
classic Greek myths and tragedies in a contemporary way. It renders culture
as an obsessive fascination with the new.
The new technologies have therefore given the cult of the new a considerable
impetus. They are able to provide exact (digital) calculation in every form of
inscription (lines of computer code) producing a seamless montage of visual
and sound images, speech, musical lines, and, finally, writing itself. This is
the culture of the inhuman if we accept that to be human is more "messy" and
cannot ultimately be codified. Inhuman techno-culture however, is hard-
pressed to acknowledge anything that escapes its powers of codification.
"What is really disturbing is the importance assumed by the concept of the bit,
the unit of information. When we're dealing with bits, there's no longer any
question of free forms given here and now to sensibility and the imagination"
(Lyotard, 1991a; 34). The bit is highly seductive because of its cool ability to
store a unit of information perfectly so that retrieval is guaranteed and
instantaneous. By comparison the human capacity for memory storage and
retrieval starts to pale.
AA
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3.3.2 Bodiless Thought
In these technologies Descartes' temptation of a perfectly accessible
"bodiless thought" has found its most feverish manifestation to date. Some
would argue that the disappointment humans feel when confronted by these
inhuman organs of bodiless thought resides in the fact that they operate on a
binary logic.
Human thought does not depend on binary oppositions. It doesn't work with
units of information (bits), but with intuitive, hypothetical configurations. It
accepts imprecise, ambiguous data that does not seem to be selected
according to pre-established codes of readability. Consciousness becomes
aware of a "horizon", aims at a "noema" (the undifferentiated parts of a
phenomenon as yet un-quantified), a kind of object, a sort of non-conceptual
monogram that provides it with intuitive configurations and opens up "in front
of it" a field of orientation and expectation, a "frame" or "scheme".
Thought moves towards what it looks for by "choosing" (using among other
things rational criteria), that is, by discarding and recombining the data it
needs, but none the less without making use of pre-established criteria
determining in advance what's appropriate to choose (Lyotard, 1991a; 15). A
human, in short, is a living organization that is not only complex but rep/ex.
Replexivity means that a human being is equipped with a symbolic system
that's both arbitrary in terms of semantics and syntax, letting it be less
dependent on an immediate environment, and also "recursive", allowing it to
take into account, above and beyond raw data, the way it has of processing
such data. Replexivity can be described as a "sense of self'. According to
Lyotard (1991 a; 12 - 13) this "sense of self' is situated in a human's ability to
understand itself on four different levels. In terms of medicine it understands
itself as a "medium" through which healing can take place. In goal directed
activity it acts as an "organ" that performs a specific function. It can also
regard itself as an "object" for aesthetic as well as speculative thought. In
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logic and mathematics it can even abstract itself from itself and take into
account only its rules of processing.
More and more this replex human self is dependent on the technologies of
information and processing in order to complete the tasks of thinking. For the
human to think, at the very least, it has to breathe, eat, etc. At the very least,
it is still under an obligation to "earn a living" (Lyotard, 1991 a; 13).
Technology has none of these obligations. The human thought process,
because it does not depend on pre-established criteria but can actually place
such criteria into question, is a much richer process of becoming aware. It
also takes much longer and has unpredictable results. Due to its lack of
replexivity the inhuman completes tasks much faster and more efficiently, with
calculable results. It does not waste time trying to "find itself'. Hence, the
watchword in postmodernity is "performativity". As Lyotard says: "Technology
became important to contemporary knowledge only through the mediation of
a generalized spirit of performativity" (Lyotard, 1991 a; 12 - 13).
For humans to compete with the inhuman they have to disregard the
inefficiency of self-consciousness. Questions as to why they as specific
individuals are busy completing a task becomes subordinated to completing
the task in as little time as possible. Of course for the inhuman such
questions are not subordinated because it cannot ask them at all.
3.4 PERFORMATIVITY: A LEGITIMISING POWER-PLAY
In the absence of a legitimising metanarrative, technology provides the tools
with which one claim to truth outperforms another and increases a claim's
chances of survival.
In a similar way as classical skepticism the breakup of the Modern
metanarrative of emancipation, promising freedom through Rationality, into
an infinitude of essays , generates problems for legitimisation. Where
Descartes could fence off the skepticism of humanists with an appeal to
guaranteed access to thought, scientists after 1950, in the wake of Hiroshima
and the Nazi rise to power on a metanarrative that found "scientific"
legitimation of the use of technology in the "destiny" of the German people as
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a "historica-spiritual people" lived out through the three services of "labor",
"defense" and "knowledge", could not. Scientists have increasingly been
asked to legitimize their legitimization, in other words their Rational method.
Science has become one more language game among so many others.
3.4.1 The Dilemma of Rational Science
The Enlightenment's distinguishing characteristic IS that it grounds the
legitimization of science and truth in the autonomy of interlocutors involved in
ethical, social and political praxis. As we have seen, there are immediate
problems with this form of legitimization. The problem becomes apparent
when we look at the way language functions in statements constructing such
a legitimating narrative.
A denotative statement with cognitive value describing a thing or situation
only leads to a prescriptive statement with practical value on the grounds of
relevance. Establishing the relevance of a description to act as a prescription
therefore, depends on the competence of the person judging what is relevant
and what not. The problem, however, is that there is nothing to prove that if a
statement describing a real situation is true, it follows that a prescriptive
statement based upon it (the effect of which will necessarily be a modification
of that reality) will necessarily be just, no matter how competent the judge is.
Here, the effect of dividing reason into cognitive or theoretical reason on the
one hand, and practical reason on the other, is to attack the legitimacy of the
discourse of science as a metanarrative. In effect it says that science has no
special calling to supervise the game of praxis or the game of aesthetics, for
that matter. The game of science is thus equalised with the others (Lyotard,
1991b; 40).
3.4.2 The Production of Proof
In postmodernity the production of proof thus falls under the control of
another language game, in which the goal is no longer truth, but
performativity. In other words, proof does not mean that something has to be
true but is calculated through the most effective possible inputloutput
equation. Hence, once again, similar to the 1th century, "in the discourse of
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today's financial backers of research, the only credible goal is power"
(Lyotard, 1991b; 46). Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased
not to find truth, but to augment power". Lyotard (1991 b; 46) identifies three
distinct language games in this power play:
• denotative game (in which what is relevant is the true/false distinction)
• prescriptive game (in which the just/unjust distinction pertains)
• technical game (in which the criterion is the efficient/inefficient distinction)
Gaining power in the postmodern context means that the first two are largely
ignored or paid scant lip-service and the third is made to act as a de facto
metanarrative that has to breach all incredulity by sheer domination. "Force"
appears to belong exclusively to the last game, the game of technology. It
remains a game, however, and excludes all force operating by means of
terror. Force operating as terror establishes, what Lyotard (1988; 9) calls, the
differend, that is, an indication of what lies outside the realm of language
games or play of differing opinions. As he (Lyotard, 1988; 9) says: "I would
like to call a differend [différendj the case where the plaintiff is divested of the
means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim". The efficacy of such
force is based entirely on the threat to eliminate the opposing player, not on
making a better "move" than he. Whenever efficiency (that is, obtaining the
desired effect) is derived from a "Sayar do this, or else you'll never speak
again," then we are in the realm of terror, and the social bond is destroyed.
3.4.3 Controlling the Context or Being Right
Performativity, the technical language game coupled with the efficiency
provided by superior technology, increases the ability to produce proof, and
subsequently also increases the ability to be right. The technical criterion,
introduced on a massive scale into scientific knowledge, cannot fail to
influence the truth criterion. The same can be said of the relationship
between justice and performance. The probability that an order would be
pronounced just is said to increase with its chances of being implemented,
which would in turn increase with the performance capability of the
prescriber. Hence, in postmodernity the "normativity of laws is replaced by
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the performativity of procedures" (Lyotard, 1991b; 46 - 47) which has "context
control" as its ultimate goal. In other words, the most efficient language game
in a given context gains de facto legitimation and does not have to explain
itself any further. And as we have seen neither the denotative game that has
truth as its aim or the prescriptive game that has justice as aim is regarded as
efficient in postmodernity. They have to be either supplemented or entirely
supplanted by the technical game.
The technical language game creates a virtual reality of jargon that describes
the existence and operation of certain technologies. Because this is the most
efficient language game it drives out any contenders. The way it describes a
context is the way "reality" will look. By merely adopting the jargon one is
already speaking the "truth" and because the operating procedures are so
efficient they are considered to be just by default. The reality of the
technological language game is narrowed down to include only "what works",
whatever that might be.
Technology has a way of promoting itself. Through information technology a
world in which technology in general provides the best solutions to problems
is propagated. Those individuals who are most skilled at making use of the
technologies on offer are celebrated as hero's and rewarded accordingly.
The exorbitant amounts of money attracted by sports stars, the ultimate
skilled performers, testify for this claim. A world, and any possible context in
that world, is propagated where all problems disappear through technological
solutions, whether that is a pill for impotence, or mass-manufacturing of
hamburgers. The only criteria to which proof of technological success has to
adhere in postmodernity is that it works. Often, the limited sense in which it
worked and possible side effects are disregarded. We have to look closer at
what it means for something to have worked as a solution. For this reason
we have to look closer at what it means to "prove" something.
3.4.4 Proving the Proof
Lyotard (1991 b; 24). provides three criteria to which a statement acting as
proof has to adhere in order to be considered legitimate:
Aa
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• the sender should speak the truth about the referent (reality).
• it should be possible for the addressee validly to give (or refuse) his assent
to the statement he hears.
• the referent is supposed to be "expressed" by this statement in conformity
with what it actually is.
The rule of adequation (law of identity) becomes problematical. What I say is
true because I prove that it is but what proof is there that my proof is true?
The scientific solution of this difficulty, says Lyotard (1991 b; 24), consists in
the observance of two rules:
• a referent is that which is susceptible to proof and can be used as
evidence in a debate. Not: I can prove something because reality is the
way I say it is. But: as long as I can produce proof, it is permissible to think
that reality is the way I say it is, and,
• the same referent cannot supply a plurality of contradictory or inconsistent
proofs.
Thus science and its laws are legitimised on the basis of their efficiency in
producing referents that can be used as proof. In turn this efficiency is
legitimised on the basis of science and law. . It is precisely this context
control, establishing the context by efficiently producing proof of its
limitations, that a generalized computerization of society may bring.
The performativity of an utterance, be it denotative or prescriptive, increases
proportionally to the amount of information about its referent (reality) one has
at one's disposal. The relationship between science and technology is
reversed. Science no longer provides the truth about a referent rather
technology provides an abundance of information that allows one to force
less informed opinions out of consideration. The quest for more information
necessitates greater sophistication in the means of obtaining proof, and that
in turn benefits performativity in accordance with this "logic of power growth
based on the acquisition of more efficient technology" (Lyotard, 1991 b; 47).
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.4.5 Skills in the Performativity Driven Environment
The sophistication of a performativity driven environment necessitates two
kinds of skill identified by Lyotard (1991 b; 48). The first kind is more
specifically designed to tackle world competition. "Specialities" in different
fields are created to sell on the world market as expert skills for high and
middle management executives. "Telematics", operation of information
technology, such as computers, receive priority in education, medicine and
biology.
The second kind fulfills society's own needs, maintaining its internal
cohesion. It implies the formation and dissemination of a general model of
life, most often legitimated by the emancipation narrative
The question now asked is no longer "Is it true?" but "What use is it?" In the
context of the mercantilization of knowledge, more often than not this
question is equivalent to: "Is it saleable?" And in the context of power-growth:
"Is it efficient?" Having competence in a performance-orientated skill does
indeed seem saleable in the conditions described above, and it is efficient by
definition. What no longer makes the grade is competence as defined by
other criteria like true/false, just/unjust, etc. and, of course, low performativity
in general.
3.5 POSTMODERN REALITY
A near all-pervasive notion in postmodernity is that reality is mediated,
produced, by technology and that this has brought on a crisis in
representation (Hutcheon; 1991; 31). In a society where performativity is
ubiquitous and technology is used to establish and control reality it is no
surprise to find that images proliferate and compete veraciously for attention.
The idea that reality is a simulation, that our environment has become a
virtual-reality is the extreme thesis that Jean 8audrillard attempts to work out.
For him this is nowhere more apparent than in the realm of television.
1:;1
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3.5.1 Reality as a Television Screen
The faster the flow of pictures on the TV screen and the greater the amount
of channels the happier the postmodern individual considers himself to be.
Scanning images and channels is considered the height of entertainment. It
provides a fascinating variety of experience, at a breath-taking pace in an
endless play of simulation. It also provides freedom from responsibility for
anything seen. Baudrillard identifies a flaneur that is tied to an armchair in
front of the TV set. The stroller does not stroll any more rather it is the TV
images, TV commercials, the goods and joys they advertise who stroll, and
run, and flow in front of the hypnotized viewer. Viewing is the only activity left
to the former stroller. "Baudelaire's stroller has turned into Baudrillard's
watcher" (Bauman, 1994a; 155).
The scoptophiliac flaneur is transfixed before the seduction of the television
set that promises a total overall picture. It is within this promise of
omnipotence that the watcher seeks to find the one thing that characterizes
postmodern reality: disappearance.
For Baudrillard the Television set is a desert of images in which can be found
"an ecstatic critique of culture, an ecstatic form of disappearance" (Bauman,
1994a; 154). The most bizarre disappearance of all is that of death, the
principle of Evil. "Rather than a mortal mode of disappearance, a fractal
mode of dispersal" (Baudrillard, 1993c; 4). This disappearance of evil, itself
evil in the sense of dispersing ignorance as "anything goes", provides an
opportunity for an anarchic ethics. Over-stimulated by images of possible
ethical configurations the watcher is tempted to tryout ever changing forms of
ethical interaction without the burden of memory tying him to anyone option.
In postmodernity ethics can be changed like fashion.
3.5.2 A Fractal Seduction
The image of a television in every house shaping its occupants view of life
according to a programmed code recalls for Baudrillard the notion of a fractal.
Fractals provide a geometry that can deal with more complicated needs for
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representation but still makes distinctions between useful and useless
information in an arbitrary way. It is a more powerful calculation and for that
reason very seductive, but is not for this reason less indifferent to human
needs. This fractal dispersal has the cold quality of an unbreakable
mathematical object. It generates itself infinitely and perfectly by feeding the
results of its equation back into the variables of its algorithm in an infinite
unbreakable loop that creates ever more complicated patterns. It is the
statistical calculation of the ratio with which things disappear in order to
reappear in a mutated or digitally "morphed" form elsewhere in the system.
This is the promise of perpetual reappearance, reversability, eternal life, the
end of death. The alternative, "fragility, which belongs to the realm of
appearances" (Baudrillard, 1990; 122), itself disappears leaving appearances
under perfect control of the fractal. This promise of the end of death is what
gives TV the power to fascinate the viewer more completely than the cinema.
"Television knows no night. It is perpetual day. TV embodies our fear of the
dark, of the night, of the other side of things. It is the incessant light, the
incessant lighting, which puts an end to the alternating round of day and
night" (Baudrillard, 1990; 169).
TV is inherently conservative because it depends on "soundbites" to get its
message across. In the same way that fractal mathematics is used to factor
out unnecessary information and free up more bandwidth in the transmission
of digitised images via the internet, "soundbites" factor out free play and
excess meaning. Fractals seduce with its apparent complexity and ability to
be self perpetuating in a systematic way. The television is seductive in a
similar way, it also promises complexity and everlasting life but in a controlled
way that never lets the watcher experience his actual powerlessness to live
up to the standards set by the medium. In actuality the watcher has a body
that takes time to heal after being punched and cannot get up again after its
been shot through the heart. Also, the situations in which this body might find
itself always has an unpredictable quality and cannot be negotiated with the
cool detachment of a consciousness that later edits the bits that don't fit.
3.5.3 Disappearance or the Deterioration of Sign and Image
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In order to create a scenario for the phenomenon of disappearance in
postmodernity Baudrillard works with the deterioration of two key concepts,
the image and the sign. Baudrillard thinks that the difference between
"original" and "copy" is "entirely redundant". This is in keeping with his belief
that the only way to prevent the social system from imploding according to the
law of entropy, is to take up an extreme theoretical position. He suggests that
an extreme position aims to "[pj/ay out the end of things, offer a complete
parody of it ... even if things are not really at their end, well! Let's act as if
they were. It's a game, a provocation. Not in order to put a full stop to
everything but, on the contrary, to make everything begin again" (Baudrillard,
1993a; 133).
The deterioration of image and sign leaves reality to be explained in terms of
a "single brutal sign which exists in its purest state and which goes through
the universe, simply reproducing itself, constantly and forever" (Baudrillard,
1993a; 141). This brutal sign is the simulacrum of which the fractal is the
mathematical metaphor. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation
by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole
edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum.
Baudrillard (1983; 11) provides a synopsis of the progression that led to this
state of affairs. The deterioration follows the successive phases of the image
and the sign:
• it is the reflection of a basic reality
• it masks and perverts a basic reality
• it masks the absence of a basic reality
• it bears no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum
In the latter instance the simulacrum, having no relation to any basic reality,
is reproduced (produced as an "original" that has no original) by means of
different codes. Simulation and models are the exemplars of pure
reproduction. By means of the "code" reality can be bypassed and a
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simulacrum can mark the place of its disappearance. Bypassed reality allows
a curious potential to emerge: reversibility.
Given that the origin in reproduction is the principle of generation, and not the
object generated, complete reversability is possible: the last "original"
produced can be perfectly reproduced. Difference between the real and its
representation is erased. Reversability implies that death does not really
happen because an exact copy merely takes the place of the previous copy
and no one knows, or cares, if the "previous" "copy" might have been the
original.
Generalised simulation and reverseability is accompanied by the death of all
essential isms. One of the symptoms of this is that opposites begin to
collapse and "everything becomes undecideable": the beautiful and the ugly
in fashion, the left and the right in politics, the true and the false in the media,
the useful and the useless at the level of objects, nature and culture, all these
become interchangeable in the era of reproduction and simulation. All
finalities disappear; nothing is outside the system, which becomes a
tautology.
Baudrillard (1983; 83) identifies three kinds of simulation that developed at
stages during history:
• counterfeit - classical Renaissance
• production - industrial era
• simulation by means of the code - post-industrial era
The "code" Baudrillard (1983; 103) has in mind refers not to a single master
code but to the principle of generation that produces copies perfectly and is
triggered by the ubiquitous codes that pervade our society, for example:
• binary code of computer technology
• DNA code in biology
• digital code in television and sound recording
• code in information technology ("bar code")
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The reign of the simulacrum as the sign (non-sign) into which all other signs
flow means that no human economy can be reduced to a putative utilitarian
base, with equilibrium being its normal state. Waste is inevitably generated
in the drive for prestige as the sign becomes a symbol of status.
In postmodern socio-economic reality human beings do not search for
happiness or equality but by means of the consumption of codes differentiate
themselves through systems of signs. Life-styles and values, not economic
need, is the basis of social life in postmodernity. Analogous to Lyotard's
observation an analysis of consumption in terms of signs and symbols
undermines the validity of the distinction between true and false, artificial and
real needs. Because signs can be infinitely produced and manipulated they
cannot be withheld from circulation as the aspect of their performativity forces
them onto the scene. The object itself has no inherent value but can be
made to play, signify in relation to other objects. "In order to generate the
meaning of a sign, not only that sign, but the whole system, is involved - the
meaning is distributed ... In a system of distributed semiotics the sign is
constituted by the sum of its relationships to other signs" (Cilliers, 1998a; 81).
In such systems signs and images have no scarcity value. There is a
constant production, overproduction of signs. There is a constant threat of
deflation of prices in a postmodern market. But there is not necessarily a
concomitant overproduction of meaning. Meaning becomes a scarce
commodity which experts, the envois of modernity, dispense at ever inflating
prices. As Lyotard has pointed out, the expert will be more believable if he
can back his claims up by means of technology or if he has access to
information technology, as all the guests who flaunt their books and
knowledge on the Oprah Show will undoubtedly attest. The importance of the
content of the programming has to play second fiddle to what is considered of
utmost importance namely the "technological fix" (Bauman, 1994b; 187). The
mere fact that information is delivered by means of the coolest new gadget
permeates the contents with a sense of meaningfulness.
In other words, the work of the expert is to calculate, by using the most
sophisticated technology available, the "sum" of the relationships one sign
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has with another. This can only be done if all information about the sign's
relationships are available. The quest for maximized surveillance and
statistical data is a characteristic of the modern search for meaning, the
search for reality. In a postmodern environment the notion of a search is
abandoned and meaning and reality is produced by surveillance and
information in the form of statistics.
Individuals lose their uniqueness and become mere statistics. This process
leads to a deterioration in the individuals ability to take personal responsibility
for his actions. In a world where nothing is real and death and economic
need has disappeared behind the efficiency of technology driven lifestyles
the individual cannot relate to the seriousness of his actions. This inability to
identify personal responsibility presents a challenge to the very core of
ethics.
3.6 THE ARTIST POLITICIAN: OBJECTIVE IRONY
It is not a matter of taking up a critical position outside of the discourse of
consumption. That is to say, if it is at all possible to imagine an outside. All
discourses and all dialectics are in principle consumable, in larger quantities
and less, and inevitably generate revenue, including capital.
Instead Baudrillard suggests an artistic approach that he borrows from
Baudelaire's idea of the "absolute commodity". Baudrillard suggests that "the
modern artist should not try to revalorize, resacrilize traditional art or
aesthetics, but go further into the commodity the modern artist owes it to
himself to give the commodity a heroic status " (Baudrillard, 1993b; 148).
Thus, an anti-discourse must be achieved within the sentimental discourse of
consumption. The exalted discourse of abundance must be duplicated by a
critique of consumer society, even to the point where advertising intentionally
parodies advertising. The society of consumption can then also be the
society of the denunciation of consumption in the form of objective irony. This
form of criticism resides inside the object or commodity itself and is produced
with it. Baudri liard (1993a; 143) writes that:
t:."7
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· .. today we have a form of irony which is objective ... It can no
longer be exercised as if from outside of things. Instead, it is the
objective irony which arises from within things themselves - it is an
irony which belongs to the system, and it arises from the system
itself because the system is constantly functioning against itself.
Baudrillard suggests two political strategies in which the idea of objective
irony takes on a political force. Firstly, what he calls fatal theory seeks to
rediscover the subject's death and destiny, by implementing secondly, the
notion of Seduction in the sense that the subject is dominated by the
ungraspable irony of the object, which fascinates it completely and to which it
is both morbidly attracted, in spite of itself, and at the same time repulsed.
The irony of the object lies in the fact that it never delivers what it promises.
It seduces by promising but never delivering satisfaction. In this sense the
consumer is caught up in a game where sooner or later he has to realise the
extent to which he has exhausted his powers in pursuit of satisfaction and
that the promise of satisfaction is empty. For Baudrillard this reintroduces a
consideration of death and of evil. It is a strategy that forces consideration of
the fatal consequences of our actions into the sphere of television, fractals
and the simulacra. The objects that we use in order to deceive ourselves into
believing that we will not die and that the individual has no responsibility for
the fragility and death of the other is brought into plain sight by Baudrillard's
strategy that exposes the futility of consumer driven happiness.
Baudrillard demonstrates, by way of pushing consumer phenomena to the
extreme, the very real consequences of changes in symbolic and material
forms, and this is important in a world increasingly dominated by media hype
and obsfucation.
What the artist politician understands and has to use to her advantage, is that
to conceive of a utopian society based on communication is an impossibility.
Communication results, precisely, from a society's inability to set for itself
new goals and to transcend itself by achieving them. Information shares this
characteristic. Excess knowledge is dispersed arbitrarily in every direction on
&:.0
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the surface of screens. But this information is not subject to a pre-
established law of meaning. Instead it is only subject to commutation.
In a communication society participants in dialogue interface each other
through a connection. The simulacrum of the other interlocuter can only be
rooted in reality as an electric plug in a socket. People are replaced by
screens and terminals. It is almost as if dialogue takes place between
different terminals or between different media. In a way the medium
converses with itself in an intense circulation, an auto-referentiality of media
which incorporates us in its network. Baudrillard (1993b; 146) calls this
network an "integrated man-machine circuit". Communication "occurs" by
means of a sole instantaneous circuit of electronic media mutating as it goes
along. For it to be "good" communication it must take place fast and without
pause in order to mutate constantly into ever refreshed versions of itself.
Silence is banished from the world inhabited by screens; it has no place in
communication. But silence, as a form of objective irony, is exactly that blip
in the circuitry, a minor catastrophe, a slip which, on television for instance,
becomes highly meaningful. "It is a break laden with anxiety and jubilation,
which confirms the fact that all this communication is basically nothing but a
rigid script, an uninterrupted fiction designed to free us not only from the void
of the television screen but equally from the void of our own mental screen"
(Baudrillard, 1993c; 13).
For Baudrillard, all figures of otherness in the end, boil down to just one: that
of the Object. All that is left is the "inexorability of the Object, the
irrideemability of the Object" (Baudrillard, 1993c; 172). Baudrillard suggests
a politics of the Object. As we have seen, power, the ability to be tolerant,
exists solely by virtue of its symbolic ability to designate the Other, the
Enemy, what is at stake, what threatens us, what is Evil. For Descartes this
power lay in the certainty of rational thought. Lyotard described how power is
gained through performativity. But, performativity makes no real distinctions
between "enemy" and "friend", it takes whatever it needs to improve its own
efficiency from whomever has it on offer. In other words it disregards the
object as something that holds surprise in itself.
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For Baudrillard however, the Object is exiting, because the Object is the point
at which the subject vanishes. "The object is what theory can be for reality
not a reflection but a challenge. This, potentially, is the way to go in search
of otherness" (Baudrillard, 1993c; 173). Baudrillard's strategy might restore a
sense for the need for personal responsibility in the face of an object that
challenges the subject to move beyond itself and consider ethics but he does
not provide a way of dealing with the return of evil, dealing with death. He
provides nothing more than the starting point, the realisation of a need for
postmodern ethics. Zygmunt Bauman (1994b) attempts to think the
possibilities opened up by such a beginning.
3.7 POSTMODERN ETHICS
As we have seen Modernity regulated moral conduct by subsuming it to a
large extent under the legislative and law-enforcing activity of global societal
institutions (The Church and the University) responsible for correct thinking.
"This condition does not hold anymore; ethical discourse is not institutionally
pre-empted and hence its conduct and resolution (or irresolution) must be an
organic part of any theoretical model of postmodernity" (Bauman, 1994a;
201).
The ethical paradox of the postmodern condition is that it restores to agents
the fullness of moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving
them of the comfort of the universal guidance that modern self-confidence
once promised. Ethical tasks of individuals grow while the socially produced
resources to fulfill them shrink. Moral responsibility comes together with the
loneliness of moral choice (Bauman, 1994a; xxii).
3.7.1 A Difficult Ethics
Bauman (1994a; 202) says that the distinctly postmodern ethical paradox
arises primarily from two features of the postmodern scene:
• pluralism of authority, and
• the centrality of choice in the self-constitution of postmodern agents
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An authority that (attempts to) conforms to the logic of "passages", in other
words, an authority without universalizing and globalizing ambitions, has a
two-fold effect:
First, it rules out the binding norms that each "agency" must (or could be
reasonably expected to) obey. Rules emerge mostly as reactions to strife
and consequences of ensuing negotiations. However, the already negotiated
rules remain by and large precarious and under-determined, while the need
for new rules keep proliferating.
Secondly, in the absence of a "principle of coordination" the negotiation of
rules must assume a distinctly ethical character. What is expected is non-
utilitarian self-constraint on the part of autonomous agencies. Both non-utility
and autonomy define moral action as distinct from either self-interested or
legally prescribed conduct.
Thus, the pluralism of authorities is conducive to the resumption by agents of
moral responsibility. Moral responsibility tend to be neutralized when
agencies (subjects?) are subordinated to a unified, quasi-monopolistic
legislating authority. "Having become perforce subjects of a dialogue, they
must now refer to principles wide enough to command authority of the sort
that belongs solely to ethical values" (Bauman, 1994a; 202).
In the absence of Absolute Law the enhanced autonomy of the agents has a
twofold effect for ethics:
Firstly, postmodern ethics is characterised by a preoccupation with self-
determination. Autonomy is the defining trait of the postmodern agent. This
autonomy manifests as self-monitoring, self-reflection and self-evaluation and
are the mechanisms synonymous with self constitution.
Secondly, the limits of the agent whose autonomy is to be observed and
preserved turn into a most closely guarded and hotly contested frontier. How
far are the autonomous powers of the agent to extend and at what point is
their limit to be drawn?
On the postmodern scene, the agent is not just an actor and decision-maker,
but a moral subject. As Bauman (1994a; 202) says: "Only ethical principles
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offer such criteria of value-assessment and value-choice as are at the same
time supra-individual (carry an authority admittedly superior to that of
individual self-preservation), and fit to be used without surrendering the
agent's autonomy". Postmodern existence, in the sense that it is an ironic
objectivity, demands "that the agent be a morally competent subject"
(Bauman, 1994a; 203). There is no way out of this responsibility. There is no
legislating authority that can take the blame for making bad rules. There is
no excuse like "I was just doing my job" or "I merely followed orders".
3.7.2 Practical Tolerance
This ethical dialogue cannot depend on any obvious social agencies that may
guide the choice between indifference and solidarity, the two sharply
opposed versions of postmodern tolerance. The choice will eventually have
to be practical and do without the support of philosophical assurances.
Which form the postmodern tolerance will take is in no way guaranteed in
advance (Bauman, 1994a; xxiii).
Behind the postmodern ethical paradox hides a genuine practical dilemma:
acting on one's moral convictions is naturally pregnant with a desire to win for
such convictions an ever more universal acceptance however, every attempt
to do just that smacks of the already discredited bid for domination. The
"moral law" that prescribes conduct to which every individual must conform at
the expense of autonomy leads, paradoxically, to indifference in ethical
matters (Bauman, 1994a; xxiii).
It is not easy to find the golden mean between colonizing temptations
(fundamentalist faith and fascistic expansionism) and the selfishness of tribal
self-closure (the gang and patriotism). None of the alternatives seem to be
an attractive proposition, yet none of their mixtures promises to be foolproof
and, above all, stands a chance of persevering (Bauman, 1994a; xxiv).
On the postmodern scene ethics can only stand a chance of achieving any
form of credibility if it becomes a strategy of "radical antagonism", a "play
upon reality", the "issuing of a challenge to the teer an attempt to "put the
real, quite simply, on the spot" (Baudrillard, 1993a; 140).
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This means that the simulacrum itself must be confronted. The system of
signs must be infiltrated and made to signify ethically. If reality is the effect of
the "sign and the system of reference is only the result of the power of the
sign itself' (Baudrillard, 1993a; 141) then the sign itself must be interrupted
by ethics.
In working out a program for ethics one should however, not lose sight of the
moral character of the individual. The anarchic ethics of postmodernity may
be too much to bear in the long run but, reason alone cannot replace the
spontaneous action that a good deed requires. As we have seen in the
previous chapter, Reason has come to be closely connected with Modernity
and the narrowing effect it implies. Bauman (1994b; 247) unfortunately works
with the notion of reason as a Modernist construct and is thus unable to think
of reason as being of ethical and moral significance: "Reason is about making
correct decisions, while moral responsibility precedes all thinking about
decisions as it does not, and cannot care about any logic which would allow
the approval of an action as correct".
In chapter six the argument will be made that reason has to return in order to
produce good moral judgment. One cannot merely depend on an emotive
"unfounded, non-rational, un-arguable, no-excuses-given and non-calculable
urge" (Bauman, 1994b; 247) to provide appropriate moral conduct.
3.8 SUMMARY
Postmodern ethics does not provide a system of rules by way of which each
individual knows how to act responsibly. It provides an anarchic environment
in which differing notions of ethics compete with each other. It is a situation
that is complicated by the proliferation of technology and its enhancement of
performativity. This situation provides a unique opportunity, the most
redeeming aspect of postmodernity, for individual responsibility to take effect.
However, it is not an easy endeavor because the guarantees of rule following
are absent. If Modern ethics is considered a rule based system, postmodern
ethics tends towards absolute chaos and an "anything goes" approach in
which the one with the most sophisticated technology calls the shots.
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Neither of these approaches to ethics is satisfactory. In the following
chapters we will look at the complex possibilities that present themselves if
an attempt is made to think about ethics as residing between absolute rules
of conduct on the one hand and absolute chaos and moral amnesia on the
other hand.
NOTES
1 Modern temporality is that which under Modernitywith a capital "M" turns malignant
in its megalomaniac attempts to make time stand still.
2 It is my contention that Modernity is the tyranny of the same that allows no change
and resists it with force. This principled resistance is met by a counter force directly
opposed that is intent on change, The Principle of Revolution.
3 I will not use the term "culture industry" here to express what the Frankfurt School
regarded as the "capitalist" attempt at "hegemony". This I believe is a facile
conclusion. That "capitalism" is able to guarantee the stability of the capitalist
system by imposing a "system of values" aimed at "ensuring a conformity upon its
recipients and driving out all oppositional, resistant ways of thinking" (Campbell and
Kean, 1997; 283) depends on a simplistic notion of what a system is. It does not
take into account the many ways in which the system adapts to the activities that
feed into it and changes because of it.
4 This is an external power. Once again it is a power aimed at dominating what is
perceived as a threatening and chaotic world.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EMMANUEL LEVINAS
A "RADICAL" ETHICAL POSITION
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The Jewish scholar Franz Rosensweig was interested in bringing the traditions
of Philosophy and the Old Testament into conversation with each other and was
for this reason one of Levinas' most prominent early influences. Rosenzweig
arguably provides the best introduction to Levinas' work. The following provides
a good common sense description of his personal standpoint on the possibility of
thinking:
I really believe that a philosophy, to be adequate, must rise out of
thinking that is done from the personal standpoint of the thinker. To
achieve being objective, the thinker must proceed boldly from his
own subjective situation. The single condition imposed upon us by
objectivity is that we survey the entire horizon; but we are not
obliged to make this survey from any position other than the one in
which we are, nor are we obliged to make it from no position at all.
Our eyes are, indeed, only our own eyes; yet it would be folly to
imagine we must pluck them out in order to see straight (Glatzer,
1972; 179).
This chapter follows Levinas as he complicates matters for the personal
standpoint by introducing the notion of an association with the "proximity" of the
other. The inquiry focuses specifically on the question of justice regarding the
position of an "I" or ego in relation to what Levinas calls the "other", my
neighbour, and also the "Other" as the world in general or God'.
65
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
For Levinas it is "[s]peaking, rather than 'letting be,' [that] solicits the Other"
(Levinas, 1994a; 195). This solicitation into face-ta-face discourse opens a site
where ethics, through the responsibility of interlocutors for each other, can take
place.
Levinas is convinced that this meeting of faces is the expression of a desire for
that which transcends self-centred categories of understanding. For him,
categories, the pigeon-holes in which acquired knowledge are ordered to make
sense, merely seek to assimilate the other and make use of him, in the process
disrespecting the fact that the other always remains, in some way, outside the
sphere of what can be known. Hence, ethics manifests as the desire to break
with these categories of prejudice in the instant of meeting, face-ta-face.
However, the ethical desire awakened in the instant of meeting is infinite and
does not meet with satisfaction in any simple sense. By way of analogy it might
be compared with the desire of an artist to express an object in a rendering. The
desire to know the other as object is caught in a sublime double movement
between melancholy and iouisence? It is the desire to take part in the
contingency of the concrete world of which the mind carries only a reflection. As
Levinas explains:
The basic difference is between a mode of thought which tries to
gather all things around the mind, or self, of the thinker, and an
externally oriented mode which attempts to penetrate into what is
radically other than the mind that is thinking it. This difference
emerges with peculiar clarity in the case of my meeting with the other
person (Levinas, 1994b; 16).
This entails an ethics that relies on the use of senses and metaphors in human
relationships that supplement those of sight. An ethics that urges an exploration
with eyes closed, unafraid of the dark relying on a "[s]peech [that] cuts across
vision" (Levinas, 1994b; 195).
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This chapter will look at the way in which Levinas thinks of philosophy and the
old testament tradition respectively. Having surveyed the territory, the notion of
"Ethics as First Philosophy" can be introduced. The most important aspect of
Levinas's ethics is the face-ta-face relation. Without this complex interaction
there can be no ethics or subsequent justice. We will look specifically at what
Levinas means by "face".
For Levinas, language and rationality are linked and makes it possible for faces
to interact. We will look at his claim that neither language nor rationality
establishes or grounds ethics but rather, that the relationship is reversed. We
will also look at Levinas's attempt to overcome his own ontological language
use, threatening to end the ethical relation, by focusing on the notions of "said"
and "saying". The ethical relationship depends on the singular individual
substituting himself for the other in language. We will look at what this means
for the identity of the "self'. This leads to a consideration of the social context,
designated by Levinas as "the third party". .
Lastly this chapter will consider criticism of Levinas on three fronts. Firstly, that
he attempts to ground ethics in a mystical religious metaphysics. Secondly, that
he denies a place to woman as significant participants in an ethical relation.
And thirdly, that he denies the artificiality of his own project.
4.2 BETWEEN TWO TRADITIONS: PHILOSOPHYAND THE OLD
TESTAMENT
Hebraism and Hellenism, - between these two points of influence
moves our world. At one time it feels more powerfully the
attraction of one of them, at another time of the other; and it ought
to be, though it never is, evenly and happily balanced between
them (Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy) (Derrida, 1993f; 79).
The quote above is placed at the start of Derrida's essay on Levinas called
Violence and Metaphysics. It acts to illustrate what Levinas considers the
Western world to consist of. It is this oscillation that Levinas tries to come to
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grips with in his ethics. Of the Western world, as reflected in the traditions of the
Bible and the Greeks, Levinas says: "[d]espite the end of Europocentrism,
disqualified by so many horrors, I believe in the eminence of the human face
expressed in Greek Letters and in our own, which owe the Greeks everything. It
is thanks to them that our history makes us ashamed" (Nemo, 1985; 117). And
further: "though it's a dangerous thing to say publicly, ... humanity consists of
the Bible and the Greeks. All the rest can be translated: all the rest - all the
exotic - is dance" (Mortley, 1991; 18).
These are highly problematic statements if one considers that Levinas wants to
break with prejudice to allow specifically the "exotic", the "rest", to furnish the
individual with a concrete experience. Levinas seems to be saying that concrete
experience can only be regarded as "experience" if it is translated back into an
understandable idiom.
Literature, for Levinas, has the right quality, unlike the hard, neutral, concepts of
philosophy, to attempt the translation of experience, and specifically the unique
experience of a "face". As he says: "Across all literature the human face speaks
- or stammers, or gives itself a countenance, or struggles with its caricature"
(Nemo, 1985; 117).
An archetypal scene in Western literature describes the misunderstanding
between two lovers engaged in a relationship so possessive that it attempts to
exclude all interference. In the ever hopeful story of Romeo and Juliet the lovers
inevitably meet with their death. The irreducible face-to-face relationship of the
lovers, one-on-one, excludes the world-of-faces in which their relationship has
no place, to privilege only each other's face. Inevitably the exclusion turns
violent because the encryption of the relationship is untenable for a responsible
life within society as a whole. As Levinas says: "there is a sense in which my
relationship with another is in conflict with my relationship with a third party ... I
cannot live in society on the basis of this one-to-one responsibility alone"
(Mortley, 1991; 18).
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/The analogy of the lovers serve to illuminate a tendency throughout the tradition
of philosophy to favour only the rational and the purely theoretical. Theory
cannot risk being disturbed by the messiness and unpredictability of concrete
social interaction. In this sense philosophy is obsessed with the purity of its
theory in the way two lovers would be about the exclusivity of their love. As
Levinas says:
In western philosophy, sociality is regarded almost as a
coincidence, which is a failure. A coincidence which failed to
realise its potential: and there's a whole theme of western
philosophy, and western literature as well, which is devoted to
disappointment in love. Lovers misunderstand each other. They
don't coincide, they are alien to each other. In my view sociality
should be regarded as the excellence of the human species:
sociality is worth more than solitude (Mortley, 1991; 20-21).
For Levinas, the interruption of theory, as with the lover's relationship, is exactly
what can save it from having to resort to violence. Hence, he characterises the
ethical relationship as marked by infinite interruption. Whereas philosophy
seeks to close itself up in a perfect theory the tradition of the old testament
always seeks to deal in one way or another with failure. For Levinas "the Jewish
contribution in philosophy always comes with the appearance of the ethical as
being of prime importance" (Mortley, 1991; 20). Thus, the old testament tradition
interrupts the perfect theories of philosophy by introducing the notion of "society"
as being of prime importance.
The flux of interruptions, of faces presenting themselves, are brought under
some control through words offered to the other. The proximity of the face is not
only about understanding the other, but also means essocietio« with him. This
association is not a Rational endeavour that aims to put the other into
submission or forces him to acknowledge my superior knowledge. In this sense
it does not take its que from Plato or Aristotle but from something older.
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Aristotle reverts to an appeal to reason, albeit sensitive to context, on which to
base ethics. For him reason is what is essential to the individual, as he says:
Indeed this Principle (pure philosophical contemplation) would seem
actually to be (the "Self' of) each man, in that it is the authoritative
(sovereign) and better (supreme in goodness) part of him. So it
would be strange (absurd) if he were to choose not the life of his
own self, but that of something else (of some other) .... everything
finds best (proper) and pleasantest what is truly (naturally) its own.
For men, therefore, the life of reason (pure intellect) is the best and
pleasantest (since reason more than anything else is man) - and
consequently the happiest also (Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics
Book X, chapter vii").
However, something has to be capable of this thought before it becomes a self,
conscious of its own sovereignty. For Levinas reason is not what fosters man's
happiness. On the contrary reason is tainted with guilt because it distracts man
from ethical interaction that precedes consciousness and seduces him away
from society into a fabricated world of the mind. Hence, "individuals exist;
cognition yields only generalities. The operations of the understanding are in
and of themselves tainted with guilt. It is not difficult to detect the biblical origin
of the view that the appearance of knowledge portends a loss of innocence"
(Wyschogrod, 1974; 91). Guilt arises out of not partaking in the actuality of the
world. In order to contemplate, to reason, one has to remove oneself from
practical matters. This can be done in absolute solitude. According to Aristotle
happiness can be slowly attained through this process of awakening Reason
and theory. As Levinas says:
The culmination of this sort of philosophy lies in contemplation ...
of pure essence. Transcending the otherness of the world, and its
alien character, through a kind of knowledge which makes it
accessible to human thought. Happiness itself, the aspiration of
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man, is thought to lie in understanding and the peace of truth
(Mortley, 1991; 20).
Later in this chapter it will become clear how reason's resolution of this guilt
takes the form of a theoretical identity, of which nationalism is the most extreme
example, that allows theory an uninterrupted participation in the world. Not only
is Aristotle's theory of being through knowledge a "total ising" structure that
admits to nothing outside, it is also an insular theory that holds the wise man to
be one that can practice contemplation by himself. Aristotelian Reason is
insular, dependent only on the being who thinks it, an activity that is
disinterested and self-sufficient. It needs no others.
Levinas acknowledges that the progression of Reason is subtle, and that it does
initially admit to an outside, alterity or other, but by progressing rapidly it seeks
to close in, to grasp' (tassen) onto the "unknown" and force it down to
understanding. Levinas (1994b; 42) describes this progression as follows:
Knowledge designates first a relation with being such that the
knowing being lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its
alterity and without marking it in any way whatever by this cognitive
relation ... [but] theory ... designates comprehension (intelligence) -
the logos of being - that is, a way of approaching the known being
such that its alterity with regard to the knowing being vanishes.
Levinas makes a distinction between "thinking" and "knowledge". Thinking is a
vital process of dealing with the world and survival. It flows forth from a living
being, whereas knowledge is stagnant and forces the movement of life into a
pre-packaged form. This force is compared with grasping or gripping something
tightly. Levinas is adamant that the process of understanding is an alienation
from the realities of life and that "this [grasping] is not something applied like a
form of magic to the 'impotent spirituality' of thinking, nor is it the guarantee of
certain psycho-psychological conditions" (Levinas, 1994a;76). Rather, it is the
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product of a sustained denial of sociability. The consequent lack of respect for
that which is other and will always escape from insular contemplation and theory
is then made manifest in the violence needed to secure the insulated theory
against the disruptive forces of being (otherness), that is always unpredictable.
Insulated theory, pure reason, has the ability to give the individual the feeling of
freedom, unconnected to anything outside of the sphere of reason. This sphere
is characterised by two features:
• knowledge that re-presents the presented, fragmented lived world as a
whole, a totality, and,
• independence from the lived world, solitude of a self divorced from any other.
These features sustain the notion of a pure theoretic of thought's freedom.
Socrates spoke of the inner voice or deamon that led him and on whom he has
always depended. For Socrates an equivalence can be drawn between wisdom
and freedom that continues throughout Western tradition. This can be described
as the partial coincidence of the divine life with the human domain. Reason is
an attempt to bring the divine into an understandable form, make man divine, a
god, and also closed and self-similar without need of anything outside of it.
Thus Levinas says:
The primacy of the same was Socrates' teaching: to receive
nothing of the Other but what is in me, as though from all eternity I
was in possession of what comes to me from the outside - to
receive nothing, or to be free. Freedom does not resemble the
capricious spontaneity of free will; its ultimate meaning lies in this
permanence in the same, which is reason. Cognition is the
deployment of this identity; it is freedom. That reason in the last
analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralising the
other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was
laid down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing
other limits it. The neutralisation of the other who becomes a
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theme or an object - appearing, that is, taking its place in the light -
is precisely his reduction to the same (Levinas, 1994b; 43).
In the whole of western philosophy, contemplation or knowledge and the
freedom of knowledge, the domain of the "free thinker" is inspiration for the mind
(l'esprit). As Socrates (Plato, 1956; 130) says in his dialogue with Meno:
All nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so that
when man has recalled a single piece of knowledge - learned it, in
ordinary language - there is no reason why he should not find out
all the rest, if he keeps a stout heart and does not grow weary of
the search; for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but
recollection
Knowing for the Socratic tradition, is the psyche or pneumatic force of thought,
even in the act of feeling or willing. According to Levinas it has come to
dominate the whole of human lived experience, in the period up to, and above
all, including the present. And this knowing cannot tolerate, or even admit to,
anything that escapes it. It has to experience and convert experience into
accepted doctrine, teaching, sciences. The sociality of the Old Testament, the
contribution of the Jews according to Levinas, is unthinkable in this sense for it
is experience that allows for what cannot be explained.
4.3 ETHICSAS FIRST PHILOSOPHY: THEWISDOM OF LOVE
Levinas' article Ethics as First Philosophy (Levinas, 1994a; 75 - 87) can help us
to formulate the following questions: Can thought be understood as possibly
having a meaning beyond the representative structure of knowledge and its hold
on being, a more urgent form of thought, that of pre-reflective, non-intentional,
non-self-conscious wisdom? And how does this give meaning to ethics?
He starts the investigation with the notion of intentionality. Intentionality is
generally regarded as the directedness of consciousness towards objects and
the world. It consciously sifts through a myriad of options and chooses some
73
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
while discarding others. Intentionality, in this sense translates as the direction
which the pursuit of knowledge takes.
What is of interest here is not the workings of such a self-conscious
directedness but, on the contrary, whether or not there can be talk of an
originary, non-theoretical intentionality preceding the active emotional
(sensational) life of consciousness.
Levinas turns to Husserl as an example of someone who has been able to
isolate non-theoretical intentionality, but who then bases his explanation on re-
presentation, the objectivising act, dragging it into some form of intellectualism
again. Not that Levinas is "anti-intellectualist" (Levinas, 1994b; 109) but, he is
concerned with what makes intellectualism possible.
Husserl's theory unpacks as follows: he assumeswithout question that the world
contains two sorts of phenomena, physical and psychical, and seeks to find,
• some feature or features which will distinguish psychic phenomena from
physical phenomena and,
• certain basic classes into which psychic phenomena may be divided.
The difference between physical and psychical phenomena, Husserl concludes,
is that the latter exhibits,
• intentionality or directedness towards objects and,
• direct and inerrant revelation to "an inner perception", which is one with the
act perceived.
Intentionality, directed towards objects and internally perceived, is revealed by
the fact that most "mental verbs" are senseless (or only elliptically significant) in
the absence of appropriate object-expressions, which state what the mental
activity expressed by the verb is concerned with. Examples of such mental
verbs are: doubt is about 2+2 = 4; pleased with etc. These mental verbs have
no meaning by themselves and depend on the action and the object which they
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combine for relevance. However, neither the act or object will signify
meaningfully if the correct mental verb does not bind them.
Thus for Husserl psychological intentionality exercises a hold on being, (being
that has no intention or consciousness without this hold and merely is), that
constitutes it as a specific object with a specific orientation or function in the
world. This filling out of being gratifies a longing for being to be accessed as an
object. Intentionality directs being towards objects in the world and through
returning again from the objects in the world a difference is established and
being is experienced as a specific object amongst objects.
This movement of consciousness as intentionality, control and directedness, is
the transcendental ego the unique identity of the individual. It is established by
a 'Transcendental Reduction that suspends all independence in the world other
than that of consciousness itself, and causes the world to be rediscovered as
noema [intended given]" (Levinas, 1994a; 79). Against Husserl, Levinas
maintains that the transcendental ego is a reduced consciousness that cannot
be said to encapsulate the whole of reality. It leads, or ought to lead, to full self-
consciousness affirming itself as absolute being and confirming itself as an "I".
This "I" is thought to maintain its identity (self-similarity) against all possible
differences and is considered master of its own nature and of the universe, able
to illuminate the darkest recesses of resistance to its powers.
However, Levinas argues that the "I", supposed to encapsulate the world and
understand it, comes up against a contingent sphere in which it is, by its very
flesh, implicated. This flesh, the world, implicates the "I" from the outset in what
the transcendental ego would like to reduce from complexity and control as
simplicity. The flesh is heir to all the vicissitudes of contingency, and so is
implicated in the world. It is the pool of impure consciousness from which the
reduced consciousness of the transcendental ego is distilled and crystallised
into an object. Levinas is specific:
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This reduced consciousness - which, in reflecting upon itself,
rediscovers and masters its own acts of perception and science as
objects in the world, thereby affirming itself as self-consciousness
and absolute being, also remains a non-intentional consciousness
of itself, as though it were a surplus somehow devoid of any wilful
aim. A non-intentional consciousness operating, if one may put it
like this, unknowingly as knowledge, as a non-objectivising
knowledge (Levinas, 1994a; 79).
Intentional consciousness, having established being as the transcendental ego,
an object amongst other objects, sets about to seek its own reflection in the
objects of the world. Hence, along with its own mental acts and states, it also
thematises and seeks to grasp supposedly implicit modes of the non-intentional
lived experience and attempts to show it explicitly, thus again reducing it to the
control of the known. For Levinas this provides the counterpoint of what he is
aiming at:
One may ask, however, whether, beneath the gaze of reflected
consciousness taken as self-consciousness, the non-intentional,
experienced as the counterpoint to the intentional, does not conserve
and free its true meaning (Levinas, 1994a; 80).
This "true meaning", a meaning that escapes or dives under consciousness does
not simply refer to a formal notion of potentiality. In other words, one cannot say
that the non-intentional is merely the realm from which all possibilities may
appear and come to fruition. For Levinas this would be equivalent to saying
nothing at all which will leave only Husserl's reduction. Hence, he seeks to
radicalise the notion of possibility. For this purpose two notions of the non-
intentional may be pitted against each other: the non-intentional may find its true
meaning in the
• potentiality of what is considered possible within a context, on the one hand,
and,
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• the intimacy of the non-intentional within what is known as pre-reflective
consciousness and which is duration itself, on the other hand.
The first notion is a limited notion of possibility, because the context is marked
off and only within this space can a consideration of what is possible take place.
The second notion, the non-intentional coupled with the pre-reflective raises the
question whether any knowledge, particular, implicit, potential, non-intentional or
otherwise, of pre-reflective, consciousness can really be said to know anything?
Two possible answers to the latter question present themselves. In the first,
knowledge is available albeit as a confused or scrambled code waiting to be
deciphered. In the second, the more radical notion, no knowledge can be said
to be apparent and is consciousness without aim or goal.
In both instances the word know can be more profitably substituted for the word
awareness. Levinas seems to indicate that "awareness" comes closer to what
he means by "originary intentionality":
It is less an act than a pure passivity. Not only due to its being-
without-having-chosen-to-be but also because of its fall into a
confusion of possibilities already realised even before any choice
might be made. It is a 'consciousness' that signifies not so much a
knowledge of oneself as something that effaces presence or
makes it discreet (Levinas, 1994a; 80).
Awareness suggests a pure duration that in phenomenology is still described as
intentionally structured by a play of retentions and protentions. Following
Bergson, what Levinas suggests, is not another sort of time but a duration that is
not marked in space by the hands of a mechanical clock or any protention or
retention of any form, which remains free from the sway of the will, absolutely
outside all activity of the ego as the symbolical substitute for the real and
concrete self (Bergson, 1910; 193). This pure duration, of which Bergson says,
when he casts a look about him, "these objects ... like myself they have lived,
and like myself they have grown old" (Bergson, 1910; 130), is like the ageing
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process which he considers a perfect model of passive synthesis, a lapse of time
that no act of remembrance or reconstructing the past, could possibly reverse.
He adds:
Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious
states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from
separating its present state from its former states. For this
purpose it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation
or idea; for then, on the contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor
need it forget its former states: it is enough that, in recalling these
states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point
alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states
into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a
tune, melting, so to speak, into one another (Bergson, 1910; 100).
Duration and experience, the living of life in the moment without marking it with
the will, the intention of objectifying it as if such a moment belongs to myself
alone and no other, is also the spiritual access to a realm beyond beinq". "Pure
duration or non-intervention as being without insistence, as being that dare not
speak its name, being that dare not be; the agency of the instant without the
insistence of the ego, which is already a lapse in time, which is 'over before its
begun!" (Levinas, 1994a; 81) is a realisation that allows an awareness of the
fleeting nature of all life and knowledge. The implications of such a non-
intentional consciousness is a return to mauvaise conscience (unhappy
conscience).
The latter supposes an existence without any intentions, or aims, that cannot
avail itself of the protective mask of a character contemplating in the mirror of
the world a reassured and self-positing portrait. It has no name, no situation, no
status. It is stripped of all qualities and identity recoils before its affirmation, for
it dreads the return to self that is a necessary part of identification.
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This is either mauvaise conscience or timidity. It is not guilty, but accused and
responsible for its very presence. It has not yet been invested with any
attributes, nor has it been justified in any way (Levinas, 1994a; 81). Because it
is a consciousness that is accused and responsible for its presence, it is
unhappy. It possesses no knowledge of how or as what to respond. It has to
become singular and affirm itself as an "I", a self that can take responsibility.
Immediately upon doing so, it enters into ethics, into the need for justification
and for doing right.
4.4 THE FACE-TO-FACE RELATION
As we have seen, Levinas radicalises the notion of consciousness and thought
to a point that he calls "originary", in other words, he needs to show that
something exists before any thought or consciousness in the Cartesian sense. It
is something so old and original that it cannot even be doubted. He needs to
make this move to establish his most fundamental point which is that ethics, and
nothing else, allows consciousness' to develop. Whatever comes out of the
place of origin is already in confrontation with that which it differentiates itself
from, the other. Thus, the first moment of consciousness is also the first problem
for ethics. The first moment is already a discourse, even before any notion of
formal language. It is, he argues,
apperceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity,
toward apperceiving Desire - where power, by essence murderous
of the other, becomes, faced with the other and "against all good
sense,'; the impossibility of murder, the consideration of the other,
or justice (Levinas, 1994b; 47).7
For Levinas the non-allergic relation is always from the start established
between two faces that regard each other. He describes the opening of ethical
discourse between faces as follows:
... its critical intention leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique
does not reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls
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into question the exercise of the same. A calling into question of
the same - which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the
same - is brought about by the other. We name this calling into
question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics
(Levinas, 1994b; 43).
This initial meeting is the reserve of the stranger or sojourner who walks the
earth without claiming an identity. The "homeless" person who is not welcome
for he is not known. For Levinas we are all initially in this position and can
return there at any time. A return to this initial meeting is always apparent to
those who travel to a foreign country for instance.
For Levinas mental interiority, the theoretical attitude of philosophy, that shuns
contact with an exterior world exhibits an insufficient courage to assert oneself in
one's being as a body of flesh and blood. This courage awaits the moment
when it has enough knowledge about a situation so that it can act with control.
The lack of courage dooms existence to the realm of being in general, the il y aB.
Breaking free from the il ya involves violence for which no amount of theoretical
speculation can prepare and for this reason involves others. Hence, one comes
not into the world as such, but into question.
In "memory" of this violence, having the question of this violence posed to it, the
ego (mal) has to remain ambiguous enough to recognise itself as potentially
hateful to others in the manifestation of its identity. It is a hateful manifestation in
the sense that it attempts to exclude all others in its drive to satisfy its appetite.
The face of the other places a question mark over the priority of A=A9, the
principle of identity. Hence, "the principle of intelligibility and meaning, this
sovereignty, or freedom within the human ego, is also the momentwhen humility
occurs" (Levinas, 1994a; 81).
This moment of humility questions the affirmation and strengthening of being
found in the famous and superficially rhetorical quest for the meaning of life.
Humility suggests that the absolute ego, having used its vital, psychic and social
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forces seen as its transcendental sovereignty, returns humbly to its mauvaise
conscience and contrasts its identity with its previous state of non-identity or
equivalence.
Pre-reflective, non-intentional consciousness, would never be able to return to a
moral realisation of this passivity. For one cannot suppose that in non-
intentional consciousness one could already see a subject postulating itself,
assured of its right to be and "dominating" the timidity of the non-intentional like
a spiritual infancy that is outgrown. Morality is the domain of a humbled ego,
one that has been placed into question, returning to its mauvaise conscience at
the very moment when it identifies itself as distinct from it.
The position of being in the ontological sense, a distinct and identifiable ego that
asserts itself as an "I", depends on the following notions in order to work its
guarantee:
• intentional thought
• knowledge and,
• a grasp of the here and now.
All three these notions can carry on undisturbed according to the tradition of
Western metaphysics. There need to be no questioning except the solipsistic
development of the self as it delves deeper into the pit of its own Reason.
Against this tradition Levinas argues that the humble and moral character is
established by a questioning that comes to rationality from the outside. As he
says:
What one sees in this questioning is being as mauvaise
conscience; to be open to question but also to questioning, to have
to respond. Language is born in responsibility. One has to speak,
to say I, to be in the first person, precisely to be me but from that
point, in affirming this me-being; one has to respond to one's right
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to be. To this point is it necessary to think through Pascal's
phrase, "the I (moi) is hateful" (Levinas, 1994a; 82).
In responding to one's right to be, one need not refer to some abstract and
anonymous law or judicial entity. One responds out of fear for the other.
Questions are put to an "I", questions like: my being-in-the-world, place in the
sun, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces
belonging to the other man whom" I" have already oppressed or starved, driven
out into a third world. Are the claims of the "I" not acts of repulsing, excluding,
exiling, stripping, killing? If not, why not?
Levinas quotes from Pascal's Pensees: "... 'my place in the sun', marks the
beginning of the image of the usurpation of the whole earth" (Levinas, 1994c;
82). For Levinas it is exactly this place in the sun that shapes the fear for the
other:
• A fear for all the violence and murder my existing might generate, in spite of
its conscious and intentional innocence.
• A fear which reaches back past my "self-consciousness" in spite of whatever
moves are made towards a bonne conscience by a pure perseverance in
being.
• It is a fear of occupying someone else's place with the Da of my Oasein; but it
is also the inability to occupy a place; a profound utopia, without coming up
against the resentment of others.
The other presented to me in a face-ta-face encounter addresses my fear and
holds me responsible. I need to answer for my place, need to justify myself in
the eyes of the other. The other is always close, in my proximity or vicinity. As
Levinas says:
The face of the other being the original site of the sensible, is the
description of the irruption of the face into the phenomenal order of
appearances. The proximity of the other is the face's meaning,
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and it means from the very start in a way that goes beyond those
plastic forms which forever try to cover the face like a mask of their
presence to perception, but always the face shows through these
farms (Levinas, 1994a; 82 - 83).
The face has many expressions, joy, sadness, astonishment, etc. But, prior to
any particular expression and beneath all particular expressions there is the
nakedness and destitution of the expression as such, that is to say, extreme
exposure, defencelessness, vulnerability itself.
This extreme exposure - prior to any human aim is like "a shot at point blank
range" (Levinas, 1994a; 83). The face-ta-face steadfast in its exposure to
invisible death that, for Levinas, is the other regarding me prior to confronting
me. Before any knowledge can be gained about death or anything is revealed
by the face mortality is engraved in the other.
For Levinas no code of conduct or morality can substitute the effectiveness of
this extreme exposure. Encountered as the nakedness and defencelessness of
a human face, it encourages and directs the violence of the first crime.
Murderous intent in its self-confident manifestation is particularly effective in
expressing the fragility of human countenance. Since this is a difficult position, it
has to be understood that Levinas does not encourage experimentation with
murder in order to reach awareness or enlightenment, on the contrary he says:
The first murderer probably does not realise the result of the blow
he is about to deliver, but his violent design helps him to find the
line with which death may give an air of impeachable rectitude to
the face. But in its expression, in its mortality, the face before me
summons me, begs for me, as if the invisible death that must be
faced by the other, pure otherness separated, in some way, from
any whole, were my business (Levinas; 1994a; 83).
The other man's death, the death that stares me in the face, therefore calls me
into question, as if, by my possible future indifference, I had already become the
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accomplice of the death to which the other, who cannot see it (his death through
my indifference), is exposed. Exercising non-indifference would be to
accompany the other in his mortal solitude. Responsibility for the other is
responsibility for the naked face of the first individual to come along.
This non-indifferent responsibility goes beyond any act of injury or fortitude that I
mayor may not have caused or exhibited to the other, as if I were devoted to the
other man before being devoted to myself.
It is as if the other established a relationship or a relationship were established
whose whole intensity consists in not taking the idea of community for granted.
The face of the other places the "I" face-ta-face with its responsibility and the for
of the "for the other", the fear for my own death is turned around and the "I"
hears the death of the other approach. My fear becomes the fear for the other,
the fear for harm or death coming to the other. I am called by this awareness
into a position of care.
4.5 LANGUAGE AND RATIONALITY
Levinas is concerned with the concrete situation in which human beings find
themselves when their bodies, expressed by him as faces, come into proximity
with each other. For him it is the moment of sound rather than sight. It is the
moment in which speech becomes possible. "Language is exceptional in that it
attends its own manifestation. Speech consists in explaining oneself with
respect to speech; it is a teaching" (Levinas, 1994b; 98). We teach each other
the ways in which we can be together without violating the proximity. The
appearance of the other next to me is something that "I" do not understand and
is not even sure of but through speech the other is made to signify. As Levinas
says:
Apparition reveals and conceals; speech consists in surmounting, in a
total frankness ever renewed, the dissimulation inevitable in every
apparition. Thereby a sense - an orientation - is given to every
phenomenon.... Speech introduces a principle into this anarchy [of
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the apparition]. Speech disenchants, for the speaking being
guarantees his own apparition and comes to the assistance of
himself, attends his own manifestation. His being is brought about in
this attendance. ... The entry of beings into a proposition constitutes
the original event of their taking on signification; the possibility of their
algorithmic expression itself will be established on this basis. Speech
is thus the origin of all signification ... (Levinas, 1994b; 98).
Speech for Levinas is the ultimate form of language because the speaker is
present and can correct the manifestations of what is said. Speech can defend
itself and correct misinterpretation. Unlike writing, which is left as it is and
manifests as the dead letters of the philosophical "Said". In contrast with this,
ethics is a living "Saying" that has to be considered as the greatest
responsibility. "Saying is not a game" (Levinas, 1981; 5) says Levinas, rather
"the gravity of this response is beyond the measure of being" and contrasts with
the "fallacious frivolity of play?" (Levinas, 1981; 6).
For Levinas the ontology of being, is as dead as the "Said", established and
guaranteed by the rules of the philosophical game. "Being is play or détente,
without responsibility, where everything possible is permitted. But, is play free of
interest? Right off a stakes, money or honour, is attached to it" (Levinas, 1981;
6). Levinas therefore reminds us that, although a game might have given rules
the outcome is unpredictable and winning can sometimes exceed an acceptable
margin.
The philosophical game is the game of reason. Once it establishes itself as a
system there can be no further outside to it. What Levinas calls into question is
the initial moment of freedom in which reason establishes itself, makes a
beginning. He asks where reason gets the right, the freedom, to establish an
edifice or system? He explains:
Reason is sought in the relationship between terms, between the one
and the other showing themselves in a theme. Reason consists in
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ensuring the coexistence of these terms, the coherence of the one
and the other despite their difference, in the unity of a theme; it
ensures the agreement of the different terms without breaking up the
present in which the theme is held. This coexistence or accord
between different terms in the unity of a theme is called a system ...
Reason, in which the different terms are present, that is, are
contemporaneous in a system, is also the fact that they are present to
consciousness inasmuch as consciousness is representation,
beginning, freedom (Levinas, 1981; 65).
"Theme" is used by Levinas as another word for "concept". A concept is the
third neutral term into which that which is different from each other is taken up in
order to signify or agree. The uniqueness, alterity, of the other is compromised
in this process and the other is taken up in an abstraction. He clarifies as
follows:
This mode of depriving the known being of its alterity can be
accomplished only if it is aimed at through a third term, a neutral
term, which itself is not a being; in it the shock of the encounter of
the samewith the other is deadened. This third term may appear as
a concept thought. Then the individual that .existsabdicates into the
general that is thought. The third term may be called sensation, in
which objective quality and subjective affection are merged
(Levinas, 1994a; 42).
The neutrality of philosophical reason that has been established in writing, is
always revitalised by the encounter with the other that leads us into speech, a
speech that has to reason on account of the difference between an "I" and the
other. For Levinas "this difference in proximity between the one and the other,
between me and a neighbour, turns into non-indifference, precisely into my
responsibility. Non-indifference, humanity, the-one-for-the-other is the very
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signifyingness of signification, the intelligibility of the intelligible, and thus
reason" (Levinas, 1981; 166).
For Levinas this is not the reason of logic but the reason of ethics. Logic is the
threat that would make an end to the face-ta-face relationship and give rise to
the violence of an indifferent politics. "The interlocuter that does not yield to
logic is threatened with prison or the asylum or undergoes the prestige of the
master and the medication of the doctor: violence or reasons of state or an
approach ensures to the rationalism of logic a universality and to law its subject
matter" (Levinas, 1981; 170). Hence, for Levinas logical reasoning is not
reasoning at all and writing, which would constitute the most logical thing, cannot
be said to be language. For Levinas, therefore, both language and reason can
only be truly said to exist in the moment of the face-ta-face.
4.6 SAIDAND SAYING: THE RETURNOF SKEPTICISM
Levinas recognises that his writing itself becomes what we have previously
refered to as the "Said". This is the dead letter of the Law and of philosophy.
The realisation of difference brings an end to indifference which is a dead state
of equilibrium. This equilibrium is disturbed by the ethical "Saying" arevitalising
force that gets the conversation going again and opens up a place for the unique
experience of individuals. This movement of the "Said" and "Saying" Levinas
relates to the old philosophical schema of skepticism and the refutation of
skepticism (Levinas, 1981; 167). "It is as though skepticism were sensitive to the
difference between my exposure without reserve to the other, which is saying,
and the exposition or statement of the said in its equilibrium and justice"
(Levinas, 1981; 168).
For Levinas the return of skepticism is the return of saying and is the undeniable
outcome of all attempts at totalising structure. The ultimate relation is not with a
concrete other but with the Other as an audience. This audience, or "existent"
represents what could be called a "collective conscience" and it is to this
collective, also called God, that saying turns. Levinas says that, "[t]his 'saying to
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the Other' - this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an
existent - precedes all ontology; it is the ultimate relation in being" (Levinas,
1994a; 48).
Philosophy seeks to understand this saying by studying the audience and pulling
it apart. Calculating and counting heads to establish exactly who is saying, what
the saying is saying and who is on the receiving end. And as soon as it does so
and has refuted the resistence against its previous said, it establishes another in
its place. Levinas describes this movement of philosophy as follows:
Philosophy serves justice by thematising the difference and reducing
the thematised to difference ... Philosophy, in its very diachrony, is
the consciousness of the breakup of consciousness. In an alternating
movement, like that which leads from skepticism to the refutation that
reduces it to ashes, and from its ashes to its rebirth, philosophy
justifies and criticises the laws of being and of the city, and finds
again the signification that consists in detaching from the absolute
one-for-the-other bath the one and the other (Levinas, 1981; 165).
This movement, the rebirth of skepticism from the ashes of refutation is made
possible by the trace of it that is inevitably carried forward into the next
refutation. This trace is not in itself a presence but an obligation that carries no
force. "[T]he trace of saying, which has never been present, obliges me; ... This
trace does not belong to the assembling of essence. Philosophy underestimates
the extent of the negation in this 'not appearing,' which exceeds the logical
scope of negation and affirmation" (Levinas, 1981; 168). The said cannot be
forced open by the trace of saying that is within it but, is caught unawares by it.
It is a memory that returns without being invited and refuses to accept the
present state of things as the only way it can be (Levinas, 1981; 168 - 169).
If everything in time were recallable the return of skepticism would be pure
nonsense. But, because it is not, skepticism is a challenge to any system that
holds itself out to be foolproof. Thus,
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saying, is a relationship with what is not understood in the together,
the out-of-the-series. A subversion of essence, it overflows the theme
it states, the "all together," the "everything included" of the said.
Language is already skepticism. ... Coherence thus dissimulates a
transcendence, a movement from the one to the other, a latent
diachrony, uncertainty and a fine risk (Levinas, 1981; 170).
The important notion here is Levinas' conviction that language and skepticism is
one and the same. Skepticism would thus be bound up with speech and not with
writing. This presents a problem for Levinas if he wants to have a consistent
theory. How is writing a sceptical book, an ethical book, one that does justice
both to philosophy and the old testament tradition, at all possible?
4.7 SINGULARITYAND SUBSTITUTION
For Levinas the proximity, the intimacy and the desire to be with the other is not
sexual. It is, however, also, not a gender blind, non-differentiated proximity.
The sexual proximity, instead, is subordinated as pretence to the more originary
proximity, a Good, of an other for whom I fear. Intimacy is "a non-erotic
proximity, ... a desire of the non-desireable, a desire of the stranger in the
neighbour. It is outside of concupiscence, which for its part does not cease to
seduce by the appearance of the Good. In a Lucifarian way it takes on this
appearance and thus claims to belong to the Good, gives itself out to be its
equal, but in this very pretention which is an admission it remains subordinated"
(Levinas, 1981; 123).
"Proximity is a difference" (Levinas, 1981; 166), the very realisation of the
difference between myself as a being and that which is outside of the limits of
who" I" am. A problem exists, however,
... about how to relate this proximity and the transcending of the
otherness of material reality. It doesn't take place through
knowledge but through a relationship with the other, in love of the
89
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
other. This irreducible love of the other cannot be contained in
terms which are expressible in philosophy (Mortley, 1991; 20).
As we have seen, Levinas regards the logic of philosophical thinking as non-vital
or dead intelligence. So he says that "[t]o intelligibility as an impersonal logos is
opposed intelligibility as proximity" (Levinas, 1981; 167). This intelligibility
carries a responsibility stemming from a time before my freedom (for freedom
presupposes the restrictions of community and the struggle to break from them) -
before my beginning, before any present. A fraternity existing in extreme
separation. One may ask the question: Before any present, but in what past? It
is better to quote Levinas for the argument becomes nearly mystical at this point.
He says:
Not in the time preceding the present, in which I might have
contracted any commitments. Responsibility for my neighbour
dates from before my freedom in an immemorial past, an
unrepresentable past that was never present and is more ancient
than consciousness of ... (Levinas, 1994a; 84).
Levinas plays on the impossibility of curbing the infinite regression to which any
epistemology is heir in its attempts to build universal criteria of validity, a
foundation, for knowledge. Starting with what seems like a logical progression
from a point somewhere in the past, knowledge seeks to show the first thought,
it invariably ends up with a thought that precedes it ad infinitum. Confronted by
this endless moving away of the origin farther and farther into the abyssal
depths of a collective human amnesia that is unable to remember or even
imagine a satisfactory explanation to its own beginning, the individual vomits in
despair. Levinas suggests that in taking up our responsibility for the neighbour
the fear that the infinite engenders, is addressed. He says:
A responsibility for my neighbour, for the other man, for the
stranger or sojourner, to which nothing in the rigorously ontological
order binds me - nothing in the order of the thing, of the something,
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of number or causality ... It is the responsibility of a hostage which
can be carried to the point of being substituted for the other person
and demands an infinite subjection of subjectivity. Unless this
anarchic responsibility, which summons me from nowhere into a
present time, is perhaps the measure or the manner or the system
of an immemorial freedom that is even older than being, or
decisions or deeds ... This summons to responsibility destroys the
formulas of generality by which my knowledge or acquaintance of
the other man re-presents him to me as my fellow man (Levinas,
1994a; 84).
In the face of the other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently the
unique and chosen one. By this freedom, this summons to responsibility that
frees me from the reign of the formulas of generality, frees me from the
pigeonholes of knowledge, humanity in me, that is, humanity as me, signifies as
infinite vigilance. In spite of being's ontological contingence as finitude and
mortality, the anteriority, absolute otherness, and uniqueness of the non-
interchangeable drags being out of itself.
This is the anteriority of an excellence that cannot be reduced to the features or
qualities distinguishing or constituting individual beings in the order of their
world or people, or to the role they play on history's social stage, as characters,
that is, in the mirror of reflection or in the mirror of self-consciousness.
Fear for the other, fear for the other man's death, is my fear, but in no way is it "I"
who take fright. It is not an individual, closed up in logos, who by his fear is
banished to an alienated life. It is not fear as a "state-of-mind". It is a fear that
reaches out and establishes contact and community. Thus, Levinas holds, it
stands out against the phenomenological analysis of Befindlichkeit found in
Heidegger's (1995; 172) Sein und Zeit.
Levinas argues that Befindlichkeit is a reflective structure expressed by a
pronominal verb in which emotion is emotion for something moving you, but also
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always emotion for oneself. According to this state of mind emotion consists in
being moved, being scared by something, overjoyed by something, saddened by
something, but also in feeling joy or sadness for oneself. Hence, emotion
always, in the final analysis, returns to the me being, where it is given its true
meaning expressed as angst.
Levinas recognises that Heidegger's notion of Befindlichkeit treats fear as that
which only holds repercussions for my being-towards-death. Against this,
Levinas places fear for the other's death: Fear for the other man's death does
not turn back into anguish for my own death, it cannot be reversed for it is not a
state of mind. It extends beyond the ontology of the Heideggerian Dasein and
the happy conscience of a being that is identified by the approving
acknowledgement given to it by its own ego. The ethical awareness and
vigilance of fear for the other does cause emotional unease issued in by the
realisation of the fragility of the other's life, but does not return as angst.
This doubt or emotional unease is the hidden human face behind perseverance
in being. The human face lies hidden behind the affirmation of being persisting
in its analytical vivisection of the world. A being that, through the ideal vigour of
identity, identifying, affirming and strengthening itself, is the life of human
individuals struggling for vital existence, whether, conscious or unconscious or
rational. But, the miracle of the ego vindicated in the eyes of the neighbour, or
the miracle of the ego (mal) which has gotten rid of self (soi) and instead fears
for the other, is like the suspension of the eternal and irreversible return of the
identical to itself and of its logical and ontological privilege. Levinas is
convinced that what is superseded is the ideal priority of the Self, which wipes
out all otherness by murder or by all-encompassing and totalising thought.
To summarise, the question of this study should be asked again: Where is ethics
to be found?
This question has no need of theoretical reply in the form of new information.
Rather, it appeals to responsibility, which is not a practical stop-gap measure
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designed to console knowledge in its failure to match being. This responsibility
does not deny knowledge the ability to comprehend and grasp; instead, it is the
excellence of ethical proximity in its society, in its love without concupiscence.
The human is the capacity to fear injustice more than death, to prefer to suffer
than to commit injustice and to prefer that which justifies being over that which
assumes it. It is the question of the meaning of being, not the ontology of the
verb as a program for efficient action, but moving beyond ontology, accepting
that it always already is, the ethics of its justice. According to Levinas, the
question par excellence, the question of philosophy is not, "why being rather
than nothing?" but, rather, "how does being justify itself?"
This need of justification is an order that comes to me from a height. The other
makes an almost impossible demand on me. But, I can only respond in
language. The first language is not structured or bound, it is sounds, vowels for
which consonants have to be found. It is the act of signification. The response
called forth is that of a signifier. "There is an ambiguity of the order that orders
to me the neighbour who obsesses me, for whom and before whom I answer by
my ego, in which being is inverted into a substitution, into the very possibility of
gift" (Levinas, 1981; 162).
The possibility is the very possibility of a gift, a gift of language. A gift of
signification. This possibility is called forth by the "I's" difference from the other
as the "I" breaks with itself, substitute itself in language, in the gift, as that which
moves outside of itself, a signifying substitute that seeks to communicate with
the other and to warn him. "The one in the-one-for-the-other is not a being
outside of being, but signification, evacuation of Being's essence for the other"
(Levinas, 1981; 164).
For Levinas substitution is filled with ethical gravity. It is the very sombre
responsibility for the gravest of possibilities, the death of the other.
"Signification, the for-the-other, will not be an act of free assumption, will not be
a for-itself that denies its own resignation, nor ludic gratuity in which the gravity
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of alterity goes off in smoke, in cheerfulness and ecstasy (of him who only hides
himself) as a 'nothing at all' in the equivalence of everything and nothing.
Signification is the ethical deliverance of the self through substitution for the
other" (Levinas, 1981; 164).
Against the anarchy of the self who uses signification to amuse itself, to play and
to return to itself satisfied with its own aesthetic achievements Levinas places
the signification of substitution. The possibility of the self giving itself up, taking
the place of the other and suffering the other's death onto itself. This for Levinas
is the hallmark of patience. "The self before any initiative, before any beginning,
signifies anarchically, before any present. There is deliverance into itself of an
ego awakened from its imperialist dream, its transcendental imperialism,
awakened to itself, a patience as a subjection to everything" (Levinas, 1981;
164).
Peace is the outcome of such patience. But it is never perpetual and never
guaranteed. It is a risk that one takes, the risk of ethics. But, it is only a risk in
so far that I have knowledge of an outcome. In terms of infinite, radical
possibility it is a risk that summons forth the Good. "Peace then is under my
responsibility. I am a hostage, for I am alone to wage it, running a fine risk,
dangerously. This danger will appear to knowing as an uncertainty, but it is
transcendence itself, before certainty and uncertainty, which arise only in
knowledge" (Levinas, 1981; 167).
4.8 THE THIRD PARTY: OTHERS AND THE STATE
Thinking through what the proximity of the other means can now be placed into
perspective. It is necessary to grapple with the impossibility of fully
understanding the face-ta-face relationship and what I will call the quasi-concept
of "proximity". The other by himself does not present "me" or "him" with any
problems. We have a common bond that precedes us and can overcome any
difficulty. "The responsibility for the other is an immediacy antecedent to
questions, it is proximity. It is troubled and becomes a problem when a third
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party enters" (Levinas, 1981; 157). There is a certain symmetry in the face-to-
face that is broken up by the third party. It is this dissymetry that introduces a
schema of problems. As Levinas says:
The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose
signification before the other until then went in one direction. It is of
itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I
have to do with justice? A question of consciousness. Justice is
necessary, that is, comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness,
assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus
intentionality and intellect, and ... the intelligibility of a system
(Levinas, 1981; 157).
The third party's appearance is the demand for a system. An "I" has to calculate
the attention given between the other, in a direct face-ta-face relation and all
Others as possible face-ta-face relations. For Levinas, the obsession, the
specific situation of a face-ta-face relation with an other, has to be balanced with
the responsibility that in general to all possible others. These possible others
are what Levinas refers to as the "third party". He explains:
It is not that the entry of a third party would be an empirical fact, and
that my responsibility for the other finds itself constrained to a
calculus by the "force of things." In the proximity of the other, all the
others than the other obsess me, and already this obsession cries out
for justice, demands measure and knowing, is consciousness. A face
obsesses and shows itself, between transcendence and
visibility/invisibility (Levinas, 1981; 158).
The system to which the third party binds me calls for calculation and a redress
of the asymmetry of my attention, but again it calls me out towards the Other and
does not allow a return to the self. This system is not a hermeneutics or an ideal
speech situation. It is constantly working to correct and to balance itself:
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The relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the
asymmetry of proximity in which the face is looked at. There is
weighing, thought, objectification, and thus a decree in which my
anarchic relationship with illeity is betrayed, but in which it is
conveyed before us (Levinas, 1981; 158).
A rational peace is one in which the possibility of irrationality as asymmetry is
confronted on an ongoing basis. All the energies of the system have to be put
into play. This is an adventure and a complex system, that also confronts that
which is supposed to ground it, the very rules that make it possible. The very
authority that legitimises it. "Responsibility for the others or communication is
the adventure that bears all the discourse of science and philosophy. Thus this
responsibility would be the very rationality of reason or its universality, a
rationality of peace" (Levinas, 1981; 160).
In this way the search for justice and the ongoing reappraisal of that which
makes the system possible is what binds us to responsibility. "The apparition of
a third party is the very origin of appearing, that is, the very origin of an origin....
The foundation of consciousness is justice" (Levinas, 1981; 160).
This system of justice does not guarantee that I am protected against being an
other. I have rights but also duties and must remember to exercise the one and
fulfil the other. Thus, justice demands two things. A situation,
where subjectivity is a citizen with all the duties and rights measured
and measurable which the equilibrated ego involves, or equilibrating
itself by the concourse of duties and the concurrence of rights. But
justice can be established only if I, always evaded from the concept of
the ego, always desituated and divested of being, always in non-
reciprocable relationship with the other, always for the other can
become an other like the others (Levinas, 1981; 161).
The demand of justice is that the awareness of responsibility, as residing in a
singular individual, must not be forfeited to the neutrality of a third term or dead
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concept. This will bring on the authoritarian State and bury democracy. "The
State issued from the proximity of the neighbour is always on the verge of
integrating him into a we, which congeals both me and the neighbour" (Levinas,
1981; 161) which will bring on an excuse once more for the "Principle of
Revolution" discussed in the previous chapter. The problematic nature of
judgements is also the point at which the need for justice is most apparent.
"Judgements and propositions are born in justice, which is putting together,
assernblinq, the being of entities. Here with a problem begins the concern for
truth, for the disclosure of being" (Levinas, 1981; 161).
Levinas has to admit that the obsession with the other can turn into an unjust
situation if the role of the third party is not acknowledged. But the overwhelming
responsibility of the "I" for the other is infinitely multiplied in the third party or
Other. There is a need for philosophy. The spiritual union of the "I" and the
other, a union never consummated, must be assisted by the love of wisdom that
philosophy brings with it. Spiritual union is the way, but is beset on all sides by
problems. As Levinas says
The way leads from [absolute] responsibility to problems. A problem
is posited by proximity itself, which, as the immediate itself, is without
problems. The extraordinary commitment of the other to the third
party calls for control, a search for justice, society and the State,
comparison and possession, thought and science, commerce and
philosophy, and outside of anarchy, the search for principle.
Philosophy is this measure brought to the infinity of the being-for-the-
other of proximity, and is like the wisdom of love (Levinas, 1981; 161).
Responsibility is an infinite demand but infinity is also that which overwhelms the
individual. It needs to be calculated and measured in an ongoing process. It is
not a place that by itself can be measured out but is paradoxically a place which
makesall measurement possible.
4.9 THE PROBLEMOF METAPHYSICS:THE IDEA OF INFINITY
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Metaphysics, like the metanarratives of Modernity, attempts to know everything
about everything but in the process brings everything to a standstill. Needing to
control the flux and contingency of what is perceived as a chaotic world, it wants
to have the last word once and for all. However, Levinas says that "the enigma
of the Infinite, ... seperates the Infinite from all phenomenality, from appearing,
thematization and essence ... as though it were an infinite object which
subjectivity tries to approach, but misses" (Levinas, 1981; 154).
For Levinas, the problem of the infinite is the problem of a word that does not
signify anything and yet exists, placing all significant words into question. It calls
forth that which cannot be called forth. In the face of this overwhelming word
Levinas falls back on the tradition of the old testament and introduces the notion
of the "Other", which he also designates as "God". As he says:
The revelation of the beyond being is perhaps indeed but a word, but
this "perhaps" belongs to an ambiguity in which the anarchy of the
Infinite resists the univocity of an originary or a principle. It belongs
to an ambiguity or an ambivalence and an inversion which is stated in
the word God, the apex of vocabulary, admission of the stronger than
me in me and of the "less than nothing," nothing but an abusive word,
a beyond themes in a thought that does not yet think or thinks more
than it thinks (Levinas, 1981; 156).
Levinas does not return to this tradition in an unproblematic way. He recognises
that "infinity, has been recognised as the Good by Plato" (Levinas, 1981; 19)
but insists on talking of God as that which in society is called "aid" and "grace".
For Levinas this recognition by Plato means that God can now come to live
within the society established by the calculation of philosophy. As we shall see
in the following chapter, Derrida identifies khóra at the heart of Platonism in
much the same way as Levinas recognises this possibility for the "gift"
somewhere at the heart of the polis. A symmetry is established by this gift
between the "wholly other" and "myself' as other. "It is only thanks to God that,
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as a subject incomparable with the other, I am approached as an other by
others, that is, for myself ... The passing of God, of whom I can speak only by
reference to this aid or this grace, is precisely the reverting of the incomparable
subject into a member of society" (Levinas, 1981; 158).
For Levinas "[a]1I human relations as human proceed from disinteretedness"
(Levinas, 1981; 159), the coldness of finding oneself alone and unable to hold
the attention of the others. From this is born a need to establish dependable
relations. But, these relations may become too calculated and exclusive, too
philosophical, hence, the need for God as sanctuary. Levinas insists on that
which is for philosophy, as ontology, nearly impossible, because unthinkable:
... goodness is other than being. It no longer keeps accounts; it is not
like negativity, which conserves what it negates, in its history. It
destroys without leaving souvenirs, without transporting into museums
the altars raised to the idols of the past for blood sacrifices, it burns
the sacred groves in which the echoes of the past reverberate. The
exceptional, extra-ordinary, transcendent character of goodness is
due to just this break with being and history. To reduce the good to
being, to its calculations and its history, is to nullify goodness
(Levinas, 1981; 18).
Although Levinas comes so close to not falling into the trap of establishing a
metaphysics himself, his insistence on the use of the word God instead of Other
seems to indicate that he is attempting to do more than just point out a problem
in philosophy. He needs to establish a certain religious aspect, a counter-
metaphysics to the metaphysical projects of philosophy. In other words,
philosophy itself is not "good" enough, organised religion must step in. But,
organised religion in Levinas' sense of ethics would be an oxymoron. Religion,
is that which falls outside the calculations of philosophy, it cannot be
philosophical and thus not organised. The only way to express what he is up to
is to put it paradoxically, even mystically: he wants to organise without
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organisation. This would leave only charisma and seduction with which to
complete the foundation as a work carried out on an ongoing basis and at every
instant.
In this sense how is one to understand what he means when he says: "to forget
what is better than being, that is the Good" (Levinas, 1981; 19).
4.10 FEMININE: THE INSISTENCE ON SPEECH AND PRESENCE
A specific problematic that can be identified in Levinas' work is the resistance
against imagination. This has to do with the notion of the fallen state in which
man's creations come into existence. The notion of the good and evil yetser
(Kearney, 1994; 39) places man's imagination under suspicion. The good
imagination is the one with which God created the world and everything in it.
The bad imagination is man's attempt to imitate God. The Adamic myth is
clearly in evidence. It is this inheritance that gives Levinas such a hard time.
His insistence on using this inheritance also brings him to the point of making
the worst mistake. In his description of the feminine and of woman it becomes
apparent that a woman is not considered to have a "face". Hewrites:
And the other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with which is
accomplished the primary hospitable welcome which describes the
field of intimacy, is the Woman. The woman is the condition for
recollection, the interiority of the Home, and inhabitation ... It is
comprehensible and exercises its function of interiorization only on
the ground of the full human personality, which, however, in the
woman, can be reserved so as to open up the dimension of interiority.
And this is a new and irreducible possibility, a delightful lapse in
being, and the source of gentleness in itself (Levinas, 1994b; 155).
This "discreet absence" is in itself problematic if one considers that it is the face-
to-face relationship that establishes the ethical. But it becomes even more
problematic if we consider again Levinas's insistence on speaking and speech
that has to back itself up. As he says:
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In human welcome the language that keeps silence remains an
essential possibility. Those silent comings and goings of the feminine
being whose footsteps reverberate the secret depths of being are not
the turbid mystery of the animal and feline presence whose strange
ambiguity Baudelaire likes to evoke (Levinas, 1994b; 156).
If Levinas is not able to grant the imagination room to explore creatively it is hard
to see how he would be able to avoid becoming the first casualty of his own
ethics. For Levinas' highly prised Hebraic tradition, and also that of the Greeks,
has a shameful legacy of excluding other voices, especially those of woman.
This makes Levinas' ethics vulnerable to the sort of questions Luce Irigaray
(1991; 113-114) poses in her essay Questions to Emmanuel Levinas. She
concludes one of the sections by saying:
To go beyond the face of metaphysics would mean precisely to
leave the woman her face, and even to assist her to discover it and
to keep it. Levinas scarcely unveils the disfigurements brought
about by ontotheology.
Levinas grapples with this problem but he does not go far enough. It seems that
the problem of the sexual dynamic that prevails between men and woman is
something he would rather not consider. For instance, he uses only the pronoun
"he," opening up the consideration of another sexual dynamic, that of
homosexuality, but never addresses this explicitly. He does, however, try hard
to allow for any other when he says: "the neighbour, the first one on the scene,
concerns me for the first time (even if he is an old acquaintance, an old friend,
an old lover, long caught up in the fabric of my social relations) in a contingency
that excludes the a priori" (Levinas, 1981; 86).
The question is whether the neighbour can be a sister, a woman. Also, how
would Levinas have to change his view on ethics if he has to allow the feminine
to partake in the debate, to signify ethically, to have a face? He seems to be
obsessed only with the brother and says so in explicit terms. "The neighbour is
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a brother. A fraternity that cannot be abrogated, an unimpeachable assignation,
proximity is an impossibility to move away without the torsion of a complex,
without 'alienation' or fault. This insomnia is the psyche" (Levinas, 1981; 87).
What he says is not wrong but surprisingly biased.
4.11 IN COMPLICITY WITH ART: LEVINAS' BETRAYAL
Levinas' problematic relationship with art bears a connection with the problem of
imagination touched on in the previous section. For Levinas there can be no
real relation with the other except in speech. Answering the call of the other
directly, face-to-face. Even though a book may carry a preface that situates it in
a time specific and congruent with reality the book itself is only a dead image in
the same way as "the smile of the Mona Lisa about to broaden will not broaden"
(Levinas; 1994e; 138). For him the imagination has no real ability to establish
contact with reality. It is significant that Levinas uses writing as a metaphor to
explain this inadequacy of the imagination. He says: "In imagination our gaze
then always goes outward, but imagination modifies or neutralises this gaze: the
real world appears in it as if it where between parenthesis or quote marks"
(Levinas; 1994a; 134).
But it is exactly at this point that it seems that the notion of the trace within the
said becomes most prominent. It is exactly a word that has been placed
between quotation marks that calls forth a memory, a trace, and interrupts the
given meaning of the word. Levinas seems to understand this but cannot allow
the reader to play any significant role. Eventually books have only one fate, in
Levinas' view, and that is to become dead objects that art was unable to
animate. He says:
In writing the saying does indeed become a pure said, a
simultaneousness of the saying and of its conditions. A book is
interrupted discourse catching up with its own breaks. But books
have their fate; they belong to a world they do not include, but
recognise by being written and printed, and by being prefaced and
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getting themselves preceded with forewords. They are interrupted,
and call for other books and in the end are interpreted in a saying
distinct from the said (Levinas, 1981; 171).
Levinas never uses the term "reader" but it is clear that if he did introduce such a
notion it would place his theory on a different level. It is the reader of a text, or
image that interprets and animates it in imagination with the help of memory.
The reader experiences the surprise of a saying in the text that makes the said
come unstuck. Levinas himself uses the appreciation of the images of the
painter Dufy. He says:
This modification by which the same comes unstuck or parts with
itself (like the creaking of a piece of furniture in the silence of the
night), undoes itself into this and that, no longer covers itself and thus
is disclosed (like in Dufy's paintings, where the colours spread out
from the contours and do not rub up against them), becomes a
phenomenon - is the esse of every being (Levinas, 1981; 30).
Levinas critises art even more harshly than philosophy and in his fight against
the atrophying effect of images has no qualms in employing the sacred tools, the
enchanted rock on which philosophy stands, namely "concepts" which he calls
the "muscles of the mind" (Levinas, 1994a; 143). For Levinas the concepts are
eternal, as is God, able to revitalise life but the images of art, and most
prominently the statue, is only "inert matter". For this reason "the proscription of
images is truly the supreme command of monotheism, a doctrine that overcomes
fate" (Levinas, 1994a; 141).
Why should concepts expressed in Greek letters and words, be the only symbols
invested with trust in the exercise of discourse? After all, does not a picture
paint a thousand words and in any language?
For Levinas the problem of the image is that of the radical silence it carries as
exteriority. The imagination is the best example of such a place. Radically
interior and obscure, unreachable and off limits to the other. It is the exclusion
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of the other, the living world, in preference of an atrophied inner sanctum that
knows no outside. But what could he possibly mean then when he says: "then
light presents itself in light, which latter is not thematic, but resounds for the 'eye
that listens,' with a resonance unique in its kind, a resonance of silence"
(Levinas, 1981; 30). Is this "eye that listens" not the best example of the
workings of the imagination. Peters (1997; 15) makes the point most succinctly:
"Levinas is right, then, when he claims that art 'does not give itself out as the
beginning of dialogue', but it is precisely this insight which could have reminded
him of the radical silence surrounding ethics, not least because the rhythm of
alterity has such a silence as its source".
In conclusion Levinas condemns the artistic approach in seeking out the Other
perhaps too harshly. It may indeed be conceded that artists seek only to
establish their own egos supremely, after all Hitler was an art student. However,
when Levinas is called on to suggest ways in which to experience a return to the
mauvaise conscience and, in so doing, to gain ethical and moral insight, his
description of the face is vague, generalistic and metaphysical. While Levinas'
animosity towards art is well understood from the viewpoint of the Adamic myth
and the fall of man, (the imagination (yetser) has a power for evil that was first
dramatised in man's defiance of divine prohibition), art also has a power for
good which grows either good or bad dependent on whether the imagination is
fed by good or bad. The question, therefore, has to be put to Levinas whether
art, or more precisely, the artistic endeavour of confronting one's own ideas by
comparing them to those of others as creations operating in discourse, could not
be regarded as infinitely able to open up an avenue towards the Other.
4.12 SUMMARY
Levinas provides a humanistic ethics that makes concern for the other person a
priority of every individual. The greatest contribution is his insistence that life
should be lived with respect and care for others. However, he does not consider
any ethical relation towards the ecology or to animals which raises questions
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about his consideration of the world as that which is merely at the disposal of
human survival at any cost.
It is also an ethics that depends on the presence of interlocutors in a speech
situation and in this sense does not break with the ontological tradition of
philosophy in any real sense. A consequence of this is that he cannot admit to
the fictional aspect of ethics and eventually has to ground it in the "reality" of a
religious metaphysics. Such a metaphysics does not adequately address the
ethical complexities encountered by contemporary democracy. Thus, in the
following chapter we will look at "deconstruction" as it attempts to keep the
humanist aspect of Levinasian ethics while at the same time broadening the
scope of ethics to include questions about the environment, communications
technology and globalisation.
NOTES
1 Levinas is not consistent in his use of the capital letter to maintain the distinction as I
have set it out but uses the terms "other" and "Other" at times interchangeably.
2 Levinas uses the word other, with a small "0" to designate that which can be
experienced of the world and which is outside myself. Using the word with a capital
letter - Other - designates a relationship with something that is "wholly" different and
falls outside of any sort of comprehension. It is the name of God that in its infinite
unknowableness can never be spoken or written. The ethical relationship of
responsibility with the other is for Levinas the gateway to experiencing the revelation of
the Other itself. Responsibility is the hallmark of the divine life that is a constant filling
up and overflowing. It also signifies the most human face that lies hidden behind the
mask of being. In the Old Testament it is told that all humans where created in the
image of God (Gen. 1: 27 ).
3 The French term for orgasm or orgiastic but meaning also joy or pleasure. Here it is
used in the sense of pleasure derived or given, a pleasure that at the height of its
satisfaction is already descending into dissatisfaction.
4For the purpose of showing the different word usage between the translations of
Aristotle I have quoted the passage from four individual translations. It helps, I believe,
to situate readers of Levinas who might not be familiar with his word use and also
shows the difficulty of translating anyone text so that it forms one coherent meaning.
(Aristotle, 1949; 253)
105
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(Aristotle, 1902; 253 - 254)
(Aristotle, 1901; 341)
(Aristotle, 1934; 338)
5 Aristotle does argue for a reason that is context sensitive. The rational man is
educated by interaction with other members of the polis and is for this reason not
uninfluenced by other members of the state. However, these members all share
Aristotle's belief in reason and forms a community of educated thinkers. There is no
confrontation or interaction with any "other" that falls outside this community of
legitimate citizens in a radical way.
6 It "is not an objective pulse; it is, rather, a rhythm where 'participation' takes the ego
both outside of itself and away from an objective 'reality to be captured'. This is far
removed from the sympathetic communion sought by Bergson, which, in the tradition of
Kant's analytic of the beautiful, generates pleasure. Here it is more a question of
'horror', the horror of absolute passivity experienced as 'participation' in an alterity
ontologically incapeable of retention or protention" (Peters, 1997; 13).
7A poignant example of what Levinas is trying to get at here is given in Spielberg's film
Shindler's List. The camp commander, Goetz, is told by Shindler that true power
resides in being able to pardon someone for a wrongdoing. In a macabre scene where
one can see Goetz struggling with his beliefs and the impossible situation he finds
himself in, as a Nazi commander in charge of exterminating Jews, he flippantly pardons
first his Jewish housekeeper for some domestic mishap and then his Jewish stable boy
for leaving an expensive saddle on the ground. What he did not count on was the fact
that such an act of pardon translates into an act of love towards another. A humane
act of recognition of the other's right to life. A life with a face that can turn towards me
with a "thank you" or a plea for help, or possible counter violence. Goetz starts to
realise what his action of pardon actually means. This puts him in a terrible dilemma
because as Levinas points out "the murdered people transported on the lorries . . .
[was] referred to in neutral terms - die Scheiss - they weren't human bodies" (Mortley,
1991; 21).
8 The il ya is the being-in-general that houses the unhappy consciousness. It is written
in many forms but relates to the same basic sadness that lingers in creation due to the
feeling of loneliness experienced by an awakened self-consciousness. "The God of the
mystics yearned to be known by his creatures. The Ismailis believed that the noun ilah
(god) sprang from the Arabic root WLH: to be sad, to sigh for" (Armstrong, 1994; 273).
9 For Hegel the characterization of the Absolute and for Leibniz the law of Identity. No
distinctions are real, and identity with itself is the only ultimate equivalence.
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CHAPTER FIVE
JACQUES DERRIDA
A DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN REGARDING ETHICS
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The word deconstruction signals a development in the history of philosophy
that places its most cherished concepts and assumptions under serious and
rigorous scrutiny. Deconstruction poses the philosophical question, not only
to the tradition of philosophical writing but also to the writing it produces in
the process, namely, What is it? (Derrida, 1992c; 34). The ethical
significance of this question is of primary importance. It is not accepted that
deconstruction asks the question in the name of a specific group or of a
specific politics. It aims at opening a discussion about what is not already
understood as purely given. In this way dialogue is encouraged on topics
that does not furnish ready made answers.
In this chapter we will proceed by firstly looking at the difficulty that presents
itself in defining deconstruction. This process also serves as a demonstration
of the difficulties encountered in providing definitions in general.
Secondly, the resistance of religious belief against ethics will be looked at.
This is of utmost importance because a difference has to be identified
between the self-closure of belief and the openness towards alternative
points of view that creates a space for ethics.
Thirdly, a technical discussion on the importance of the philosophical notion
of khora attempts to show how deconstruction works toward creating an
opening for ethics within philosophy that traditionally attempts to establish
itself as a metaphysics that logically finalises all discussion.
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Fourthly, the time for ethics as it attempts to utilise this space opened by
deconstruction is explored. A few suggestions about topics that might merit
the time of an ethical investigation is also suggested.
5.2 DECONSTRUCTION INA NUTSHELL
Derrida relates an incident that occurred on the occasion at which he
received an honorary degree from Cambridge University, where a journalist
asked him: "Well, could you tell me, in a nutshell, what is deconstruction?"
(Caputo, 1997; 16).
In answer to this, one could say from the outset that the idea of a nutshell or
capsule or, for that matter, any other example of collection or gathering is a
mistake in this context. The task deconstruction sets itself "is to mark humbly
and clearly that things are still more complicated - and that the reader ought
to be aware of it" (Derrida, 1992c; 429). Deconstruction is set on opening up
and complexifying in an attempt to release unheard of and as yet un-dreamt
of possibilities. Hence, deconstruction attempts to crack nutshells wherever
they appear.
This makes the idea of the nutshell immediately problematic, for as soon as
we think that we have slammed the door on deconstruction, it swings back to
hit us in the behind. This hinged motion that allows deconstruction to be at
the same time defined and already swinging against the limit of the definition
can be called the "aporetics of the nutshell" (Caputo, 1997; 32).
It is exactly this motion that is the force of deconstruction. Deconstruction
resists summary and yet we have to summarise if we are to make any sense
of it and if it is to be of any use to us in making decisions in everyday life.
The epotie', however, confronts us with the utter paralysis and impossibility
of delivering the final definition. It is exactly this formidable impasse that
drives deconstruction, that gives it the energy to get up in the morning.
Derrida (1993a: 13) returns to Aristotle's Physics IV as the original place in
which the word is found in terms of the "aporia of time": dia ton exoterikon
logon. It regards the problem of a "certain impossibility as non-viability, as
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non-track or barred path. (Diaporeo is Aristotle's term here; it means 'I'm
stuck [dans l'embarras], I cannot get out, I'm helpless')." This is as much of a
description as one can venture about that which defies description for "it is
impossible to determine time both as entity and non-entity ...The now is and
is not what it is. More precisely, it only 'scarcely' (amundros) is what it is"
(Derrida; 1993a: 13-14). With the notion of the aporia, Derrida establishes a
way of thinking through new events and challenges that does not disregard
the past. It is a process of mourning in which what has gone before and has
established certain barriers, limits and rules are remembered and
acknowledged.
However, mourning indicates that an event already took place, death, for
instance, that always comes as a surprise, necessitates the adjustment of
boundaries and accepted spaces in order to live on, to start anew. These
acts of mourning pertain "in all the domains where the questions of decision
and of responsibility that concern the border - ethics, law, politics, etc. - are
posed" (Derrida; 1993a: 15).
What we seek when suggesting a nutshell for deconstruction is to expose its
style (Gallop, 1985; 23), or its signature, as Derrida (1982a; 328) prefers.
Caputo (1997; 33) suggests that several spirits inhabit a deconstructive way
of reading and writing, thinking and acting that appreciates the aporia into
which (even tentatively suggesting) a nutshell leads us and the seemingly
impossible task of escaping from it.
5.2.1 Experience as Language
Deconstruction is characterised by a specific notion of "experience". An
impossible thing would be hard to experience in the traditional
phenomenological sense that entails the perception of that which presents
itself. So, Derrida looks for a way of describing experience that is not an
explicitly visual metaphor. Firstly, he ties experience to loss, and specifically
to the "very common experience" of the most "inconsolable" suffering, the
loss of memory. As he (Derrida, 1995i; 207) says it is:
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... as if an appeal for a witness had no witness, in some way,
not even the witness that I could be for what I have lived. This
for me is the very experience of death, of catastrophe.
The loss of memory acts as an experience of cinders or traces for Derrida
which is not only the experience of forgetting, but inevitably also "the
forgetting of forgetting, of the forgetting of which nothing remains" (Derrida,
1995i; 207). This marks the worst of all experiences that is also, at the same
time, a "benediction".
Secondly, Derrida turns to "maritime language" (an indication, perhaps, that
experience is always also a sense of being at sea, cut adrift, so to speak) to
furnish his description of experience with the notion of parages, which literally
means vicinity. It is a metaphor for being in the proximity of something at a
distance that is difficult to measure and designates that which is neither near
nor far, a definite attraction or kinship, but without fusion. The image that
presents itself, is of two boats hailing each other over the expanse of an
ocean that lies between them. For Derrida to mention the word experience,
to ask "what is experience?" immediately places the questioner in the vicinity
of "philosophical experience, experience of language" (Derrida, 1992c; 373),
an ocean of memory traces. He urges (Derrida, 1992c; 373) that,
[t]he philosopher has indeed to recognize that philosophy does
not take place outside of a natural language. The so-called
fundamental concepts of philosophy were tied to the history of
certain languages, the Greek language, the German language,
the Latin language; and there comes a moment in which one
can no longer dissociate the concept from the word in some
way. Sometimes this link between the concept and the word
imports metaphors, tropes, rhetorical figures that, without being
assimilable to the philosophical concept, continue nonetheless
to haunt it, so that the philosophical critique may often consist in
liberating oneself from the rhetorical figure ... and from the
source in a natural language.
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Further, experience supposes the interaction of something that experiences
and something else that is experienced. But, when coming out of the aporia,
when breaking through the limit of impossibility, the distinction is not
immediately clear. As Derrida (1992c; 373) puts it,
[e]xperience obviously supposes a meeting, reception, perception,
but in perhaps a stricter sense, it indicates the movement of
traversing. To experience is to advance by navigating, to walk by
traversing. And by traversing consequently a limit or border.
Thus, for Derrida experience is rooted in the language that relates the
experience and constitutes memory. Memory and language are forever
running up against the limits of what can never be present and passing the
limits of the un-presentable and the un-re-presentable in a quest forthe most
desirable experience of all: experience of the. impossible. In an ocean of
memory the most impossible thing is to communicate clearly. To make
meaning understandable. This is the impossible task that deconstruction sets
itself. How does explanation and language work to gather traces and make
an utterance mean something? This is a question that preoccupies
deconstruction.
5.2.2 The Scene of Writing
Derrida works with a theory of language that is produced through a careful
deconstruction of the work of Ferdinand de Saussure on the way language is
structured. Saussure's theory operates with three key notions, referent
(object-in-the-world), signified (mental picture; semantic meaning) and
signifier (the "word" or "mark"). Firstly, Saussure makes a rigid distinction
between langue, the structure of language, and parole, the use of language.
Langue is supposed to precede parole as an exhaustive list of the rules of
language to which parole must adhere if it is to be successful in expressing
any meaning. But, as Derrida shows, which one of these is responsible for
language in the first place, is not at all a made case. This is not only a
problem for language in the common sense of this word, but for any system of
signs in general. The question remains open: what constitutes language in
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the first place, the rules or the use? Derrida describes an opening in this
circle:
One must recognise, prior to any dissociation of langue and
parole, code and message, and what goes with it, a systematic
production of differences, the production of a system of differences
- a differance among whose effects one might later, by abstraction
and for specific reasons, distinguish a linguistics of langue from a
linguisties of parole (Derrida, 1981b; 28).
Secondly, for Saussure distance, absence, misunderstanding, insincerity, and
ambiguity are features of writing. In order to overcome these "problems" he
distinguishes writing from speech in order to construct a model of
communication that takes as its norm an ideal associated with speech. The
latter seems to promise that "words bear a meaning and the listener can in
principle grasp precisely what the speaker has in mind" (Culler, 1994; 101).
However, Derrida suggests that meaning is never simply present, as a
referent or signified, but has to be found through a process of deconstruction,
even, and perhaps especially, when the speaker is standing before us.
According to Derrida this is a notion that has been suppressed throughout the
history of Western philosophy. Ever since Plato metaphysics privileges
"unity, identity, immediacy, and temporal and spatial presentness over
distance, difference, dissimulation, and deferment" (Derrida, 1981a; vii). The
"metaphysics of presence" privileges the spoken word over the written word,
a phenomenon Derrida calls "Iogocentrism" (Derrida, 1976; 12). Extended it
also reveals a privileged male subject in philosophy as a "desire to posit a
'central' presence at beginning and end" (Derrida, 1976; lxviii). Derrida calls
this "phallologocentrism" (Derrida, 1976; lxix).
By way of deconstruction these privileges are placed in question.
Deconstruction makes the point that both the referent and signified is subject
to the signifier and that one can only speak or write by using signifiers.
Signifiers only refer to other signifiers. Meaning is thus produced through the
relationships in which signifiers find themselves, one to the other. These
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relationships are rearranged constantly through an infinite playfulness,
another word for eresure' bywhich signification proceeds.
Derrida introduces "writing" as the "signifier of the signifier" to be a model for
the linguistic system. "In all senses of the word, writing thus comprehends
language" (Derrida, 1976; 7). Derrida finds in writing a place from which the
privilege of presence in all its guises can be interrogated and asked to justify
itself. In literature and writing in general space for interrogation is opened up.
As Derrida (1995b; 159) says:
My central question is: from what site or non-site (non-lieu) can
philosophy as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it
can interrogate and reflect upon itself in an original manner? Such
a non-site or alterity would be radically irreducible to philosophy.
... In literature, for example, philosophical language is still present
in some sense, but it produces and presents itself as alienated
from itself, at a remove, at a distance. This distance provides the
necessary free space from which to interrogate philosophy anew,
and it was my preoccupation with literary texts, which enabled me
to discern the problematic of writing as one of the key factors in
the deconstruction of metaphysics.
The main characteristic of philosophy is to solve problems, to show how
things are, or to untangle a difficulty. The aim is always to put an end to
writing on a topic by getting it right. This is, however, not a characteristic
exclusive to philosophy but pertains to any discipline. The latter must
suppose the possibility of solving a problem, finding the truth, and writing the
last word on a topic. The idea, that structures any discipline, or philosophy is
the "idea of an investigation in which writing might be brought to an end"
(Culler, 1994; 90). It is for this reason that "the philosophical text, although it
is in fact always written, includes, precisely as its philosophical specificity, the
project of effacing itself in the face of the signified content which it transports
and in general teaches" (Derrida; 1976, 160).
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All critics are inspired to write by this drive to get it right or to get to the truth.
It is a desire that cannot meet with satisfaction because "paradoxically, the
more powerful and authoritative an interpretation, the more writing it
generates" (Culler, 1994; 90)
However, it is exactly the problem of mediation that Derrida explores. Neither
reason nor truth is unmediated. It has to pass through language and by
definition through writing. For Derrida, as Culler rightly says, "it is in writing
that the unfortunate aspects of mediation become apparent. Writing presents
language as a series of physical marks that operate in the absence of the
speaker. They may be highly ambiguous or organised in artful rhetorical
patterns" (Culler, 1994; 91). Even when philosophy admits this mediation it
still holds out an ideal "to contemplate thought directly" by insisting that
"language should be as transparent as possible" (Culler, 1994; 91). This
ideal very easily slips into obscurity and becomes the invisible, unquestioned
structure of philosophy. The ideal fiction of Unmediated Truth forgets that it
is a fiction.
The term "transparent" here seems innocent enough. However, that which
becomes transparent does not only allow us to see through, but also holds
the possibility of leaving nothing to see. Language and that which it attempts
to bring to light may just as easily disappear. By insisting on the privilege of a
speaking subject, whose words could disappear as they make the meaning
that supposedly resides in them come to light, philosophy can claim to ground
the guarantee of meaning in a subject that can defend his words and stand in
for their meaning, allowing no misunderstanding. This subject can
immediately take control of any misappropriation of the intended referent or
signified that his words, the successive signifiers, employ. His meaning can
be defended in his presence and be made immediately accessible. This
allows the subject to hide the use he makes of signifiers. The object,
meaning (represented as signified and referent) is taken control of and
appropriated by the subject. In a way, the subject swallows the object and
becomes meaning incarnate. Hence, the only meaning is the meaning
sanctioned by the speaking subject in full presence. The risk run in rejecting
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the signifier, is that language loses its physicality, its body, and disappears
like smoke.
This exclusion of writing, in Plato and elsewhere, Derrida calls
"phonocentrism" "and does not depend on a choice that could have been
avoided" (Derrida, 1976; 7). It is an attitude that treats writing as a
representation or supplement of speech and puts speech in a direct and
natural relationship with meaning. It is inextricably associated with the
"Iogocentrism" of metaphysics, the orientation of philosophy toward an order
of meaning (thought, truth, reason, logic, the Word) conceived as existing in
itself, as foundation. Derrida (1993e, 279 - 280) explains:
The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the
history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix .. is the
determination of Being as presence in all senses of this word. It
could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to
principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable
presence - eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia, (essence,
existence, substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality,
consciousness, God, man, and so forth".
None of these concepts escape the notion of presence. Its figure pervades
philosophical attempts to describe what is fundamental. All the above
mentioned concepts have, at some time or another, been treated as a
centring, grounding force or principle. As Derrida (1995a; 93) makes clear:
The enterprise of returning "strategically," ideally, to an origin or to
a "priority" held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, standard, self-
identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complication,
deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians, ... have
proceeded in this way, conceiving good to be before evil, the
positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the
simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the
imitated before the imitation, etc. And this is not just one
metaphysical gesture among others, it is the metaphysical
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exigency, that which has been the most constant, most profound
and most potent.
Presence establishes itself as the ultimate authority. Its power of valorisation
structures all our thinking. Conventional notions such as "making clear,"
"grasping," "demonstrating," "revealing," and "showing what is the case" all
invoke presence. Culler (1994; 94) summarises two types of appeal to
presence as typical:
• Firstly, that the "I" resists radical doubt because it is present to itself in the
act of thinking or doubting, which is the appeal to presence Descartes uses
to establish the cogito.
• Secondly, that the meaning of an utterance is what is present to the
consciousness of the speaker as "intention", that is, what he or she "has in
mind" at the moment of utterance.
The metaphysics of presence is thus pervasive, familiar, and powerful.
However, Culler (1994; 94) continues, it characteristically encounters the
following problem:
... when arguments cite particular instances of presence as
grounds for further development, these instances invariably prove
to be already complex constructions. What is proposed as a
given, an elementary constituent, proves to be a product,
dependent or derived in ways that deprive it of the authority of
simple or pure presence ... The presence of motion is conceivable,
it turns out, only insofar as every instant is already markedwith the
traces of the past and the future.
Hence, the present instant can serve as ground only insofar as it is not a pure
and autonomous given. By introducing motion, a movement from past
through present to future, the claimed moment of pure presence must already
be marked by difference and deferral. Presence is derived as an effect of
differences.
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A "subject" claiming pure presence in the moment is constituted as such only
by the difference of that moment to another moment in the past or a moment
that awaits. Hence Derrida (1976; lxii) "works, rather, with a 'subject' which
can never be a 'total personality,' the 'exercise of whose function' is to be
forever divided from the object of its desire ... and to constitute itself in the
distortive play of metaphor and metonymy - displacement and condensation -
that forever distances the other, the object of its desire, from itself'.
Absence, as an impure absence, is not the negation of presence. Instead
absence makes presence possible in a non-symmetrical relation. To risk an
even stronger formulation: absence is the condition for any notion of
presence. Hence, we can treat "presence" as the effect of a "generalised
absence" or, as Derrida calls it, of différance. The latter is Derrida's solution
to the tricky problem of avoiding any clearly marked theoretical opposition
between absence and presence. The technical term différance is
pronounced the same as difference and thus in spoken language the
ambiguity is not apparent. It is only in the written form that a space seems to
open up within the word itself allowing another interpretation. As Derrida
(1981b; 27) says:
[Différance] is a structure and a movement that cannot be
conceived on the basis of the opposition presence/absence.
Différance is the systematic play of differences, of traces of
differences, of the spacing [espacement] by which elements relate
to one another. This spacing is the production, simultaneously
active and passive (the a of différance indicates this indecision as
regards activity and passivity, that which cannot yet be governed
and organised by that opposition), of intervals without which the
"full" terms could not signify, could not function.
The smallest unit in Derrida's system is the notion of trace. Trace is not
quantifiable as a singularity at a given point, it is rather unstable and tends to
flicker in and out of existence. Its unpredictability is at the root of the
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uncertainty of meaning in any linguistic system. Traces are present and
absent from all forms of meaning suggesting that:
Whether in written or in spoken discourse, no element can function
as a sign without relating to another element which itself is not
simply present. This linkage means that each "element" - phoneme
or grapheme - is constituted with reference to the trace in it of the
other elements of the sequence or system. This linkage, this
weaving, is the text, which is produced only through the
transformation of another text. Nothing, either in the elements or
in the system, is anywhere simply present or absent. There are
only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces (Derrida, 1981b;
26).
Hence, acts of signification depend on differences such as the contrast
between "food" and "nonfood" that allows food to be signified, or the contrast
between signifying elements that allows a sequence to function as a signifier.
The sound sequence bat is a signifier because it contrasts with pat, mat, bad,
bet, etc. The noise that is "present" when one says bat is inhabited by the
traces of forms one is not uttering, and it can function as a signifier only
insofar as it consists of such traces.
An account of language seeking solid foundation, will doubtless wish to treat
meaning as something somewhere present for instance present to
consciousness at the moment of the signifying event; but any presence it
invokes turns out to be already inhabited by difference.
However, if one tries instead to ground an account of meaning on difference,
one fares no better, for differences are never given as such and are always
produced. A scrupulous theory must shift back and forth between these
perspectives, of event and structure or parole and langue, which never lead
to a synthesis "into that which is properly dialectical" (Derrida, 1993; 14).
The more rigorously Saussure pursues his investigations, the more he is led
to insist on the purely relational nature of the linguistic system and also the
arbitrariness of this relation. Indeed, he concludes that "in the linguistic
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system there are only differences, without positive terms" (Saussure, 1974;
120).
The system with no positive terms is an instance of the paradoxical notion of
the "exoteric aporia ... in a certain way irreducible, calling for an endurance,
or shall we rather sayan experience other than that consisting in opposing,
from both sides of an indivisible line, an other concept, a non-vulgar concept,
to the so-called vulgar concept" (Derrida, 1993a; 14).
For Saussure the model of a trace may very well reside in sound. He argues
that sound itself cannot belong to the system but that "it permits the
manifestation of units of the system in acts of speech" (Culler, 1994; 98). For
Derrida this is true of writing more than speech because in writing the trace
can be apparent as an etymological mark, for instance, within the unit or
word. He (Derrida, 1976; 159) says:
... there has never been anything but writing; there have never
been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which
could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the
"real" supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning
from a trace and from the invocation of the supplement, etc.
Nature, ... have always already escaped, have never existed; that
what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance
of natural presence.
5.2.3 The Reader and her Reading
Culler presents the case of woman readers as an example of "resistant
reading". It is an important example for ethics in the sense that it illustrates
why certain oppressed groups may not have the courage to enter into a
debate about injustice. It is further an instance of an interpretation of Derrida
by a critic that attempts to put deconstruction to practical use. Deconstruction
is a resistant reading against the presence of the "intention" of the author as
it presents itself in a text. The "case of woman" is not here treated as a
special case, but as one among many.
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The example presupposes that it has been expected of women since time
immemorial to identify with male rationality. When a woman reads, she is
required to identify with the pronoun "he". A similar shift in identity is not
expected from male readers. However, "to ask a woman to read as a woman
is ... a divided request. It appeals to the condition of being a woman as if it
were a given and simultaneously urges that this condition be created or
achieved" (Culler; 1994; 49).
Oppression in other forms (race, ethnic groups, disability, age) functions in
the sameway. Culler (1994; 50) commentsthat:
The most insidious oppression alienates a group from its own
interests as a group and encourages it to identify with the
interests of the oppressors, so that political struggles must first
awaken a group to its interests and its "experience".
For deconstruction, as we have seen, experience is the experience of
language and is thus closely bound to literature the soil of language. Culler
attempts to illustrate what reading deconstructively entails by resorting to a
founding fable of American literature, The Legend of Sleepy Hal/ow. This is
the story of protagonist Rip Van Winkle, the allegorical figure of the birth of
the American imagination. It is the first successful "homegrown" American
legend and it celebrates, however playfully, "the flight of the dreamer from the
shrew". This legend sets up the archetype for the American novel if it is to
investigate or articulate a distinctively American experience. The basic
schema of this archetype typically has the male protagonist struggling against
the constricting, civilising, oppressive forces embodied by woman. The
protagonist is seen as embodying the universal American dream, it is the
dream of "a man on the run, harried into the forest and out to sea, down the
river or into combat - anywhere to avoid 'civilisation,' which is to say, the
confrontation of a man and a woman which leads to the fall to sex, marriage,
and responsibility" (Culler, 1994; 51-52).
The effect of this archetype throughout American literature is to alienate the
woman reader because "what is essentially a simple act of identification when
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the reader of the story is male becomes a tangle of contradictions when the
reader is female ... she is required to identify against herself' (Culler, 1994;
52). If a woman wants to continue reading as a woman she has to "become a
resisting rather than an assenting reader" (Culler, 1994; 53). Instead of trying
to identify with a protagonist that is constantly fleeing, not only from women in
general but also from women who want to identify with it, women have to
insist on protagonists that embody their concerns.
As we have argued, a group's oppressed interests can be brought to the
group's attention by focusing on it's actual experiences. We suggested that
the experience most likely to bring out the oppression of woman is an
experience of reading that provides leverage for displacing or undoing the
system of concepts or procedures of male criticism. However, " 'experience'
always has [a] divided, duplicitous character: It has always already occurred
and yet is still to be produced - an indispensable point of reference, yet never
simply there" (Culler, 1994; 63).
Derrida's insight that "experience is language" is valuable here because it is
only as writing that we can truly come into contact with the body of
experience. The act of reading and subsequently of writing asks of the
reader/writer to assume certain roles in the wayan actor would do. "To read
is to play the role of a reader and to interpret is to posit an experience of
reading.... to read and interpret literary works is precisely to imagine what 'a
reader' would feel and understand" (Culler, 1994; 67). It is a process that
proceeds by the "suspension of disbelief'.
The roles of reader/writer can be played out by bearing in mind three cues
that vary but inevitably guide all stories (Culler, 199450, 69-73):
• the issue of control,
• the question of the content of the text,
• the ending.
On the question of control, it would be a mistake to think that "[t]he shift back
and forth ... between readers' decisive actions and readers' automatic
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responses" (Culler, 1994; 73) should be corrected. This indecisiveness is a
structural necessity of a reading that is to produce another writing. The
control that seeks to bring to an end this fluctuating motion in reading and
force equilibrium also runs the risk of bringing reading and writing, hence
language to an end. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that a
...reader who creates everything learns nothing, but one who is
continually encountering the unexpected can make momentous,
unsettling findings. The more a theory stresses the reader's
freedom, control, and constitutive activity, the more likely it is to
lead to stories of dramatic encounters and surprises which portray
reading as a process of discovery (Culler, 1994; 72).
What is in the text is a matter closely related to control. If all control is
abandoned, in other words, if a reader makes everything up, there can be no
notion of a text that exists as an object for scrutiny. Thus, "interpretation is
always interpretation of something, and that something functions as the
object in a subject-object relation, even though it can be regarded as the
product of prior interpretations" (Culler, 1994; 74). What is inside the text is
thus not an authoritative meaning that needs to be found and followed but an
object to be experienced, a world in which we may learn through imaginative
interaction.
All stories have an end even if it is an end that promises a continuation or an
end that opens up further reading. The question, however, can be put as to
whether or not all stories end in know/edge.
At the end of the seventeenth century discovery was a process
offering reassurances as regards the certitudo sa/utis, thus
relieving the distress caused by the Calvanist doctrine of
predestination. In the eighteenth century, instead of discovering
that they were saved, readers discovered 'human nature.' In the
nineteenth century the reader 'had to discover the fact that society
imposed a part on him, the object being for him eventually to take
up a critical attitude toward this imposition. In the twentieth
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century, the discovery concerns the functioning of our own
faculties of perception .... The outcome of reading, it seems, is
always knowledge (Culler, 1994; 78-79).
It seems that when it comes to legitim ising the telling of a story, or interest in
a story it must always be sanctioned beforehand by a promise that knowledge
will be gained from it. The pure pleasure of listening to a story even if it does
not guarantee any knowledge as an outcome seems to be an unfathomable
risk. "It is as though what permits one to describe reading as misadventure is
the happy ending that transforms a series of reactions into an understanding
of the text and of the self that has engaged with the text. The text's
manipulation of the reader makes a good story only if it turns out well" (Culler,
1994; 79). This is an idealised notion of reading that cannot hold under all
circumstances. There is no guarantee that the subject who engaged with a
text will not come away feeling fundamentally interrupted, its unity shattered,
by what it has experienced in a text. And there is further no guarantee that
the subject will ever be able to reunite all the shattered pieces into
coherence. That is if it can still assume that any coherence exists at all. The
American literary critic Harold Bloom "sees no escape or transcendence" as
the necessary outcome of a reading. In his opinion "the best a reader can
achieve is a strong misreading - a reading that will in turn produce others"
(Culler, 1994; 79-80).
Hence, if a resistant reading is followed, it has to contend with these three
things, namely that control of the reading is largely abandoned, that the
authoritative meaning of the author is disregarded or not even admitted to
exist and that the end does not guarantee a gain in knowledge. In this thesis
such a resistant reading is not only suggested for the woman reader but
seeks to go even further and expand these themes to a notion of what
"ethical reading" might be.
5.2.4 The Meaning of Iteration and the Iteration of Meaning
From the treatment to which Derrida submits the language theory of Saussure
and the notion of a resistant reading, it can be inferred that deconstruction
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favours an anything-goes approach to meaning, that in effect deconstruction
abandons all notions of meaning. This would surely suit those who would
want to make deconstruction the ultimate nihilism. But that cannot be further
from what deconstruction desires. Deconstruction is instead driven by an
insatiable thirst for meaning. Meaning is approached through the notion of
iterability. Something can be a signifying sequence only if it is iterable, only if
it can be repeated in various serious and non-serious contexts, cited, and
parodied.
The distinction between using an expression and mentioning it is of help here.
Mentioning what someone else has said inevitably entails giving a slightly
new meaning and force to the discourse. On the other hand, since everybody
uses expressions, every use of language entails some element of mentioning.
"I love you, is a case in point" (Culler, 1994; 120). Mentioning is thus not a
parasitic form of utterance that attaches to use. Instead iteration depends on
the fact that cases of use and mention are dependent upon each other.
In speech act theory Austin tries to give an exhaustive account of what a
performative would be. A performative's illocutionary force is held to depend
upon the intention of the performer. In order to account for meaning, the
necessary features of the context, such as the nature of the words, the
persons uttering them and the circumstances required, must all be
exhaustively listed. But, as Derrida says: "Context is always, and always has
been, at work within the place, and not only around it" (Derrida, 1995a; 60).
To illustrate this one can consider a scenario in which the requirements for a
marriage ceremony were met, but one of the parties was under hypnosis, or
in which the ceremony were impeccable in all respects, but was called a
'rehearsal,' or in which the minister were licensed to perform a marriage and
the couple had obtained a license, but all three of them were on this occasion
acting in a play. Considering only the intended meaning and not the effect
that a speech act may have, we will fail to see that for someone on the
receiving end of a performative the words may have signified very
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successfully. What Derrida shows with regards to iteration is that there
cannot be any meaningless sentences.
When anyone proposes an example of a meaningless sentence, listeners can
usually imagine a context in which it would in fact have meaning. By placing
a frame (parergon) (Derrida, 1987b; 63) around it, they can make it signify. In
order to arrest or control this process, which threatens the possibility of a
successful theory of speech acts, Austin is led to reintroduce the notion,
previously rejected, that the meaning of an utterance depends on the
presence of a signifying intention in the consciousness of a speaker. He
goes about doing this in two ways:
• First, he sets aside the nonserious - a notion not explicitely defined but
which clearly would involve reference to intention: a "serious" speech act is
one in which the speaker consciously assents to the act he appears to be
performing (Culler, 1994; 122).
• Second, he introduces intention as one feature of the circumstances by
setting aside speech acts performed unintentionally - done under duress,
or by accident, or owing to this or that variety of mistakes, say, or
otherwise unintentionally (Culler, 1994; 122).
However, this reintroduction of intention does not solve the problem of
context; intention cannot serve as the decisive determinant or the ultimate
foundation of a theory of speech acts. What the speaker had in mind at the
moment of utterance does not determine what speech act his utterance
performed. What counts is the plausibility of the description of the
circumstances: whether the features of the context create a frame that alters
the illocutionary force of the utterances.
Thus the possibility of grafting an utterance upon a new context, of repeating
a formula in different circumstances, does not discredit the principle that
illocutionary force is determined by context rather than by intention. What the
indissociability of performative and performance puts in question is not the
determination of illocutionary force by context but the possibility of mastering
the domain of speech acts by exhaustively specifying the contextual
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determinants of illocutionary force. This is a general principle that holds
sway wherever deconstruction engages. A theory of speech acts must in
principle be able to specify every feature of context that might affect the
success or failure of a given speech act or that might affect what particular
speech act an utterance effectively performed. This would require, as Austin
recognises, a mastery of the total context. But, the total context is
unmasterable, both in principle and in practice. Meaning is context-bound,
but context is boundless. As Derrida (1995a; 79) says:
Every sign, linguistic or non-linguistic, spoken or written (in the
current sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can ...
break with every context, engendering an infinity of new contexts
in a manner which is absolutely illimitable. This does not imply
that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the contrary that
there are only contexts without any centre or absolute anchoring
[ancrage].
Culler (1994; 124) explains this boundlessness with the following two
examples:
• First, any given context is open to further description. There is no limit in
principle to what might be included in a given context, to what might be
shown to be relevant to the performance of a particular speech act. The
notion of the unconscious is important because, if unconscious desire
becomes a contextual consideration, the status of some speech acts will
change. For instance, an utterance that promises to do what the listener
apparently wants but unconsciously dreads might thus cease to be a
promise and become a threat; conversely, an utterance that would be
deemed a defective promise, because it "promises" something the listener
claims nona want, might become a well formed promise.
• Secondly, any attempt to codify context can always be grafted onto the
context it sought to describe, yielding a new context which escapes the
previous formulation. Culler uses an example provided by Wittgenstein.
The suggestion that "one cannot say 'bububu' and mean 'if it does not rain
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I shall go out for a walk,' has, paradoxically, made it possible to do just
that".
Austin gives the act of signing one's signature as the equivalent in writing of
an explicit performative utterance with the form 'I hereby ... '. Signing one's
signature is a most common everyday procedure by which we aim to
authoritatively take responsibility for an utterance. It is not uncommon for us
to feel that by signing a document one intends its meaning and seriously
performs the signifying act it accomplishes.
But, again, certain questions can complicate what Austin and we so readily
accept. For instance is it still a signature when the supposed signatory calls
it counterfeit? Can one counterfeit one's own signature? "Are there
signatures" (Derrida, 1982a: 328).
Traditionally a signature is supposed to witness the presence to
consciousness of a signifying intention at a particular moment. The case of
the signature presents a moment when I fully intended a particular meaning,
no matter what my thoughts were before or after and obliges me to return in
fullness to that moment when called to do so. "In order to function, that is, in
order to be legible, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imateable
form; it must be able to detach" itself from the present and singular intention
of its production" (Derrida; 1982a; 328).
The signature on a check has to correspond to a model of the signature that
was previously given to the bank. If a check is signed with an acceptable
copy of the model the check can be cashed whatever my intentions at the
moment of signature. Hence, it is also part of the structure of the signature
that it can be produced by a stamp or by a machine. "The requirement that a
signature be recognisable as a repetition introduces the possibility of a
machine as part of the structure of the signature at the same time as it
eliminates the need for any particular intention at the point of signature"
(Culler, 1994; 126-127). Culler is of the opinion that the need for intention is
eliminated totally but Derrida himself does not take such a radical stance. He
(Derrida; 1982a, 326) says:
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... the category of intention will not disappear; it will have its place,
but from this place it will no longer be able to govern the entire
scene and the entire system of utterances. Above all, one then
would be concerned with different types of marks or chains of
iterabie marks, and not with an opposition between citational
statements on the one hand, and singular and original statement-
events on the other. The first consequence of this would be the
following: given this structure of iteration, the intention which
animates utterance will never be completely present in itself and
its content. The iteration which structures it a priori introduces an
essential dehiscence and demarcation.
It is not a matter of denying that signatories have intentions, but of situating
those intentions in the subject of enunciation. The moment of enunciation
overflows with the fullness of the unconscious, which is the excess of what
one says over what one knows, or of what one says over what one wants to
say. "Above all I will not conclude from this that there is no relative specificity
of the effects of consciousness, of the effects of speech (in opposition to
writing in the traditional sense), that there is no effect of the performative, no
effect of ordinary language, no effect of presence and of speech acts. It is
just that these effects do not exclude what is generally opposed to them term
by term, but on the contrary presuppose it in dyssemtrical fashion, as the
general space of their possibility" (Derrida, 1982a; 327).
In its engagement with philosophy's essentialising theories, deconstruction
emphasises that discourse, meaning and reading are thoroughly historical,
produced in process of contextualisation, decontextualisation, and
recontextualisation. By way of iteration meaning is made clear and
knowledge gained as that which was incompr.ehensibleat first sight starts to
look more and more familiar at every return. Derrida supplements this way of
drawing frames around contexts with self-love or auto-affection. The subject
who loves itself and seeks to preserve its own life seeks to know its
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surroundings and to learn how to control and make use of it to optimal benefit
of itself. As Derrida (1976; 166)writes:
This possibility - another name for 'life' - is a general structure
articulated by the history of life, and leading to complex and
hierarchical operations. Auto-affection, the as-far-itself -
subjectivity - gains in power and its mastery of the other to the
extent that its power of repetition idealises itself. Here idealisation
is the movement by which sensory exteriority, that which affects
me or serves me as signifier, submits itself to my power of
repetition, to what thenceforward appears to me as my spontaneity
and escapes me less and less.
History, as this continuing return of the same that grasps meaning by
repeating it, is not a privileged authority. We are always interpreting history
as part of a general text, making determinations of meaning and halting, for
practical reasons, the investigation and redescription of context.
Deconstruction's insistence on a continuing interpretation ensures that what
is reiterated is not a pure repetition of what has gone before. As we shall see
in the following section this insistence takes the form of a graft.
Iteration thus has a double movement, a double interpretation that resists
settling on either side but rather oscillate between two readings. Derrida
(1993e; 292-293) is clear on this point:
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of
sign, of play. The one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a
truth or an origin which escapes play and the order of the sign, and
which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. The other,
which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries
to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the
name of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or
of ontotheology - in other words, throughout his entire history - has
dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and
the end of play.
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The humanities in general, and philosophy specifically, unlike pure sciences
like mathematics for instance, often seem touched with the belief that a
theory which asserts the ultimate indeterminacy of meaning makes all effort
pointless. To allay such fears one has to point out that through the
movement of iterability an opposition that is deconstructed is not destroyed or
abandoned but reinscribed. Hence, "meaning is produced by a process of
grafting, and speech acts, both serious and nonserious" (Culler, 1994; 134).
This resistant reading that reinscribes itself again and again into another
signifying chain holds ethical implications, it keeps the possibility of ethics
open. Critchley (1993; 192) calls it c/ótural reading:
it is precisely in the suspension of choice or decision between two
alternatives, a suspension provoked in, as, and through a practice
of c/ótural reading, that the ethical dimension of deconstruction is
opened and maintained.... the textual practice of c/ótural reading
keeps open a dimension of alterity or transcendence that has
ethical significance.
This ethical significance takes shape when the controlled contexts, the virtual
reality, produced by technology are grafted onto by excluded meanings and
marginalised data. The movement of iteration is produced by grafting.
5.2.5 Plato's Pharmacy: The Work of the "Graft"
Grafts are complex structures that self-organise into patterns of meaning. A
graft, the preface to a book for example, that comments on another text and in
itself offering an explanation, is also an addition that exceeds that
explanation.
In other words, the graft operates in a double way. A text's description of its
own procedures is always a graft that adds something to those procedures in
the same way a preface situates a text in a contemporary milieu for a reading
public. But, there is a related graft whereby the analyst applies the text's
statements to its own processes of enunciation. In other words creating a
feedback loop. This second feature of grafts is important here. It can be
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equated with the fractal where the results of the equation is also fed back into
the calculation. Two distinct features (Culler, 1994; 139) of grafts create this
loop in a text:
• Each text becomes a machine with multiple reading heads for other texts
much like the hyper-links on a web-page by which one can go from one
idea on the current page to another page that clarifies that idea and,
• minor, unknown texts are grafted onto the main body of the canon, or else
an apparently marginal element of a text, such as a footnote, is
transplanted to a vital spot which the author did not necessarily intend the
footnote for.
The logic of the graft is structured as the "logic of 'paleonymics': the retention
of old names while grafting new meaning upon them" (Culler, 1994; 140). By
using "writing" as a model Derrida is able to describe how grafts supplement
the accepted notion of writing and what it canachieve. He says:
Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to
another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as
well as the nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is
articulated. For example, writing, as a classical concept, carries
with it predicates which have been subordinated, excluded, or held
in reserve by forces and according to necessities to be analysed. It
is these predicates (I have mentioned some) whose force of
generality, generalisation, and generativity find themselves
liberated, grafted onto a 'new' concept of writing which also
corresponds to whatever always has resisted the former
organisation of forces, which always has constituted the remainder
irreducible to the dominant force which organised the - to say it
quickly - logocentric hierarchy. To leave to this new concept the
old name of writing is to maintain the structure of the graft, the
transition and indispensable adherence to an effective intervention
in the constituted historic field. And it is also to give their chance
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and their force, their power of communication (Derrida, 1982a;
329-330).
"The graft is the very figure of intervention" (Culler, 1994; 141) but grafting
something from the margins onto the centre does not immediately imply that a
new centre has come into being. The fact that a marginal meaning can be
grafted onto the centre places the whole notion of a centre into question.
Derrida (1981a) proceeds to deconstruct the notion of "centre" by way of
Plato's use of the notions "pharmakon", "pnermekeus", and "pharmakos".
In Plato's (1973; 95-99) dialogue the Phaedrus writing is described as a
pharmakon, which means both "remedy" (a remedy for weakness of memory,
for example) and "poison". Offered to mankind by its inventor as a remedy,
writing is treated by Socrates as a dangerous drug. Writing as a supplement
of speech is considered an artificial addition, which cures and infects. "The
text thus presents '[t]he philosophical, epistemic order of logos as an
.antidote, as a force inscribed within the general alogical economy of the
pharmakon" (Derrida, 1981a; 124).
For Derrida and deconstruction, writing is what the pharmakon was for Plato:
a medium that is hard to master. Too little and an illness might not be cured,
but too much and the patient might just die. Hence, it is ambivalent and
unstable. It is because of the instability that Plato has to attempt to fashion a
theory that can take control of the oscillation. As Derrida explains:
If the pharmakon is "ambivalent," it is because it constitutes the
medium in which opposites are opposed, the movement and the
play that links them among themselves, reverses them or makes
one side cross over into the other (soul/body, good/evil,
inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speechlwriting, etc.). It is on
the basis of this play or movement that the opposites or
differences are stopped by Plato. The pharmakon is the
movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) difference
(Derrida, 1981a; 127).
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Pharmakon is closely related to pharmakeus (magician, sorcerer) the label
that Socrates attracted to himself as the poisoner of young minds. To his
interlocuters Socrates is a magician who works by indirection and
enchantment. The role of pharmakon as a condition of difference is further
confirmed by the link with pharmakos, or 'scapegoat'. The pharmakos is cast
out as the representative of the evil that afflicts the centre of the city: cast out
so as to make evil return to the outside from which it comes and to assert the
importance of the distinction between inside and outside. But, to play his role
as representative of the evil to be cast out, the pharmakos must be chosen
from within the city. The possibility of using the pharmakos to establish the
distinction between a pure inside and a corrupt outside depends on its
already being inside, just as the expulsion of writing can have a purificatory
function only if writing is already within speech. Derrida (1981a; 133) says:
The ceremony of the pharmakos is thus played out on the
boundary line between inside and outside, which it has as its
function ceaselessly to trace and retrace. Intra muroslextramuros.
The origin of difference and division, the pharmakos represents
evil both introjected and projected.
In order for an expulsion of the pharmakos to signify the specific ritual is
important and the specific manner in which it is celebrated. "In Athens,
Derrida notes, the ritual of expulsion was repeated every year, on the day
that was also the birthday of that pharmakeus whose death by pharmakon
made him a pharmakos - Socrates" (Culler, 1994; 144). In the same manner
there is a ritual expulsion of writing from any grounding philosophy that
claims the last word.
This is the height of irony because although philosophy seeks to finalise the
discussion, "writing" is condemned for doing just that. As Socrates (Plato,
1973; 97) says: "writing involves a similar disadvantage to painting. The
productions of painting look like living beings, but if you ask them a question
they maintain a solemn silence. The same holds true of written words; you
might suppose that they understand what they are saying, but if you ask them
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what they mean by anything they simply return the same answer over and
over again". All metaphysical theories have a moment at which writing is
again banished to the outside of the theory and living speech and a subject
takes its rightful place (We have seen that Levinas does this with art and with
woman). Thus, philosophy constantly proceeds by setting its sights on a
sorcerer whose practices seem unintelligible and whose teaching seems to
be an unstable substance in order to exorcise it through the ritual of
interpretation aimed at shutting him up, and stabilising the discourse again.
Derrida insists that this is the infinite progression of philosophy. There
cannot be a last word, for at least the last of the last words will always follow,
as "writing" is made to speak through interpretation. Thus, he suggests that
philosophy make peace with this fact by accepting a certain "art of differing"
(Culler, 1994; 146).
The graft and the way it works preclude any pure meaning from appearing. A
quick consideration of metaphor in philosophy shows that "metaphor seems
to involve the usage of philosophical language in its entirety" (Derrida, 1982a;
209). Indeed separating essential concepts from the rhetoric in which they
are expressed is a fundamental philosophical task. But, to say that metaphor
constitutes "obscure" language use and that such a thing as "clarity" can be
achieved in language is already metaphorical (Derrida, 1982g; 252), if only in
a photographic sense.
What is important about the graft in terms of ethics is the rigorous scrutiny
that Derrida employs to show that philosophy is a commitment, an obligation,
from which we cannot escape by slamming the door with a final theory that will
solve all its problems once and for all. Philosophy has to return in each age
in order to graft onto and explain whatever has come to claim dominance in
the name of finality. An exploration of the devices of writing is at the hart of
such an engagement.
5.3 TEMPTING ABRAHAM: THE GIFT OF DEATH
Not only Levinas but also Derrida moves between two traditions. Hence, it is
important that we confront in this section the resistance of theology to ethical
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engagement. One of the greatest obstacles on the road to an ethics that
commits to the call of the other is a belief in God that insulates the believer in
a total one-an-one pact with God. The problem here is very much a problem
of the archetypal God in which man and God is hardly discernible from each
other. In a sense, ethics has to seduce the architypal believer into ethics.
Hence, temptation is the means by which a believer will be able to associate
with the challenge of ethics.
In the Gift of Death (1995h) Derrida, following Kierkegaard, associates ethics
with the fear and trembling that confronts us in the face of a great unknown,
the unknown that simultaneously attracts us. It is the structure of the
unknown that its seduction makes us quiver with anticipation of that which
might come. "One could say that water quivers before it boils; that is the idea
I was referring to as seduction: a superficial pre-boil, a preliminary and visible
agitation" (Derrida, 1995h; 53).
The past is irrefutable. It is a shock to see it in ruins as we walk backwards
into the future, not knowing exactly where we are going. Here we may recall
the vision Walter Benjamin (1992d; 249) has when he refers to history as an
angel. Based on a painting by Paul Klee called Angulus Novus, the angel is
thrown backwards into the future by the gust of a great wind called "progress"
that blows from paradise. Behind him the angel sees history lying in ruins.
But he is unable to turn around and look at the future.
As Derrida writes: "We tremble in that strange repetition that ties an
irrefutable past (a shock has been felt, a traumatism has already affected us)
to a future that cannot be anticipated; anticipated but unpredictable;
apprehended, but, and this is why there is a future, apprehended precisely as
unforeseeable, unpredictable; approached as unapproachable" (Derrida,
1995h; 54). For Derrida there is a future exactly because nothing blocks it
yet. There is nothing there yet, if we affirm our commitment to it, all
possibilities await. And this is where the image of the Angulus Novus
becomes important once more. Benjamin's angel is undeniably alone. There
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is no way he can feel affirmative about the future. He is carried along by the
wind without the ability to change direction or call out.
Unlike the "new angel" however, "I tremble because I am afraid of what
already makes me afraid, of what I can neither see nor foresee. I tremble at
what exceeds my seeing and my knowing ... although it concerns the
innermost parts of me, right down to my soul, down to the bone, as we say
(Derrida, 1995h; 54). This "I" that Derrida recalls and uses in the sense
Levinas would have us think of it, as an "ego" in need of justification, trembles
in this situation because "I" stand alone in a self-obsessed mode and it is
hateful because it is no angel, not even in the metaphorical sense. It is a
suffering body that is caught at the edge of an abyss and the abyss is the
instant of decision. "What does the body mean to say by trembling or
crying?" (Derrida, 1995h; 55).
Risking an answer to Derrida's question we might argue that the body wants
to say that it is a body, vulnerable and irrational. When it comes to its own
survival, it is not to be reasoned with. It fights against the unknown as if
death could be the only thing that awaits it. To the body, God makes little
sense except that God would be that place where the body ceases to exist.
This is why the body trembles. It has to do God's bidding, surrender to the
unknown, but also wants to survive. "We fear and tremble before the
inaccessible secret of a God who decides for us although we remain
responsible, that is, free to decide, to work, to assume our life and our death"
(Derrida, 1995h; 56). Hence, we have to justify the actions with which our
bodies attempt to soothe its trembling. We must justify the way in which it
chooses to survive, because the body is never alone and never an angel.
5.3.1 Silence and the Secret
The "mysterious God, the one who decides, without revealing his reasons"
(Derrida, 1995h; 58), makes a secret demand on Abraham, according to the
136
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Old Testament. It is to be a most cruel, impossible, and untenable gesture
that he is asked to perform. God demands that he offer his son Isaac, a child
he was given at a late age after much prayer by him and his wife Sarah, as a
sacrifice. For Derrida there is no way in which a man properly named
Abraham can commit this deed without being responsible for it in his own
name as the name by which he is recognised in society. Society cannot see
this act of sacrifice as anything but murder. As Derrida says:
... linking the question of secrecy to that of responsibility
immediately raises the question of the name and of the signature.
One often thinks that responsibility consists of acting and signing
in one's name. A responsible reflection on responsibility is
interested in advance in whatever happens to the name in the
event of pseudonymity, metonymy, homonymy, in the matter of
what constitutes a real name (Derrida, 1995h; 58).
Abraham has no choice but to keep the demand of God a secret. He cannot
tell anyone about it because he cannot justify it. God has not given any
reasons and hence Abraham cannot give any reasons. He has been called
by the name which signifies his pact with God, but God is the unameable.
Hence, Abraham will be treated as a murderer and punished but god cannot
be called to responsibility. Thus, on the one hand Abraham "must keep the
secret (that is his duty), but" on the other hand "it is also a secret that he must
keep as a double necessity because in the end he can only keep it: he
doesn't know it, he is unaware of its ultimate rhyme and reason. He is sworn
to secrecy because he is in secret" (Derrida, 1995h; 59). Abraham thus
keeps a secret but does not know what it is or even that he is keeping it. The
secret defies all knowledge. It places a limit on knowledge but conversely
also vitalises the pursuit of knowledge and understanding.
From the point of view of ethics ignorance of the reasons behind Gods
demand is not a good enough reason not to talk about the demand at least to
his wife Sarah. "By keeping the secret, Abraham betrays ethics. His silence,
or at least the fact that he doesn't divulge the secret of the sacrifice he has
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been asked to make, is certainly not designed to save Isaac" (Derrida, 1995h;
59). Ethics is a push to come clean. Talk, which is also a call for writing,
about the inability to understand the limit against which we have come up.
The aporia must be shared.
Abraham is terribly alone in the secret. This secret holds for Derrida also the
structure of a model for "decision" that "assumes the responsibility that
consists in always being alone, entrenched in one's own singularity at the
moment of decision" (Derrida, 1995h; 60). Each one of us as we stand at the
moment of decision stands alone. But this loneliness can be shared, the
burden can be lightened by stepping out into the possibility of forgiveness
that resides in language. "Thus, every decision would, fundamentally, remain
at the same time solitary, secret, and silent [but] speaking relieves us,
Kierkegaard notes, for it 'translates' into the general. ... Once I speak I am
never and no longer myself, alone and unique" (Derrida, 1995h; 60).
5.3.2 Breaking into Language
The problem for decision and for responsibility in general is that a decision
comes down to one person making it alone but at the same time responsibility
demands that this sealed entity be broken open in a response to that which is
not my loneliness but the loneliness of the other. This problematic becomes
apparent only in an oscillating reading that settles neither on the side of
theology nor philosophy but places the two in ethical conversation.
For common sense, just as for philosophical reasoning, the most
widely shared belief is that responsibility is tied to the public and to
the non-secret, to the possibility and even the necessity of
accounting for one's words and actions in front of others, of
justifying and owing up to them. Here on the contrary it appears,
just as necessarily, that the absolute responsibility of my actions,
to the extent that such a responsibility remains mine, singularly so,
something no one else can perform in my place, instead implies
secrecy. But what is also implied is that, by not speaking to others,
I don't account for my actions, that I answer for nothing ... and to
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no one, that I make no response to others or before others. It is
both a scandal and a paradox (Derrida, 1995h; 60).
Thus, ethics cannot ensure or guarantee responsibility in a way that
philosophy or strict discipline would like to do. The generality of ethics
carries within it the seeds of irresponsibility. It impels me to speak, to reply,
to account for something, and thus to dissolve my singularity in the medium of
the concept. Immediately upon breaking into language I am confronted with
the fact that I am using an other's words. I repeat what has been laid down
as the standard answer to the call of responsibility. To answer by giving the
standard reply would be to act irresponsibly. Only I can respond, and have to
respond uniquely. As the deconstruction of Saussure and Austin has shown
there can be no guarantee that my response will be unique and thus
absolutely responsible. Derrida (1995h; 61) puts it as follows:
Such is the aporia of responsibility: one always risks not managing
to accede to the concept of responsibility in the process of forming
it. For responsibility (we would no longer dare speak of "the
universal concept of responsibility") demands on the one hand an
accounting, a general answering-far-oneself with respect to the
general and before the generality, hence the idea of substitution,
and on the other hand, uniqueness, absolute singularity, hence
nonsubstitution, nonrepetition, silence and secrecy. What I am
saying here about responsibility can also be said about decision.
The ethical involves me in substitution, as does speaking. Whence
the insolence of the paradox: for Abraham, Kierkegaard declares,
the ethical is a temptation. He must therefore resist it.
Thus, for ethics there is an "insoluble and paradoxical contradiction between
responsibility in general and absolute resposibility" (Derrida, 1995h; 61).
Absolute responsibility cannot be derived from a concept by which the unique
individual is substituted in language, and only absolute responsibility will do.
Absolute responsibility is thus unthinkable, inconceivable and unethical. "The
ethical can therefore end up making us irresponsible" (Derrida, 1995h; 61).
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But this is the irresponsibility towards God and myself as an individual
singularity locked on the inside of faith. It seems that if I am absolutely
responsible, hence keeping the secret of God and my singularity, I am being
irresponsible to the generality, the others. If on the other hand I enter into the
responsibility required by the living in general I am irresponsible to God and
the singularity. I have a duty to be responsible but this duty cannot take the
form of a law that binds me because it oscillates between the absolute
responsibility only I can have in secret and the responsibility I have in
general. This has specific implications for the notion of "duty". Derrida
(1995h; 63) raises the notion of Kantian ethics in the following way:
The paradox of faith is that interiority remains "incommensurable
with exteriority" ... The absolute duty that obligates her with
respect to God cannot have the form of generality that is called
duty ... In order to fuifi" my duty towards God, I must not act auf of
duty, by means of that form of generality that can always be
mediated and communicated and that is called duty. The absolute
duty that binds me to God himself, in faith, must function beyond
and against any duty I have. ... Kant explains that to act morally is
to act "out of duty" and not only "by conforming to duty."
Kierkegaard sees acting "out of duty," in the universalisabie sense
of the law, as a dereliction of one's absolute duty. It is in this sense
that absolute duty (towards God and in the singularity of faith)
implies a sort of gift or sacrifice that functions beyond both debt
and duty, beyond duty as a form of debt.
"I" am always both responsible and irresponsible at the same time. In being
responsible in general "I" sacrifice being absolutely responsible and when "I"
am absolutely responsible "I" sacrifice responsibility in general.
Responsibility is always a gift from that which makes the sacrifice. And in this
sense the price of responsibility is high. "If I put to death or grant death to
what I hate it is not a sacrifice. I must sacrifice what I love. I must come to
hate what I love, in the same moment, at the instant of granting death"
(Derrida, 1995h; 64). I must hate my neighbour in order to sacrifice
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responsibility to God and I must hate God in order to sacrifice responsibility
to my neighbour. But sacrificing something I hate is not a sacrifice hence, I
must sacrifice what I love. This movement between responsibility and
irresponsibility, love and hate takes place in writing, a living writing, a textual
body that suffers misunderstanding and has to justify itself constantly. It is
never consoled, never satisfied. It is the movement of the law, the excesses
of hate tempered by love and the excesses of love tempered by hate.
5.3.3 Return of the Tragic Hero
The tragic hero, whose antics can be highly comical, is the allegorical figure
in writing that enables a reader to find a way in which to deal with and
express the movement of love and hate in her own life.
As Derrida (Derrida, 1995h; 65) explains:
I have emphasised the word instant: "the instant of decision is
madness," Kierkegaard says elsewhere.... Like the gift and "the
gift of death," it remains irreducible to presence or to presentation,
it demands a temporality of the instant without ever constituting a
present. ... Understanding, common sense, and reason cannot
seize [begreifen], conceive, understand, or mediate it; neither can
they negate or deny it, implicate it in the work of negation, make it
work: in the act of giving death, sacrifice suspends both the work of
negation and work itself, perhaps even the work of mourning. The
tragic hero enters into mourning.
The tragic hero would be one who suffers publicly and openly. The tragic
hero is the very figure of ethics. He is the embodiment of the trials and
tribulations suffered by all. He is the concept of suffering given human form.
He acts out every sacrifice he has had to make to the gods. He mourns every
loss and remembers every instant of decision. He generalises responsibility
even as he, at the same time, presents a model for the singular individual and
the absolute responsibility expected from him. The tragic hero makes the
singular absolute individual possible. It is possible for all of us to keep our
secret pact only if we have the figure of the tragic hero who takes
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responsibility in general upon himself. The tragic hero is also the pharmakos
the one who suffers, and sometimes dies, for us.
5.4 THE HEART OF PLATO: KHORA
The figure of the tragic hero makes it possible for us to frame Derrida's
reading of the Platonic tradition and aim at the central point (or non-point) in
this system of systems. At the heart of deconstruction lies what Plato denies
or tries hard to forget or to hide. This is the fact that every theory has a hole.
Every rational model sooner or later comes up short. This is especially
important in a discussion of ethics. Every rational model of ethics will have
its flaw. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that every model of ethics be
concerned and vigilant for the moment at which it will break down. It is at this
moment that an opportunity is opened up in the responsibility in general
towards an absolute responsibility.
Hence, this moment of breakdown is a moment filled with the greatest
opportunity, an opportunity for ethics to establish itself as the primordial
response to a call in the Levinasian sense. The space identified in Plato by
deconstruction operates according to a logic that allows it both to be named
and to have no name: for convenience sake it is designated as khóra.
It is well known: what Plato in the Timaeus designates by the name
of khóra seems to defy that logic "of binarity, of the yes or no."
Hence it might perhaps derive from that "logic other than the logic
of the logos." The khóra, which is neither "sensible" nor
"intelligible," belongs to a "third genus" (triton genas). One cannot
even say of it that it is neither this nor that or that it is both this and
that. It is not enough to recall that khóra names neither this nor
that, or, that khóra says this and that (Derrida, 1995e; 89).
Khóra is literally the place of place. It is what makes space possible. It is
thus also the one place from which to start thinking what it would be to name
something, in other words to say that something exists. It is the greatest
challenge to the ontological order of things. Although it does not seem to fit
into any system it makes all systems possible. "The khóra seems to be alien
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to the order of the 'paradigm,' that intelligible and immutable model. And yet,
'invisible' and without sensible form, it 'participates' in the intelligible in a very
troublesome and indeed aporetic way ... Not lying, not saying what is false:
is this necessarily telling the truth?" (Derrida, 1995e; 90).
Khóra is ultimately a place of silence but paradoxically it makes all sound and
language possible as that which resists silence and grows restless because
of its passivity. As the question above indicates if we say these things about
khóra we would not speak falsely, but is this enough, is the absence of falsety
automatically to be considered truth? Can we speak the truth about what
khóra is by merely insisting that we at least are not lying about it? We seem
to be in the realm of a strange logic that would both claim that something
exists and does not exist at the same time. This is important for a logic of
ethics. Ethics sets out to say how things ought to be. An "ought", however
does not exist in the strict ontological sense of the word "existence". We
have to think this word under erasure as it exists prior to being given a name
and being presented as a possibility in the place which is not a place, khóra.
"[T]he discourse on the khóra, as it is presented, does not proceed from the
natural or legitimate logos, but rather from a hybrid, bastard, or even
corrupted reasoning (logismo notho). It comes 'as in a dream', which could
just as well deprive it of lucidity as confer upon it a power or divination"
(Derrida, 1995e; 90).
The logic of khóra is also the logic of ethics. The possibility of ethics comes
"as in a dream", never guaranteed an existence or a name, never guaranteed
a sensibility, yet it is at the heart of philosophy, it makes philosophy possible.
Khóra is not merely a mythical notion deprived of all intelligibility and closed
to reason. It is open to reason at the same time that it withdraws from it.
Derrida aknowledges the difficulty presented to thinking in such a moment.
He asks:
... how are we to think that which, while going outside of the
regularity of the logos, its law, its natural or legitimate genealogy,
nevertheless does not belong, stricto sensu, to mythos? ... how is
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one to think the necessity of that which, while giving place to ...
opposition [to différance] ... seems sometimes to be itself no longer
subject to the law of the very thing which it situates? What of this
place? It is nameable? And wouldn't it have some impossible
relation to the possibility of naming? Is there something to think
there, as I have just so hastily said, and to think according to
necessity? (Derrida, 1995e; 90 - 91).
In ethics there is an oscillation between what is, what exists and what should
be. An oscillation between reality and dream between identifying by naming
and being unsure of the identity or name of what exhibits merely a proximity
to intelligibility without clear or ready access. This oscillation is best
described by the logic to which khóra belongs. It is a double logic, in other
words, it is a logic that moves between the logic of reality and the logic of
dream as a third logic that operates as if stitching a wound. This third logic
.operates as a way of reading, a c/ótural reading style.
5.4.1 Naming the Impossible: A Third Genus
To say that the logic of khóra is also the logic of ethics is to say that it is a
logic that is situated within different types of discourse. Strictly speaking the
logic of khóra situated within types of discourse is concerned with types of
being. In other words with the ontological question of "why something exists
rather than nothing" and how it can be said to do so. Saying this raises some
doubts, however. Derrida is concerned about the blurring of the distinction
between being and discourse. He (Derrida, 1995e; 91) asks:
But have we the right to transport the logic, the para-logic or the
meta-logic of this super-oscillation from one set to the other? It
concerned first of all types of existent thing (sensible/inteligible,
visible/invisible, form/formless, icon, or mimeme/paradigm), but we
have displaced it toward types of discourse (mythos/logos) or of
relation to what is or is not in general. No doubt such a
displacement is not self-evident. It depends on a sort of
metonymy: such a metonymy would displace itself, by displacing
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the names, from types [genres] of being to types [genres] of
discourse. But on the one hand it is always difficult, particularly in
Plato, to separate the two problematics: the quality of the
discourse depends primarily on the quality of the being of which it
speaks.
As we have seen previously it is not possible to distinguish clearly the object
of thought from that which mediates it. Hence, in the case of what exists the
description of it must pass through discourse and thus it will share by degrees
the same logic. The discourse of ethics oscillates with a logic that does not
tolerate the imposition of polarities in thinking about its subject. Rhetoric
needs to make a distinction between sensible and intelligible (what can be
felt and what can be thought) but ethics seeks to traverse this distinction in
the same way as thinking about kh6ra would traverse the polarity between
logic and myth. Derrida (1995e; 92) puts it as follows:
... [the] tradition of rhetoric which places at [our] disposal a reserve
of concepts which are very useful but which are all built upon this
distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, ... is precisely
what the thought of the kh6ra can no longer get along with ... This
problem of rhetoric - particularly of the possibility of naming - is,
here, no mere side issue ... (those who speak of metaphor with
regard to the kh6ra often add: didactic metaphor) ... We shall not
speak of metaphor, but not in order to hear, for example, that the
kh6ra is properly a mother, a nurse, a receptacle, a bearer of
imprints or gold.... It is perhaps becauseïts scope goes beyond or
falls short of the polarity of metaphorical sense versus proper
sense that the thought of the kh6ra exceeds the polarity, no doubt
analogous, of the mythos and the logos. ... the thought of the
kh6ra would trouble the very order of polarity, of polarity in
general, whether dialectical or not.
Ethics constantly traverses this boundary between logic and myth to the
extent that the word "ethics" can never be said to name something definite
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and un-moveable once and for all. Although there are moments of clear
logical exposition which distinguishes it from being khóra and also moments
of mythical and fictitious storytelling that reminds logic and clarity of what
made it possible. What Derrida says about khóra in this regard can thus also
be said, by way of analogy, about ethics:
We would never claim to propose the exactword, the mot juste, for
khóra, nor to name it, itself, over and above all the turns and
detours of rhetoric, nor finally to approach it, itself, for what it will
have been, outside of any point of view, outside of any anachronic
perspective. Its name is not an exact word, not a mot juste
(Derrida, 1995e; 93).
5.4.2 The Sur-name of Différance
Instead khóra, and ethics by analogy, is more like a sur-name. The name
that comes after a proper name and that is situated as belonging to a group
rather than an individual. "If différance is what deconstruction is all about, in
a nutshell, then khóra is its surname" (Caputo, 1997; 96) and ethics can
stand in or take the place of khóra in our discussion. Hence, the surname of
differance is ethics. Ethics is the place in which all différance takes place. It
remains eternally the same without being touched or marked by that which
passes through it. By way of an inversion of the notion what came first and
what came second the unchangeable sur-name, the name written after the
propername, is actually the constant that continues over time and to which
different proper names can be attached. It is the very possibility for any
difference at all. Ethics then would be the two together: différance khóra. To
extend the metaphor of writing to this discussion, khóra would be the blank
page and différance would be the writing that covers it. However, if the
metaphor is to incorporate the horror of khóra it has to make clear that the
page stays eternally blank. In the final analysis différance does not make any
lasting impression on khóra. The difficulty of explaining an image or sign that
is not one in the strict sense takes us back to the mauvaise conscience and
the il y a used by Levinas. Any attempt to rise out of this unhappy situation
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confronts justice and the need to do right. However, it is not as in Levinas, an
unhappiness that can be overcome through a belief in God. This
consciousness never assures us that an act springing from it is a right move.
Caputo (1997; 97) puts it thus:
To deploy a famous Platonic image: the story of khóra works like
an "allegory" of différance, each addressing a common, kindred
non-essence, impropriety, and namelessness. Just as Plato
composed the allegory of the cave to explain the surpassing
excess of the agathon, so, on the other side of being, Derrida can
put Timaeus's story of the khóra to work explaining the lowly
recessiveness of differance, being's humble hinterlands or
underside. It also helps us to understand the divergence of
deconstruction and negative theology, since différance is khóra's
cousin, not God's. Derrida loves khóra the way he loves différance,
illegitimate children both.
If deconstruction takes sides then it takes sides with responsibility in general.
It ends up being slightly irresponsible when it comes to absolute
responsibility. It tends to be tempted into justifying itself. It tends to be
slightly heroic and more than a little tragic. It establishes the possibility of a
question being put, or rather it places being into question.
5.4.3 Heidegger's Question
Heidegger presents us with the best but also most problematic example of
what the question about being leads thinking towards. Heidegger does not
place being into question rather he reintroduces the question of being,
Oasein, to philosophy. He contends that the question of being has been
forgotten and has to be rethought in a fundamental way. This is very
important for our discussion on ethics. Not only in the light of what happened
in Germany from 1930 to 1945 but also because Heidegger does not seem to
doubt for an instant that there is something that can respond to this call to
rediscover the question of being. This cannot be Dasein because the latter is
exactly what has been forgotten and what has to be rediscovered. "The very
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possibility of fundamental ontology is conditional upon Dasein's distinctive
relationship (Bezug) with the question of Being ... Heidegger's thought begins
from the necessity of making the question of Being a question once again for
us, as it was for the Stranger in Plato's Sophist. It is questioning that will take
hold of the "forgotteness of Being as forgotten" (Critchley, 1993; 193). But,
what then does Heidegger suppose will take up the call? "According to
Derrida, Heidegger's thinking moves between two determinations of Spirit,
one belonging to onto-theology or metaphysics, ... and the other pointing
towards a more originary and nonmetaphysical thinking that appears most
forcefully in the 1953 essay on Trakl, Language in the Poem" (Critchley,
1993; 191).
Spirit for Heidegger is an affirming flame that sets out to bring light in
darkness but also has the ability to scorch and to burn. What Derrida (1989)
asks in his deconstruction of Heidegger is that we keep two things in mind
when thinking the notion of Geist:
• Heidegger's analogy of Spirit with flame and,
• what happened to Jews during the SecondWorld War.
As Derrida (1989; 68) says: "When I think about [Heidegger], when I read
him, I'm aware of both these vibrations [philosophical nationality and
nationalism (Derrida, 1989; 7)] at the same time. It's always horribly
dangerous and wildly funny, certainly grave and a bit comical". The problem
with a question or with questioning is that put on the spot, so to speak, a
certain paralysis takes place in the mind of the person who is suddenly
questioned. Especially if it is a difficult question or one to whom the answer
is not apparent and requires some consideration. Who is asking this of me?
Why are they asking me? It is impossible to think of the answer especially if
the question is posed in a foreign language. In Heidegger the question of the
question of being also comes together with the rise of Nazism. Derrida
suggests a subtle congruence between Nazism and the irresponsibility of the
immediate presentation of the question as Heidegger supposes. Critchley
writes: "the immediate presentation of a question or a problem is a disaster
148
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
for thinking and ... all that Derrida is seeking to do in Of Spirit is to keep open
the possibility of thinking in spite of the disaster" (Critchley, 1993; 197). The
disaster is that of not knowing the answer to the question. Nationalism sets
up a model of what it means to belong. This model allows some to study the
answers to the questions and are able to answer quickly without having to
think. Nationalism abhors a pause or hesitation, identity documents have to
be produced instantly or arouse suspicion.
For Heidegger Dasein is eventually something that can be related to
nationality. It is not that the question of being has been forgotten in general
but that the German volk has forgotten its being. For Heidegger the ghost of
being should be rekindled like a flame that can shine (or blaze like lightning)
in the darkness of the volJ(s forgetfullness. As Derrida (1989; 81-82) writes:
"[s]eized by German idiom, Geist would rather, earlier [plutot, plus tot], give to
think flame".
We have seen that for Derrida and deconstruction experience is an
experience of language. And language is always open to the excesses of the
subconscious and of meaning. Just as Derrida questioned Saussure and
Austin about the structure of language and the limitation of context so Derrida
also introduces a most subtle questioning of Heidegger on the point of
"exclusion". Heidegger is a subtle mystic and is careful to avoid any overt
claims or soapbox rhetoric when it comes to claiming Dasein as something
distinctly Germanic.
But, Derrida concentrates on the word Versprechen used by Heidegger to
indicate an excess in the use of language. This word can be made
contemporary by rephrasing it as a "Freudian slip". It indicates a moment in
the use of language where a subject says more than he wanted to say, when
meaning escapes the tight gathering of intendend meaning. For Heidegger
Versprechen is merely a non-sensical moment before the more serious
question of being can be put. It is a moment that has to be gotten rid of
before any real question will be forthcoming. But, Derrida (1989; 94) does
not agree, on the contrary, he says:
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It remains to find out whether this Versprechen is not the promise
which, opening every speaking, makes possible the very question
and therefore precedes it without belonging to it: the dissymmetry
of an affirmation, of a yes before all opposition of yes and no. The
call of Being - every question already responds to it, the promise
has already taken place wherever language comes. Language
always, before any question, and in the very question, comes down
to [revient a] the promise.
Derrida is concerned with the possibility of a promise that would render
questioning possible and he finds it in the discarded notion of Versprechen.
But he is not interested in a questioning that would belong to the order of
interrogation. He refers us to the way in which Heidegger constantly uses the
term "hunt down" in the Trakl essay when he talks about how spirit should
approach the question of being. Heidegger (1989; 108) writes: "Inasmuch as
.the nature of spirit consists in a bursting into flame, it strikes a new course,
lights it, and sets man on his way. Being flame, the spirit is the storm that
'storms the heavens' and 'hunts down God' ". For Derrida spirit does not
resemble flame but promise, a moment of affirmation that he chooses to
describe in the language of Kant's ethics as an unconditional categorical
imperative. Derrida (1995a; 152-153) writes:
In the different texts I have written on (against) apartheid, I have
on several occasions spoken of "unconditional" affirmation or of
"unconditional" "appeal." This has also happened to me in other
"contexts" and each time that I speak of the link between
deconstruction and the "yes". Now, the very least that can be said
of unconditionality (a word that I use not by accident to recall the
character of the categorical imperative in its Kantian form) is that it
is independent of every determinate context, even of the
determination of a context in general. It announces itself as such
only in the opening of context. Not that it is simply present
(existent) elsewhere, outside of all context; rather, it intervenes in
the determination of a context from its very inception, and from an
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injunction, a law, a responsibility that transcends this or that
determination of a given context. Following this, what remains is
to articulate this unconditionality with the determinate (Kant would
say, hypothetical) conditions of this or that context; and this is the
moment of strategies, of rhetorics, of ethics, and of politics. The
structure thus described supposes both that there are only
contexts, that nothing exists outside context, as I have often said,
but also that the limit of the frame or the border of the context
entails a clause of nonclosure. The outside penetrates and thus
determines the inside.
Derrida needs to call Heidegger's, and also our, attention to the fact that
there is something that precedes any question. It is such a small thing that
we tend to push it into the margin or forget about it completely. Yet for
Derrida, as for Levinas, neither philosophy, nor anything for that matter, can
proceed without it and if attempted inevitably irrupts into violence. This very
small thing is ethics, or the categorical imperative of an opening or khóra, a
chance and a promise that a question may be forthcoming. This opening
does not mystically give (es gibt) anything. It is chance and the horror of not
being able to capitalise on it. Hence Derrida (1989; 130) writes: "[t]he
question is thus not the last word in language. First, because it is not the first
word. At any rate, before the word, there is this sometimes wordless word
which we name the 'yes'. A sort of pre-originary pledge [gage] which
precedes any other engagement in language or action". There can be no
freedom to ask a question if this pledge, this obligation that for Levinas can
never become a rule but that Derrida would paradoxically insist is an ethical
imperative, is not adhered to in advance because "[the question] answers in
advance, whatever it does, to this pledge and of this pledge. It is engaged by
it in a responsibility it has not chosen and which assigns it even its liberty"
(Derrida, 1989; 130).
This pledge takes the form of a commitment to language and to
communication. From the outset the question has to be put in a form that
precedes it, in one language or another. The responsibility becomes very
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apparent when the interlocuters speak different languages and have to
commit to a place where they will try and translate their interaction and their
questioning to each other. Translation can be regarded as a primal scene for
language and for the interlocuter. One is at the same time in language and
outside of it. The face that confronts me and speaks is not immediately
understandable. There is a pledge, an obligation to the face of the stranger,
the one who sounds mad to my ear, to start language anew. In this way
language is again originated and so we can understand what Derrida means
when he says: "The origin of language is responsibility" (Derrida, 1989; 132).
If Heidegger asks the question that has supposedly been forgotten, and one
has to wonder how such an important knowledge could have been lost, he
has to commit himself first of all to the justification of the right to ask the
question "what is being?" As Levinas says:
If the question what? in its adherence to being, is at the origin of
all thought ... all research and all philosophy go back to ontology.
... Yet the question about the Question is more radical still. Why
does research take form as a question? How is it that the what?,
already steeped in being so as to open it up the more, becomes a
demand and a prayer, a special language inserting into the
communication of the given an appeal for help, for aid addressed
to another? (Levinas, 1981; 24).
We always ask the question "what is it" from a specific point of view. This
point of view is structured more radically than anything else by the language
in which we dwell. Breaking into language can make us irresponsible. If we
are over hasty and forget that the question is always already put to someone,
we will violate the obligation of ethics and our responsibility towards the
other. We will forget that the question "what" already engages and seeks the
help of another, help we cannot force the other to offer.
5.5 TIME FOR ETHICS: MOVING AHEAD
In this thesis it has become apparent that ethics takes a peculiar shape and
form, it seems fluid and solidifies or vaporises according to the context.
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These changing states in the structure or quasi-structure of ethics is
intimately related to the notion of time. As we have seen there is a movement
of delay and deferral that "undermines presence by making it a construct
rather than a given, but time is not a foundation" (Culler, 1994; 129). Time is
not bedrock on which presence can be constructed because time represents
movement per se. Time is merely the measure of the attempts by presence
to construct and manifest itself.
Time is also the notion that is most central to a discussion of ethics. The
question is whether or not there is time for ethics? Time is money is an
expression that many are familiar with. Derrida claims that money is "the
signifier most destructive of all signification" (Derrida, 1987a; 452). This is
because money can take the place of anything. It is the signifier that can be
exchanged for any other signifier. But it has to be well proportioned and
limited. It has to be calculated.. Hence, the time of money is not what
Bergson calls duree, on the contrary, it is clock time in the strictest sense.
Derrida asks whether there can be any notion of the gift of time in such a
situation. A gift, in the true or impossible sense of this word, would be
something that exceeds its proportion and overflows without any calculation
of its return. Can ethics be such a gift of time and does that necessarily
mean that it takes place outside the economy of calculated give and take?
Derrida is in no way against economy or money, but he does not allow a
luxurious comfort with relation to either. He encourages us to know what
money is and to see how the gift is not a gift in the limited economy of money.
As he writes: "know how the gift annuls itself, commit yourself (engage-to/)
even if commitment is the destruction of the gift [the impossible that
overflows] by the gift [in Mauss' sense of the potlatch], give economy its
chance" (Derrida, 1992b; 30). There is a difference between the two senses
of gift. Derrida deconstructs the notion of gift giving presented by Marcel
Mauss. He finds that Mauss makes of the gift a bedrock to which we can
return in order to calculate the prestige of the giver and the receiver. This
intricate system of gift giving Maus describes as "potlatch". However, as
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Derrida rightly perceives, as soon as the giving of gifts enter a system of
giving where the aim is to out-give one another the notion of gift evaporates
once more into the more accurate notion of exchange. The gift is no longer
excessive but has become calculated. As Derrida says about the difference
between the gift as potlatch and the gift as impossible overflowing:
This difference is precisely that of the excessive. ... The problem
of the gift has to do with its nature that is excessive in advance, a
priori exaggerated. A donating experience that would not be
delivered over, a priori, to some immoderation, in other words, a
moderate, measured gift would not be a gift. To give and thus do
something other than calculate its return in exchange, the most
modest gift must pass beyond measure" (Derrida, 1992b; 38).
We have seen above that an absolute responsibility is limited to the
responsibility of a single individual who keeps a secret he is not even aware
he is keeping. Thus, ethics makes one irresponsible in terms of this limited
sense as one steps out and shares the secret with others, and oneself, in
language. No longer completely myself I take the risk of being responsible
for myself, my words, and more than myself. Derrida relates the economy of
calculation to a limited responsibility that is breached by ethics as an
excessive responsibility, and also irresponsibility. The absolute peace of
limited economy achieved within clearly demarcated borders, its successful
calculations, is disturbed by the call of the other. In the essay on Levinas
entitled Violence and Metaphysics (Derrida, 1993f; 128), the following
sentence is printed cursively: "We do not say absolutely peaceful. We say
economical' .
5.5.1 A Return to the Gift
Why does Derrida encourage the reader to give this absolute peace of limited
economy a chance? Is it perhaps because he sees the effects of dealing in
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such an economy as having the same effect as that which Levinas subscribes
to art? To argue on this point that Derrida sees the projects of limited
economy as a necessary evil, would not be far fetched. An evil that is bound,
if pushed to its most solipsistic limit, to implode as a lesson in ethics and the
value of an open system that allows itself to cool. Derrida, however, is well
aware of the catastrophic implications such an implosion would entail.
Instead, contra Baudrillard, Derrida does not push for an extreme theory that
would help the limited economy to implode on itself by encouraging it to
continue. Instead he pushes for an extreme thinking that might just help us
break out of the circle, if even for a moment. But, thinking the impossible,
thinking the outside from a position inside is always difficult, if not impossible.
Against the limit, a limit that Derrida acknowledges and gives a chance, he
tries to think what delimitation would mean and if we could call such a
movement a gift. The difficulty is not a small one,
... after all. What would be a gift that fulfils the condition of the
gift, namely, that it not appear as gift, that it not be, exist, signify,
want-to-say as gift? A gift without wanting, without wanting-to-say,
an insignificant gift, a gift without intention to give? Why would we
still call that a gift? That, which is to say what? What does 'to
give' mean to say? And what does language give one to think with
this word? And what does 'to give' mean to say in the case of
language, of thinking, and of meaning-to-say? (Derrida, 1992b;
27).
In the strictest sense the gift for Derrida takes shape in the same way as
Being does. Here of course he does follow Heidegger but unlike the latter he
never suggests that either being or the gift necessarily comes into existence
out of some giving substance. For Heidegger Being is guaranteed as the es
gibt that is thrown forth (geworfen) from the mists of time past as a burning
flame. Derrida has a more uncertain, prudent approach to both the gift and
being. It is a strictly phenomenological approach that at every step asks of
that which is presented only dimly, what is it? He says that,
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[ilt so happens (but this "it so happens" does not name the
fortuitous) that the structure of this impossible gift is also that of
Being - that gives itself to be thought on the condition of being
nothing (no present-being, no being present) - and of time which,
... is always defined in the paradoxia or rather the aporia of what is
without being, of what is never present or what is scarcely and
dimly (Derrida, 1992b; 27).
The question is whether or not one can speak of something that is outside or
more than the system of gifts exchanged? It is here that the notion of time
can be most fruitfully employed. Derrida focuses on the way in which deferal
and difference might be created through a negotiated delimitation. A quasi-
delimitation that would allow both the madness of absolute limitation on the
one hand and anarchic overflowing on the other hand to be curbed. Because
as he says even though the gift is impossible in the above sense, "we still
think it, we name it, we desire it. We intend it" (Derrida, 1992b; 29).
There is as much potential violence hidden in the ecstacy of the excessive
overflowing of the gift as there is in the tight-fisted calculation of exchange.
The infinite is not necessarily more preferable than the totality. Hence,
Derrida concentrates on the notion of "term" in which the gift and exchange
may be bound together in a system that temporalises différance (Derrida,
1992b; 39). The "term" is negotiated so that what would have been a gift
excessively or the impossibility of a gift in the limited economy becomes what
is commonly known as a loan. The gift here given is the gift of time. And the
term may be indefinite, or more calculated. However, the repayment is
deffered. What is set up in the space of the term is the possibility between
bridging the gap between economy and the gift by way of a compromise.
This gap between, on the one hand, thought, language, and desire
and, on the other hand, knowledge, philosophy, science, and the
order of presence is also a gap between gift and economy. This
gap is not present anywhere; it resembles an empty word or a
transcendental illusion (Derrida, 1992b; 29).
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However, this transcendental illusion is the very place from which ethics
might come. The gap or khóra is the very possibility of language to present
us with the terms of a response to the call of the other. The ethics of
deconstruction can do nothing but traverse this gap between limit and excess
in an experience of language, of different terms. This is not a mere empty
talking but very much the experience of language as it constitutes beings that
are actively able to respond to each other's demands, invitations and also
laughter.
One has to be responsible, not only for what one receives, but perhaps more
importantly for what one gives. For deconstruction when it comes to giving
there is always a "but." As Derrida explains:
... with the gift there is always a "but" - the contrary is also
necessary: It is necessary [il faut] to limit the excess of the gift and
of generosity, to limit them by economy, profitability, work, ex-
change. And first of all by reason or by the principle of reason: It
is also necessary to render an account, it is also necessary to give
consciously and conscientiously. It is necessary to answer for
[répondre] the gift, the given, and the call to giving. It is necessary
to answer to it and answer for it. One must be responsible for what
one gives and what one receives (Derrida, 1992b; 62 - 63).
From the logic that we saw above, the gift of life is always also the gift of
death. The defferral of these gifts are of utmost importance and makes all the
difference. The severity of the gift, as the possibility of ultimate sacrifice, the
gift of death, places us in the realm of the justified imperative. The gift must
occur but as a negotiated term that breaks out of absolute secrecy and
silence.
5.5.2 Restricted and General Economy
However, a disturbing question haunts the neat negotiation of terms that
compromises the limit and the excess as it regards each other in language.
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Is there any reason for giving? This also concerns most intimately the whole
question of "forgiving," of "forgiveness". Derrida is very specific:
In total, there is no gift as concerns reason, not even as concerns
a practical reason. There is no reason for there ever to be the
least gift. ... Not that it is opposed to reason or to anything
whatsoever - not at all, through and through [du tout, du tout au
tout] - but perhaps it passes them by so that something may come
to pass, including something like reason, including everything
[tout] (Derrida, 1992b; 77).
From Derrida's point of view the best reason for giving would be giving itself.
It would be the very gift of reason. Perhaps by giving reasons for giving one
is already engaged in giving per se. The ethical endeavour would be exactly
finding and negotiating reasons for giving and for "forgiving" because this
movement, this thought, taking time out to attempt reason is a gift in itself, if it
is at all possible to give time or to receive a thought that counts.
Derrida follows George Bataille's resistant reading of Hegel to establish the
notions of a restricted economy and a general economy. The gift would form
part of the general economy for which from the point of view of the restricted
economy (also called the absolute, total, or limited economy) there exists no
reason.
The restricted economy is "restricted to commercial values ... a 'science
dealing with the utilisation of wealth,' limited to the meaning and the
established value of objects, and to their circulation. The circularity of
absolute knowledge could dominate, could comprehend only this circulation,
only the circuit of reproductive consumption" (Derrida; 1993c; 271). Against
this absolute circuit is the infinite excess of general economy. Economy of
emotion, memory and the trace. The imperfect economy of "excessive
energy" that is lost without the slightest aim and consequently without
meaning. Bataille is adamant that this senseless loss is what constitutes
"sovereignty" (Derrida; 1993c; 270).
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Bataille reads the notion of individual sovereignty against the Hegelian
edifice of restricted economy, characterised by the corporation and ruled over
by a monarch as the representative of sovereignty, which for Bataille "is too
heavy to bear" (Derrida; 1993c; 251). Bataille's sovereign, another word for
the individual, chooses rather to "shrug his shoulders" and to head boldly
away into the world of wasted energy without aim. As Derrida notices,
Bataille, or rather the sovereign individual, chooses to find shelter "very close
to that at which laughter laughs: close to anguish" (Derrida; 1993c; 252).
The sovereign individual exists in meaninglessness but confronted with the
Hegelian alternative has no other option unless it wants to compromise its
singularity in the state of a universal. Those who serve the restricted
economy are no longer sovereign individuals. They carry the meaning, the
identity of the corporation (Wood, 1990; 241). But for both Hegel and Bataille
individual existence comes down to meaninglessness. In Bataille's case this
is a lightness to be celebrated but for Hegel it is madness, meaning has to be
ultimately bestowed through the adoption of a Absolute dialectical synthesis.
At this impasse between "a system of meaning permitting or promising an
absolute formal mastery" that "would amount to erasing the excess of non-
meaning and to falling back into the closure of knowledge" ethical writing may
take place. Ethical writing would be a tentative and oblique search for
reasons to justify the gift. "Only perhaps, ... [a writing] absolutely
adventurous, ... a chance and not a technique" (Derrida; 1993c; 273) can
constitute this place of ethical writing and create a text on ethics if not an
ethical text. "This text, then, is also the piece, perhaps a piece of counterfeit
money, that is, a machine for provoking events" (Derrida, 1992b; 97).
5.5.3 Tolerance: An Impure Fiction
It is critical to look at two related questions: How does the ethical text provoke
events and how does the notion of counterfeit money make ethical sense.
In a story by Baudelaire that is quoted by Derrida in Given Time. I. Counterfeit
Money a man and his friend leaves a tobacconist shop after having made a
purchase. The man's friend has calculated and distributed his change very
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carefully and has placed it in various pockets. He, however, keeps a
counterfeit coin in his hand. When they pass a beggar the man hands the
counterfeit coin to the beggar who is astonished at receiving such a
seemingly large amount of money. The man, who also narrates the story, is
also impressed by the generosity of his friend. But the friend admits that he
has only given the beggar a counterfeit coin.
This admission sets the narrator to thinking in what circumstances receiving a
counterfeit coin may be fortuitous. The beggar may not realise that the coin
is counterfeit and wager it as a bet, or invest it, or make a purchase. If the
counterfeit is not discovered he may get a lucky break. However, he soon
realises that his friend never had the beggars interests at heart. The way his
friend obviously calculated his deed and the way in which he admitted to it
shows the narrator that he passed off the counterfeit only to receive the
dubious accolade of being generous. In a sense he wanted to give himself
the gift of feeling generous without spending any money. And also he wanted
to playa mean trick on the unfortunate beggar.
In the previous chapters we have looked at the problem of tolerance and its
close connection to power. The question is whether an individual has the
power to partake in ethical behaviour. To open oneself up to the other could
be a dangerous exercise. One could be handed counterfeit money. Giving
one's time may result only in being lied to and made a fool of. From an
ethical point of view the narrator's disgust with the action of his friend is
informative. As he says: "[t]o be mean is never excusable, but there is some
merit in knowing that one is; the most irreparable of vices is to do evil out of
stupidity"."
Baudelaire is giving us a fictional account and there is thus no way for us to
know if the incident really happened or not. In this sense it has the character
of counterfeit money. It may very well be a lie. But in literature the
convention of fiction allows us to "take it or leave it" so to speak. As Derrida
(1992b; 93-94) says:
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This is what it seems to share with the phenomenon of counterfeit
money (to pass off a fiction as "true"). But since the convention
permits us to know - Baudelaire and us the readers - that this
function is a fiction, there is no phenomenon here of "counterfeit
money," that is, of an abuse of trust that passes off the false for the
true.
This is very important for the consideration of ethics. Ethics is after all a
fiction. A narrative that has as its most cherished expression the term
"ought". Ethics attempts to prevent moral action from being perpetrated "out
of stupidity". And as such it sets itself up to be true. The convention of ethics
as fiction allows us to remember that it is not trying to pass itself of as the
truth in order to look generous or to gain for itself the prestige of being right.
It has as its goal only one thing: correcting moral stupidity. Ethics may keep
its fictionality secret from time to time, hide its frame, in order to effect its
goal. But this is not the secret of the criminal or of absolute responsibility, it
is a secret without depth. Derrida (1992b; 94) explains:
... the moral fault or the criminal misdeed implies lying, the
intention to deceive - and thus knowledge - only on the part of the
emitting agent or the counterfeiter, to the exclusion of the receiver
or the "dupes" (the beggar, for example, or the narrator before his
friend's confession and, outside the narrative, in a heterogeneous
space, the reader at least preceding the same confession; but the
reader is not "deceived or "duped" in the same sense as the
narrator: in truth, his non-knowledge is not on the order of being-
deceived; it is the experience of a secret without depth, a secret
without secret ... ).
Thus, the fictionality of ethics grants the interlocutor a precarious power to
tolerate. It is never an absolute power certain of its knowledge and therefore
the outcome of its actions. It is not a power that stabilises tolerance once and
for all by grounding it either in the existence of an Almighty God or the power
of Reason. It is a process of stabilisation and a vigilance that can never be
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said to be fully done with. It is a process that depends on structures of
interaction between individuals that are itself as old as the first moment when
a face met another face in conversation. Derrida (1992b; 95) puts it
succinctly:
... no natural stability is ever given, as there is only stabilisation in
process, that is, essentially precarious, one must presuppose
"older" structures, let us not say originary structures, but more
complicated and more unstable ones. We propose here to call
them structures, and even to study them as such in literary
processes, because they are not necessarily chaotic. Their
relative "anteriority" or their greater complexity does not signify
pure disorder.
Ethics in the same way as reading asks of the calculating subject, the writer
who calculates his words, to suspend disbelief. The time for ethics is surely a
.time of luxury, a time that gives time by annulling the clock aspect, but it is
constantly made to feel uncomfortable, to check the clock, by the pressing
need to correct moral stupidity. In a way giving oneself the time to reflect on
ethics can be compared to giving oneself permission to smoke (Derrida,
1992b; 107) or to read without writing. Ethics, and fiction in general, is "a
luxury product, that is, a product of pure consumption that is burned without
leaving, apparently, any remainder" (Derrida, 1992b; 103). However, the
burning of tobacco leaves us to contemplate the ashes and all the different
images, tropes and metaphores that can be recalled there. In the same way
ethics would be a contemplation of the trace that is left and might spark into a
good moral action. This moral action will have its roots in the suspension of
disbelief. The spark that sets ethics alight is "an act of faith, phenomenon of
credit or credence" through which a certain authority of moral action can
establish itself by way of "accreditation, both in the sense of legitimation as
effect of belief or credulity, and of bank credit, of capitalised interest"
(Derrida, 1992b; 97).
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Thus, the tolerance expressed by an ethical fiction seeks to authorise moral
action by way of oscillating between two polarities that is impossible to fuse,
that of belief and of calculation. The ethics of deconstruction thus runs the
risk of receiving or giving counterfeit coin, but the logic of iteration would say
that it will not happen more than twice, before a pattern establishes itself and
a context becomes recognisable. Then control can be exerted in an instant of
decision or choice.
5.5.4 Marx and the Other Heading
We have established above that ethics sets an aim, an aim that it does not
know beforehand but vigilantly seeks and that was described in broad terms
as: correcting moral stupidity. It is not far fetched that the condition of moral
stupidity is a reality for we cannot accept that, as the ethics of deconstruction
does not, that moral integrity is given naturally. After all the word "stupidity"
shares the same root as the word "student". Hence it is necessary from time
to time, and for Derrida there is never a better time than right now, to think
through the stupidity of a moral reality as a student and to present what one
finds.
He proposes that one can look at the state of the world today, as the state of
globalisation, and remark as Hamlet did that "The time is out of joint" and that
world affairs, the multicultural impact on territorial identity for example,
presents a reality to scrutiny that resembles the image of "A black picture on
a blackboard". This is not to say that the world is in crisis but, rather, that one
has to consider two notions of what "bad" might mean when one says that the
picture looks bad. It is not a case of choosing one of these notions but of
keeping both in mind as one tries to think a correction. Hence one should
"avoid deciding between the bad as suffering and the bad as wrong or as
crime" (Derrida, 1994; 78).
Derrida (1994; 87) suggests two ways to interpret what he calls the
"blackboard picture." The first interpretation remains within an idealist logic.
This logic reduces all that is going badly in the world today to an inability to
adequately measure the gap between an empirical reality and a regulating
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ideal. According to this idealist hypothesis, a certain spirit of Marxist critique
will have to remain indefinitely necessary in order to denounce and reduce
the gap as much as possible. This critique sets itself the task of adjusting
"reality" to the "ideal" in the course of a necessarily infinite process.
The second interpretation of the blackboard picture would obey another,
more deconstructive, logic. Beyond the "facts," beyond the supposed
"empirical evidence," beyond all that is inadequate to the ideal, it would be a
question of putting into question again, in certain of its essential predicates,
the very concept of the said ideal. This would be the task of ethics par
excellance. Some of the matters to be considered would be: an economic
analysis of the market, the laws of capital, of types of capital (financial or
symbolic), liberal parliamentary democracy, modes of representation and
suffrage, the determining content of human rights, women's and children's
rights, the current concepts of equality, liberty, especially fraternity, dignity.
The task of ethics will also extend as a quasi-conceptual investigation, to the
concept of the human", its difference from the divine and the animal and to a
determined quasi-concept of the democracy that supposes it.
This last point is of particular concern. The very idea of representative
government and of democracy as citizenship for the benefit of all seems to be
under severe presure. Derrida (1994; 79). writes:
Electoral representivity or parliamentary life is not only distorted,
as was always the case, by a great number of socio-economic
mechanisms, but it is exercised with more and more difficulty in a
public space profoundly upset by techno-tele-media apparatuses
and by new rhythms of information and communication, by the
devices and the speed of forces represented by the latter, but also
and consequently by the new modes of appropriation they put to
work, by the new structure of the event and of the spectrality that
they produce (both invent and bring to light at the same time, there
where they were already there without being there: it is the relation
of the concept of production to the ghost that is in question here).
164
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
This transformation does not affect only facts but the concept of
such "facts." The very concept of the event.
The whole notion of identification of an electorate with a candidate that has
their interest at heart is made untenable by the way opinion is "produced, if
not premeditated by the power of the media" (Derrida, 1994; 80). Politicians
who might in their personal capacity have all the integrity in the world become
mere TV actors who say what their pollsters tell them to say as they try to
determine the ever changing opinions of the voters who are bombarded with
information.
With this political climate in mind Derrida (1994; 81-83) supplies a decalogue
of "plagues" that might be addressed by an ethics of deconstruction in the
future:
• Unemployment. This can be defined as social inactivity in general, or
non-work or underemployment, but also joblessness.
• The massive exclusion of homeless citizens from any participation in the
democratic life of States.
• The ruthless economic war among the countries of the European
Community, between them and the Eastern European countries, between
Europe and the United States, and between Europe, the United States,
and Japan. And here one might supplement Derrida by pointing out that
Southern Africa is not spared in this war.
• The inability to master the contradictions in the concept, norms, and reality
of the free market. For instance how does one go about saving one's own
interests in the global market by claiming to protect one's "social
advantages" in the face of those who are socially, politically and otherwise
disadvantaged?
• The aggravation of foreign debt and other connected mechanisms are
starving or driving to despair a large portion of humanity. Loans may be
granted to emerging economies on the basis of democratisation or human
rights. However, by way of many geopolitical fluctuations it becomes
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impossible for these markets to repay even the interest on such loans.
Hence, what starts out as a process of creating wealth in these economies
becomes another mechanismfor exclusion on the basis of bad debt.
• The arms industry and trade (whether it be "conventional" arms or at the
cutting edge of tele-technological sophistication) are an intricate part of
the normal regulation of scientific research, economy, and socialisation of
labour in Western democracies. Short of an unimaginable revolution, they
cannot be suspended or even cut back without running major risks,
beginning with the worsening of unemployment. As for arms trafficking, to
the (limited) degree that it can still be distinguished from "normal"
commerce, it remains the largest in the world, larger than the drug traffic,
from which it is not always dissociated.
• The spread of nuclear weapons exceeds not only statist control but every
declared market. Devices are also becoming smaller and more portable
which means that the necessity for large delivery vehicles such as inter-
global rockets are no longer a priority. These devices become impossible
to track via satelite or aerial photography. The nuclear threat has become
truly global and dissent has acquired the ability to be privatised.
• Inter-ethnic wars (have there ever been another kind?) are proliferating,
driven by an archaic phantasm and concept, by a primitive conceptual
phantasm of community, the nation-State, sovereignty, borders, native soil
and blood. Archaism is not a bad thing in itself, it doubtless keeps some
irreducible resource. But how can one deny that this conceptual
phantasm is, so to speak, made more outdated than ever, in the very
ontopology it supposes, by tele-technic dislocation? (By ontopology we
mean an axiomaties linking indissociably the ontological value of present-
being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of a
locality, the tapas of territory, native soil, city, body in general. All national
rootedness, for example, is rooted first of all in the memory or the anxiety
of a displaced - or displaceable - population.
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• Can one ignore the growing worldwide power of the super-efficient and
properly capitalist phantom-States that are the mafia and the drug cartels
on every continent, including in the former so-called socialist States of
Eastern Europe? These phantom-States invade not only the socio-
economic fabric, the general circulation of capital, but also statist or inter-
statist institutions.
• Above all, one would have to analyse the present state of international law
and its institutions.
This last point is of utmost importance if we are to consider another heading,
thinking about another course of action than the one that is at present pulling
time out of joint. If any of the above points are to be addressed the role of
law will have to be demarcated if that is at all possible. Two distinct
problems or limits with regard to the notion of international law and its
institutions will have to be crossed or traversed.
• The first and most radical stems from the fact that their norms, their
character, the definition of their mission depend on a certain historical
culture. They cannot be dissociated from certain European philosophical
concepts, and notably from a concept of State or national sovereignty.
• Another limit is strictly linked to the first: This supposedly universal
international law remains, in its application, largely dominated by
particular nation-States.
It is with regards to this last point that the force of deconstructive ethics, or
as we will see in the next section, poststructural ethics, can open a space in
which the mettle of language, the coin of its terms may be tested for signs of
possible counterfeiture. A good place to start will be with "what is obscurely
and sometimes hypocritically called the humanitarian". What does "aid"
imply? Does the gift of "aid" hold certain responsibilities for both the giver
and the receiver? For Derrida (1994; 84) it is clear that however insufficient,
confused, or equivocal signs of "aid" in the name of being a humanitarian
may still be, we should salute what is heralded today in the reflection on the
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right of interference or intervention and in limiting the sovereignty of the
State under certain terms.
"[7]he New International, refers to a profound transformation, projected over
a long term, of international law, of its concepts, and its field of intervention"
(Derrida, 1994; 84). It is before the spectre of such a "super-State,"
heralding a "new world order," that poststructural ethics trembles in
anticipation. The spectre of such an infrastructure of laws and regulations is
powerfully seductive but as a future it is indeed a "black picture" on a
"blackboard". It is difficult to see what will eventually present itself in the
name of a justice for all. What is clear though, as clear as khóra, so to
speak, is that even this Statewill be subject to deconstruction.
5.6 SUMMARY
As we have seen, deconstruction is a specific experience of language. Due
to the dynamic aspects of language and the fact that the meaning of words
"change over time and in different contexts, it is difficult to define
deconstruction which is itself a word that take on many meanings. However,
this does not mean that we cannot or are not obliged to try definitions.
Hence, a definition of deconstruction, a nutshell, and a summary could be:
Deconstruction as language is experience itself suppressing parts and
favouring others in a dynamic repetition aimed at creating new meaning
where misunderstanding arises.
This is also a definition of ethical engagement. The difference between what
deconstruction attempts and the self-closure of belief were sharply contrasted
in a discussion of the Old Testament story of Abraham. As we have seen a
key concept for ethics is the opportunity to question, but deconstruction does
not take for granted that questioning opens the road to ethics. Rather, a
certain non-knowledge, a questioning from ignorance, was presupposed in
the discussion of Heidegger's notion of the questioning of Being.
Finally, however, the ignorance from which questions are formulated is a
state of unhappy urgency as ethics cannot wait. Time plays an important role
168
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
in the delivery of effective ethical formulations and we looked at the pressure
of this situation by way of the aporia of the gift and its relation to money.
Deconstruction formulates tolerance as an impure fiction. If such a fiction is
to have any political impact it will have to be legitimised. In the next chapter,
the progress of developing a poststructural ethics can also be read as an
attempt to think through the notion of constitutional tolerance.
NOTES
1 Of this word Derrida writes that it is a "tired word of philosophy and logic, [that] has
often imposed itself on me" (Derrida, 1993a; 12) and that it is a "word, aporia, which
I chose a long time ago ... without really knowing where I was going, except that I
knew that what was going to be at stake in this word was the 'not knowing where to
go'" (Derrida, 1993a; 12).
2 "This is to write a word, cross it out, and then print both word and deletion. (Since
the word is inaccurate, it is crossed out: Since it is necessary, it remains legible)"
(Derrida, 1976; xiv).
3 The translation in Margins of Philosophy, the one I use here, differs slightly from
the one provided in Limited INC. on p. 20. In the Margins translation the signature
seems to retain an independent metaphorical existence from its production, an
autonomy that is diluted if we replace "detach itself" with "to be detached" as is done
in Limited INC. The latter does however, signify the relationship of the signature to
the system of writing better than what seems to be an arbitrary and anarchic "will"
expressed by the Margins text. An interesting example of the different political
agendas expressed by the two texts in question.
4 See: Heidegger M (1989) Georg Trakl: Language in the Poem in Blaam H (ed)
Modern German Poetry New York and Philadelphia: Chelsea House pp 83 - 121.
5 The quote is taken from a textual insert of the story Counterfeit Money by
Baudelaire and has no page numbers. See: Derrida J (1992b) Given Time: I.
Counterfeit Money Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press
6 For Derrida the question of the human is also closely related to the question of
animals. If "progress" entails a better quality of life one cannot today ignore "that
never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children
been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth". One can also not ignore
"what is becoming of so-called 'animal' life, the life and existence of 'animals' in this
history. This question has always been a serious one, but it will become massively
unavoidable" (Derrida, 1994; 85).
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CHAPTER SIX
POSTSTRUCTURAL ETHICS
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to give content to the notion of poststructural ethics.
In the previous chapters we have looked at what Modernity expected from a
project of ethics. It had to produce a comprehensive list of values that could
be taught as the authoritative version of what "correct thinking" about moral
matters implied. These authoritative versions are called "metanarratives".
In contrast, postmodernity favours an anarchic freedom of choice allowing
individuals to experiment and identify an ethic that suits them. However, this
gives rise to an "anything goes" consumption of ethical codes in which one's
allegiance can be changed at will or where one can opt for moral indifference.
Individually, both these projects fail to live up to their promises. However,
poststructuralism does not abandon these projects but thinks them together
as necessary parts of the same need for ethics. In the attempt to think what
is basically a rule based system and an anarchic enthusiasm at the same
time, poststructuralism turns to the work of Levinas and Derrida.
Poststructural ethics gains from Levinas's exposition of the phenomenality of
the human face and also the "said" I "saying" structure of ethical discourse.
Derrida, however, provides the most comprehensive contribution with his
thorough deconstruction of Western metaphysics.
Poststructural ethics, however, finds its distinction in that it insists on
decisions being made based on good judgements. It appreciates the infinite
openness that deconstruction has towards a future but cannot ignore the
responsibility that ethics has in ensuring that choices and promises are given
moral force. The exposition of poststructural ethics is intimately interwoven
with Linda Hutcheon's (1995) description of a politics of irony, Drucilla
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Cornell's (1992) rephrasing of deconstruction as "philosophy of the limit", and
Paul Cilliers' (1998) introduction to self-organisation in complex systems.
The following chapter proceeds by firstly providing a quick glance at the key
features of poststructural ethics. Secondly, a defence of reason in terms of
ethics and the ironic politics it has to contend with, will be looked at. Thirdly,
by using the example of law an explanation of the sublime or aporetic
character of judgement will be offered. This structural feature of all
judgements has the consequence of never being able to exclude ethics from
the processes of the Law. Fourthly, the notion of friendship provides an
opportunity to examine the kind of life a poststructural ethics proposes.
Finely, a note on the impossibility of ending poststructural ethics is a logical
place to bring this thesis to an end.
6.2 WHAT IS POSTSTRUCTURAL ETHICS?
In the first instance poststructural ethics, which embraces the movement of
différance and the notion of khóra, does not seek to ground itself in a
metaphysical first principle, such as Rationality or the existence of God. In
the second instance it endeavours to establish an ethics that takes up
position between "anything goes" anarchism and absolute authoritarianism by
means of stimulating a community that questions itself and its relation to
others.
In order for us to start answering the question of what poststructural ethics
entails we need to reiterate Derrida's (1995a; 93) statement quoted in the
previous chapter under sub-heading 5.2.2 - The Scene of Writing:
All metaphysicians, ... have proceeded in this way, conceiving
good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure
before the impure, the simple before the complex, the essential
before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, etc. And
this is not just one metaphysical gesture among others, it is the
metaphysical exigency, that which has been the most constant,
most profound and most potent.
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Poststructuralism does not attempt to conceive from the outset what is good
or positive or pure or simple or essential or what should be imitated. It does
not however, take the obvious alternative course following an inverted path,
and conceive a negative strategy by privileging evil, negativity, complexity,
accidents and imitation. This would be to do the same thing philosophy has
always done, but only in reverse.
Instead, poststructural ethics begins where it finds itself and is in a certain
sense blind to its own beginning. This beginning may be anywhere in what
Derrida calls the "text'". It proceeds over time in an attempt to come to terms
with emerging patterns that identify the network of relationships in which it is
embedded. In scientific terms it proceeds deductively, working from the
general to the specific rather than inductively from the specific to the general.
However, it is not a "specific theory" that attempts to develop itself a priori and
then "forces" itself upon, what is regarded as, an indifferent universe.
By identifying and describing patterns, as it goes along, it attempts to
"influence" decisions about appropriate action. It attempts to strike a balance
between arbitrary prescriptions based on knowledge that is held to be
unchanging and the requirements of contingency. These are such that an
ethical departure, or an attempt at ethics cannot have the good conscience of
knowing exactly what to do from the outset. It has knowledge and enframing
texts at its disposal but the ethical requirement may deem it necessary to
transgress the rules of this knowledge or break out of the frame. This might
happen without the agenr being aware of it initially.
. On this point Caputo (1997; 81) is wrong about the ethical impulse in
poststructuralism, and about what drives deconstruction, when he says that
"transgression is a controlled contravention or invention, requiring the
discipline of an already standing frame or horizon to transgress, which is why
it is described as a 'double gesture'''. Poststructural ethics is always a double
gesture, but it is not always a planned and controlled contravention or
invention. The agent of ethics is not "in the moment" always guaranteed of
doing the right thing. As we have seen, sometimes the ethical act can make
one irresponsible, at least initially.
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The fact that things change presents rules of behaviour, as ethics is often
perceived, with the problem that they may be incomprehensible in certain
situations to which they are supposed to pertain. This does not entail that
rationality has to be sacrificed to historico-social demands or chaotic
irrationality. Through an insistence on irrationalism "ethical responsibility is
reduced to a choice amongst other choices the individual can make. But, as
we have seen in Levinas, responsibility is not a choice at all but an
irremissible necessity, since we are inevitably in proximity to the Other"
(Cornell, 1992; 100).
Through a complex interaction of observation, experimentation and choice
poststructural ethics self-orqanises" into strategies most effective for survival.
It sifts through the rubble of what has been and also the shiny projects
proposed for the future. It evaluates, makes decisions about the appropriate
action to take and tries to render the object of theory.
6.3 RECONSIDERING RATIONALITY
Deconstruction does not proceed by conducting empirical research
necessary for resolving social debates on the level of actual politics although
it does not disallow it. Rather than regard this as an error one has to proceed
with a "quasi-transcendental analysis [for it is] crucial to justice, and more
specifically, to a conception of justice that promotes, not just allows, legal
transformation" (Cornell, 1992; 8).
In order to speak about the role of the museum and of ironic strategies
employed by curators in a postcolonial society Linda Hutcheon (1995; 176)
chose a specific exhibition that ran from 16 November 1989 to 6 August
1990, at the Royal Ontario Museum in Toronto Canada, entitled "Into the
Heart of Africa".
Her concern has focused mainly on the reception of the exhibition within a
multicultural society. She (Hutcheon, 1995; 199) makes the following
observation:
For a museum to choose not to take an unequivocal stand might
be interpreted as a refusal of any single, modern, "master
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narrative" of Truth; but from a postcolonial perspective - given the
position of authority of the institution - the possible reading was
more problematic. What might be read as irony or ambiguity
becomes, from a postcolonial perspective, potential evasion ...
ambiguity within an institution associated with cultural and
educational authority itself makes a kind of truth-claim.
This problem of reception is one that Derrida looks at in terms of the
University but is a situation that pertains in all institutions with authoritative
power. The University and the museum are prime examples of the
Enlightenment myth that represent the completed move from mythos to logos.
"This myth is dangerous from an ethical standpoint because it denies its own
mythical structure, parading as the universal truth of mankind and, thus,
foreclosing in advance the very legitimacy of its challengers" (Cornell, 1992;
10). Derrida does not, as Levinas does, insist that knowledge and rationality
are incompatible with ethics. Instead he favours a re-visioning of rationality.
Derrida's introduction of the notion of respect is one of the clear differences
between the ethics of deconstruction and Levina's Ethics as First Philosophy.
Respect, with all the connotations of vision and rationality that goes with it, is
not something that Derrida wants to abandon. For him the question of
rationality is of utmost importance. As we have seen, giving reasons is one of
the key manifestations of an ethics as discourse and it must be a priority in a
multicultural society.
When we think about thinking, and more specifically, when we seek reasons
for reason, Derrida identifies two typical risks that has to be avoided. "Some
take the form of a bottomless pit, while others take the form of a protectionist
barrier" (Derrida, 1983; 3). In the first instance reasoning regresses infinitely
as it seeks one rational proof to prove the previous proof etc. Or it can form a
circle that traps what it seeks to protect, and suffocates it. For example, the
law has the right to dispense justice, justice is dispensed by the law because
it has the right. According to Derrida sight is closely connected to the
theoretical attitude. As he (Derrida, 1983; 4) writes:
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The pleasure of useless sensations explains the desire to know for
the sake of knowing, the desire for knowledge with no practical
purpose. And this is more true of sight than of the other senses.
This one sense, naturally theoretical and contemplative, goes
beyond practical usefulness and provides us with more to know
than any other; indeed, it unveils countless differences. We give
preference to sight just as we give preference to the uncovering of
difference.
In the work of the Abstract Expressionist painter Willem de Kooning one is
able to glimpse what Derrida might mean with "countless differences". De
Kooning's work is a visual feast that in a sense reminds the viewer that one's
eyes are always bigger than one's stomach. Theory is sometimes hard to
swallow and even harder to digest and the eyes are greedy and overzealous.
Hence, Derrida (1983; 4) is moved to ask:
But is sight enough? For learning and teaching, does it suffice to
know how to unveil differences?· In certain animals, sensation
engenders memory, and that makes them more intelligent and
more capable of learning. But for knowing how to learn, and
learning how to know, sight, intelligence and memory are not
enough. We must also know how to hear, and to listen. I might
suggest somewhat playfully that we have to know how to shut our
eyes in order to be better listeners. Bees know many things, since
they can see; but they cannot learn, since they are among the
animals that lack the faculty of hearing. Thus, despite
appearances to the contrary, the University, the place where
people know how to learn and learn how to know, can never be a
kind of hive.
Derrida denies that he proposes an "art of blinking" but he does not believe
that the University should be a sclerophthalmic animal, an animal without
eyelids. It is better in this instance to remember that "[m]an can lower the
sheath, adjust the diaphragm, narrow his sight, the better to listen, remember
and learn" (Derrida, 1983; 5).
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As with a drawing that starts out in a confusion of lines that seeks to express
its object so reason starts out over-saturated and indistinct. Someone who
renders a drawing has to fight with the contradictions that lines present as
they try to move around an object. In a similar way "[t]here are two first
principles in all reasoning, the principle of non-contradiction, of course and
the principle of rendering reason. The second principle says that for any
truth - for any true proposition, that is - a reasoned account is possible. Or, to
translate more literally, for any true proposition, reason can be rendered'
(Derrida, 1983; 7). But, reason itself is an action, a practice and not an
"object in the world". So how is it possible to contemplate reason itself? How
is one to render reason? How does one give reasons for reason? For
Derrida (1983; 8) the questions of reason,
cannot be seperated from a question about the modal verb "must"
and the phrase "must be rendered". The "must" seems to cover
the essence of our relationship to principle, it seems to mark out
for us requirement, debt, duty, request, command, obligation, law,
the imperative. Whenever reason can be rendered (reddi potest),
it must. Can we, without further precautions, call this a moral
imperative, in the Kantian sense of pure practical reason? It is not
clear that the sense of "practical", as it is determined by a critique
of pure practical reason, gets to the bottom of the "must," or
reveals its origin, although such a critique has to presuppose such
a "must". It could be shown, I think, that the critique of practical
reason continually calls on the principle of reason, on its "must"
which, although it is certainly not of a theoretical order, is
nonetheless not simply "practical" or "ethical" in the Kantian sense.
A responsibility is involved here, however. We have to respond to
the call of the principle of reason.
Thus, we are obliged to render reason. But, obliged in the sense that
Levinas implies. It is an obligation that never merely forces or coerces but
invites. It is not an obligation that can be rendered once and for all as one
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succinct phrase. It is rather a commitment to an endless questioning of
reason by rational means.
Are we to use reason to account for the principle of reason? Is the
reason for reason rational? Is it rational to worry about reason and
its principle? Not simply; but it would be over-hasty to seek to
disqualify this concern and to refer those who experience it back to
their own irrationalism, their obscurantism, their nihilism. Who is
more faithful to reason's call the one who offers questions in return
and tries to think through the possibility of that summons, or the
one who does not want to hear any question about the reason of
reason? (Derrida, 1983; 9)
The postmodern attitude, and also the feminist critique of reason, attempts
exactly this questioning of the reason for reason. Modernity insisted, for
reasons of gaining power, on a "principle of reason" which holds nothing
sacred and to whose inquisition everything is an object that has to reveal an
essence and a final analysis. Derrida (1983; 9 - 10) writes:
The modern dominance of the principle of reason had to go hand
in hand with the interpretation of the essence of beings as objects,
an object present as representation [Vorstellung], an object placed
and positioned before a subject. This latter, a man who says 'I,' an
ego certain of itself, thus ensures his own technical mastery over
the totality of what is. The 're-' of repraesentatio also expresses
the movement that accounts for - 'renders reason to' - a thing
whose presence is encountered by rendering it present, by
bringing it to the subject of representation, to the knowing self. A
dominance is thus assured for representation, for Vorstellen, for
the relation to the ob-ject, that is to the being that is located before
a subject that says 'I' and assures itself of its own present
existence. But it is true that a caricature of representational man,
in the Heideggerian sense, would readily endow him with hard
eyes permanently open to a nature that he is to dominate, to rape
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if necessary, by fixing it in front of himself, or by swooping down on
it like a bird of prey.
For poststructuralism there is no such thing as a "return to reason" as if
reason has somehow been lost in thinking about it. Rather, we can talk of a
certain correction that has taken place in the way reason is approached as
we think the notions of Modernity and postmodernity together. For Hutcheon
reason has been tempered by the realisation of complexity in the world and a
challenge has been set for it by the ironic and contradictory behaviour of that
world. However, reason is not unattached from whomever employs it. And
neither is irony. As she (Hutcheon, 1995; 6) makes clear: "irony isn't irony
until it is interpreted as such - at least by the intending ironist, if not the
intended receiver. Someone attributes irony; someone makes irony happen".
Thus, from the outset the successful use of irony depends on whether or not
the intended receiver "gets it" or not. Trying to understand it is "not unlike the
difference between a joke and explaining a joke: irony cancels itself out the
moment it adds a word of interpretation" (Hutcheon, 1995, 7).
What pertains to irony also pertains to a multicultural environment and ethics.
It seems that if you "get it" you can't explain it. You either act morally in a
successful way or you don't. This is unsatisfactory, from a poststructural
point of view. One has to know wrong from right. Reason has to take up the
challenge, but not as a grand project. It has to look at right and wrong in a
more complex way.
For Derrida, the University can contribute by structuring research in two
different ways. He (Derrida, 1983; 11-12) identifies two main streams of
research namely "orientated" and "fundamental" research:
• "'Oriented' research is research that is programmed, focused, organised in
an authoritarian fashion in view of its utilisation whether we are talking
about technology, economy, medicine, psychosociology, or military power-
and in fact we are talking about all of these at once" and,
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• "In opposition to this basic concept of oriented research basic,
'fundamental' research, disinterested research with aims that would not be
pledged in advance to some utilitarian purpose".
For Derrida the distinction between these two ways of conducting research is
not clear. The blurring of the boundary between them is what constitutes a
community of reason and the ethical justification of reason. As he (Derrida,
1983; 16) says:
Now reason is only one species of thought - which does not mean
that thought is 'irrational'. Such a community would interrogate the
essence of reason and of a principle of reason, the values of the
basic, of the principial, of radicality, of the arkhe in general. What
is meant by community and institution must be rethought. This
thinking must also unmask - an infinite task - all the ruses of end-
orienting reason ... That does not mean that "orientation" is bad in
itself and that it must be combatted, far from it. Rather, I am
defining the necessity for a new way of educating students that will
prepare them to undertake new analyses in order to evaluate
these ends and to choose, when possible, among them all.
A poststructural community would be one such community, one in which
inquisitive pursuits would respect the notion of many as it constantly seeks to
understand itself in that contradiction of "one and many". A community that
exists as many cultures has tolerance as its most cherished political value
based on the rights and principles enshrined in a constitution. "Tolerance
recognizes that certain areas of human engagement should be free from state
intervention. Human beings must be free to pursue competing forms of life
and divergent moral commitments. But these pursuits must not infringe on
the basic rights and other forms of constitutional protections that are
guaranteed to all citizens as a matter of law" (Cornell, 1992; 3). Hence, in the
following section we will look at judgement as a basic tool for the justice
system but also for every individual presented with the complex choices of
democracy.
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6.4 CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT: THE SUBLIME AND THE APORETIC
The so-called return to reason discussed above has the characteristic of
"sublime judgement". By introducing the sublime we will not follow Kant all
the way to his conclusion that a "rational concept of infinity", an idea with
which the mind can grasp a boundlessness beyond all limitation, all finitude,
is what is needed to overcome the moment of awe and fear when confronted
with the pain of recognising the limits of our power to imagine. Hence,
poststructural ethics does not accept that the sublime is a definite limit of
imagination that predictably occurs at the same place and time.
Kant's thesis in The Critique of Judgement (1914) under the heading Analytic
of the Sublime is crucial for a rudimentary understanding of the paradoxical
melancholy and contradictory pleasure of the desire to move outside of the
"Self' or the in-group with whom "I" identify and are identified with by others.
On the one hand, when Derrida uses the term "idea in the Kantian sense" he
draws attention to the complexity of Kant's reasoning when he places ethics
beyond the actual in a radical way which seems to encourage a negative
acceptance that ethics is impossible in the fallen state of the world.
On the other hand, "Derrida ... is 'suspicious' of Levinas' acceptance of the
inevitability of dissatisfaction and of the right-wing Hegelian's complacency
that reduces the ethical to the actual and, therefore, at least on the
conventional reading of Hegel, to the perpetuation of order" (Cornell, 1992;
84). It is to be stressed here that poststructural ethics does not endorse the
negativity of sublimity as a form of closure. What the notion of the sublime
does provide is a dynamic structure in which a judgement may either survive
all contexts or not, and may even be the engine for unforeseen events.
For Kant, the sublime, as distinct from the merely beautiful (or in this case the
merely desirable), affords a negative pleasure because it is accompanied, as
its defining condition, by a moment of pain. By pain is meant the normal
feelings of shock or fear aroused by the presence of whatever impresses us
by virtue of its sheer magnitude, giving rise to awe or respect. In Kant's terms
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what we ordinarily consider beautiful (desirable), the object of what he calls a
"judgment of taste," (Kant, 1914; 106) is a finite entity; indeed, it is precisely
its exquisite boundaries - the finitude of its means and ends, its margins and
measure - that excite the feelings of calm enjoyment and reposeful exaltation
that we normally associate with aesthetic satisfaction. By contrast, the ethical
pleasure we take in the experience of boundlessness is, for Kant, not positive
but negative. This negativity is the very condition of sublimity.
The melancholy experienced due to the inability of a desire to be satisfied
lends itself to paradox in that it is negatively satisfied by never being
satisfied. Also, pleasure without an object from which to gain pleasure seems
like no pleasure at all, suggesting that seemingly, no pleasure is the highest
pleasure of all. Logically there is no way out of this conundrum, or
performative fallacy, without Kant's "concept of infinity". But, the "concept of
infinity" only re-establishes reason in the face of infinity that caused the
breach of reason in the first place. Thus, this measure establishes an
oxymoron that cannot effectively stem the tide of ever overflowing infinity and
the desire for it. If a "concept of infinity" was ever successful there would be
no experience of the sublime, and no further need for talk of it. On the
contrary though, it seems plausible to conclude that contracting a sublime
case of infinity, though treatable, is incurable. Hence, in the face of reason
this is the moment at which the rational subject is at its most ridiculous and
also presents the moment that defines rationality's peculiar discomfort when
confronted with ethics at its most basic level.
Poststructural awareness is awoken by the sublime realisation that no
specific statement, because it is necessarily mediated, will necessarily retain
its force and clarity in all contexts. Statements, rules, laws etc. need to be
clarified, made appropriate in different circumstances and at different times.
However, this does not preclude a certain "force of law":
The very emergence of justice and law, the founding and justifying
moment that institutes law implies a performative force, which is
always an interpretative force: this time not in the sense of law in
the service of force, its docile instrument, servile and thus exterior
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to the dominant power, but rather in the sense of law that would
maintain a more internal, more complex relation with what one
calls force, power or violence (Derrida, 1992a; 13).
Everything cannot always be discussed or reviewed. At certain times in
certain situations the letter of the law has to be enforced. This is most
notable in the case of the police. The police is supposed to act to conserve
law. It is said (Derrida, 1992a; 43) that the police are acting in an "ignoble"
way when they also partake in the founding violence of law, when they
"invent" it as they go along. "The two types of violence is at bottom the
paradox of iterability. Iterability requires the origin to repeat itself originarily,
to alter itself so as to have the value of origin, that is, to conserve itself'
But, it cannot be accepted that the case of the police should be the example
for the state of good governance. Democratic government, has the ethical
responsibility to appreciate the morphological aspects of "life" as it finds ways
to reinvent itself and survive the impossible fixes that it gets into at times.
"Deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the
undeconstructibility of justice and the deconstructibility of droit (authority,
legitimacy, and so on)" (Derrida, 1992a; 15).
These problems are not only the territory of the irrational or the thoughtless,
although a mystical element is undeniable, but also as Derrida (1992a; 16)
shows by invoking the aporia, the "dead ends" into which rational calculation
can lead.
[By] the very experience of aporia, I mean two things. (1.) The
experience finds its way, its passage, it is possible. And in this
sense it is impossible to have a full experience of aporia, that is, of
something that does not allow passage.... (2.) I think that there is
no justice without this experience, however impossible it may be, .
of aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a
desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn't be an
experience of aporia would have no chance to be what it is,
namely, a call for justice.
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Aporia in the second sense can be related to Kant's idea of the negative
pleasure in encountering the infinite. It is characteristic of deconstruction
though, that it does not settle on the side of negativity, although the
experience of it is of structural importance for any ethics or understanding of
law. "The identification of deconstruction with ethical skepticism is a serious
misinterpretation" (Cornell, 1992; 100).
As we have seen the sublime experience of negativity takes the shape of a
slippery irony in politics. For example, with every election voters invest their
every emotion in electing an official, the object of their political aspirations,
who is the best and the brightest, and they will defend his virtues to anyone.
As soon as he is elected, though, the self same voters start tearing him down
by pouring criticism on every action in anticipation of the next "best and
brightest" candidate.
In law a similar ironic situation exists. Every law has to be obeyed in its letter
and ignorance of a law is no excuse not to have obeyed. This is the condition
for all basic rights and obligations. In this basic sense "Law is the element of
calculation, and it is just that there be law" (Derrida, 1992a, 16).
However, as soon as different degrees of penalty is introduced, as law
inevitably does, for breaking the Law one enters into a situation where all
laws are not created equal. "It is precisely the 'jurisgenetive' power of law to
create normative meaning that makes law other than a mere mechanism of
social control" (Cornell, 1992, 104). Thus, one says that punishment must fit
the crime.
Absolute consistency treats The Law as The Law and punishes all offences
and transgressions as if they were the most extreme case. Hence, in a
situation of absolute consistency, all transgressions of The Law invoke the
death penalty. This could very well be the situation at the outset or
foundation of law. "If the legal system fully manifests itself in the possibility of
the death penalty, to abolish the penalty is not to touch upon one dispositif
among others, it is to disavow the very principle of law" (Derrida; 1992a; 42).
If this founding violence persists un-tempered by distinctions everyone will be
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ruled by The Law and justice will never escape from the "carnivorous
sacrifice, at the basis of our culture and our law" (Derrida; 1992a; 18).
This is a situation of extreme simplicity in which complexity is feared in the
extreme and cannot be sustained if justice is to prevail. However, for a legal
system to operate successfully it has to retain within itself, and be able to
recall, some element of its founding violence. If this can no longer be done,
"when the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal
institution disappears, the institution falls into decay" (Derrida; 1992a; 46).
For a legal system to be a system it has to make a distinction between
transgressions and distribute its founding violence, its right to make
judgements, as a proportionate conserving violence. This apportioning of
violence aimed at conserving the law is expressed as a penalty or, jail term.
A sentence is given in which the terms of restitution to the society, by whom
the law is sanctioned to serve, is explained.
In the previous chapter we looked at the notion of the gift in deconstruction.
Here, it can be used as a digression aimed as an example. The jail term, a
term of time also supposes a "gift of time". As we have seen in the previous
chapter, time and money have a close relationship in deconstruction. The
theft of money, for instance, is also a theft of time, the time it took a person to
accumulate the money stolen in an instant. For the thief to pay back what he
has stolen means sacrificing time on terms to be negotiated by the justice
system.
Murder, however, is not as easily negotiated in terms of time or money. The
murderer did not only steal the potential earning power of an individual, or
inhibit it. He did not only steal the time and money spent by a parent raising
a child. He stole a "life" in all the complex senses of that word. He did not
"make a better move" as Lyotard would describe it. He put an end to all
moves in the game. His punishment cannot entail a "gift of time" but must
entail rather all the connections that supplement the notion of "sacrifice" and
the problems raised by religious self-closure.
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If the founding violence of the law is the death penalty, as we have seen
above, the murderer establishes himself as the law through an act of killing.
But, the difference is that he has been preceded by the founding violence of
the law as a system and challenges it from the outside. In this sense the
challenge also legitimates the law as system, for it is only a system insofar as
it has an outside.
By murdering, by invoking the death penalty, the killer challenges the
authority of the law by establishing his own authority. This entails
challenging the legal system in the sense that another system sets up in
competition to it. This, the legal system cannot allow. It has to keep the
absolute right to the death penalty for itself. In this absolute sense, the law
system is exclusive.
But, a problem presents itself. In order for the challenge not to be mistaken
for an equal challenge, for the system has to remain the more authoritative of
the two and also be seen as such, the system cannot use founding violence
against the challenger. It has to do something even more powerful. It has to
invoke its founding violence without actually using it.
Through lifelong incarceration the killer is not only discredited as a worthy
opponent to the justice system, who can take all the time in the world in
putting him to death, he is kept as a reminder to others that the system has
time on its side. The challenge to the system is thus not met with an equal
but opposite violence. The system's violence against the killer is much
greater and is disseminated as a message that the system will outlive any
deed or challenge against it. Eventually there is no escape to a
transcendental outside.
The killer pays through a sacrifice of what he loves the most. His own life
becomes hateful in the acceptance of his deed. Murder or killing, in the final
analysis will always be the act of a self closed within itself at the moment of
committing the deed. It is not dissimilar to the self-closure of the archi-
believer. The murderer believes that he will not be caught, he might even
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believe that what he is doing is right, as he is the absolute authority with the
right to dispense the death penalty.
The allegorical figure of the "innocent man on death row", of which the Bob
Dylan" song The Hurricane is a good textual example, acts not only as a
political call for justice from those marginalised and mistreated by the
inefficiency and bias of the judicial system, but also as an ethical temptation
for the guilty killer to recognise in it the plight of his victim. The victim was
innocent and was not given any terms but was outright sacrificed in the name
of greed or avarice or revenge to the selfish solipsism of an individual taking
right into his own hands, by initiating an instance of "founding violence".
If poststructural ethics takes a side, it takes the position of defending the right
to a good defence. This does not mean that it excludes itself from the side of
the accuser and the prosecution. It endeavours to develop principles of
justice "through the appeal to contextual universals by which we distinguish
between differences we want to be recognised by the law from those we
condemn" (Cornell, 1992; 104).
Poststructural ethics has the task of reminding The Law and the prosecutor,
that finding the defendant guilty can provide only a negative pleasure. A
guilty verdict is in every case a victory to tnenetce" and a defeat of eros. The
"Good", the desire (eros) to do justice to the other has been forfeited to the
grasp (thanatos) of a self that in its selfishness is dead to the call of the other.
Hence, if the actions of the defendant has broken the law the prosecution's
disappointment at the failure of the individual to recognise his responsibility is
what is at stake, not a bloodthirsty pursuit for vengeance on the side of the
State.
This does not preclude judgement from meeting out severe punishment. But
punishment cannot be arbitrary and cannot go without consideration of the
case made by the defence which acts as the "face" of the other regarding the
system of justice. It also cannot revel in punishment as a pleasure but should
adopt, what Derrida has previously called, a sense of "mourning" for the law
that was forgotten. Poststructual ethics merely stand to remind both the
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prosecution and the defence that punishment has to be tempered with
encouragement. Law is in essence "not prohibitive but affirmative" (Derrida;
1992a; 8).
The aim is not to be spiteful or to delay the proceedings of the court. Instead
ethical encouragement manifests merely as the realisation that the law, even
as it has to prosecute an accused, can never do so by claiming to embody
the entirety of the accused's existence in a verdict. "For Freud, successful
mourning involves mimetic interiorisation in which the Other lives on 'in us.'
But for Derrida, this process of mimetic interiorisation will always fail,
precisely because the Other's absence, which puts the memory in us, cannot
be revoked. Ironically, it is only through this failure to fully recollect the Other
that we 'succeed' in mourning the Other as Other. There is always an
allegorical dimension to mourning" (Cornell, 1992; 73).
In keeping with the ethical obligation we have to seek justice beyond the law
while keeping the law in mind. This, movement beyond the law is not
something that can ever be precluded by making more laws or by
accumulating precedent or by way of case study. Not that the knowledge and
insight accumulated by these must be forfeited. On the contrary. It must,
however, be "made to play" so to speak in the performance of the court.
"Writing ... [is] an attempt to defend against human violence. But to the
degree that the establishment of systems for ethical and political
'representation' identifies the norm and rigidly circumscribes the definition of
right behavior, such establishments carry within them their own violence"
(Cornell, 1992; 51). Each case is different. The face of the accused is
always his own face and in a certain respect always comes from outside the
system's closure.
Cornell (1992; 54-55), identifies a problem in this regard. The overwhelming
responsibility for the other. At this point, the asymmetry of Levinas's thinking
must be tempered with a certain return to symmetry that she finds in Derrida.
The other is an other who can open herself to me precisely
because she is an other 'in my economy.' Without this strange
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symmetry, or the introduction of a positive notion of infinity in
which the encounter with the infinite Other is an encounter with
God, Levinas's insistence on the phenomenological as well as the
ethical asymmetry of the Other would degenerate into the worst
sort of violence. Derrida's concern can be translated into an
attempt to dream the dance of sameness and difference beyond
the demonstration of shared substantive properties and its
counterpart, the denial of all phenomenological symmetry.
The "I" has to take into account its own limitations. In order to be
responsible, on a practical level, to retain the ability for a response at all, the
"I" has to filter out the relevant from the irrelevant. "The work of mourning the
remains demands the mimetic persistence to scrape through the debris left
over from Hegel's system at the same time that we recognise that '[t]he rest,
the remain(s), is unsayable' " (Cornell, 1992;63).
This is most closely resembled in the figure of the "judge", of whom the
allegorical figure is the Chiffonier (Cornell, 1992; 62). He has to discriminate
between relevant and irrelevant information. He is the very figure in which
poststructural ethics places its hope, namely discretion for which another
name is différance. Cornell (1992; 62) quotesWalter Benjamin:
Here we have a man whose task is to gather the day's rubbish in
the capital. Everything that the big city has cast off, everything it
lost, everything it disdained, everything it broke, he catalogues and
collects. He combs through the archives of debauchery, the
stockpile of waste. He sorts things out and makes intelligent
choices; like a miser assembling his treasure, he gathers the trash
that, after being regurgitated by the goddess of Industry, will
assume the shape of useful or gratifying objects.
Without this ability to discriminate a judge might well feel that he is constantly
better informed but hardly ever any wiser! The movement of discretion is
what Derrida has in mind with deconstruction namely opening up knowledge
systems in order to make an informed decision. From the discussion on
188
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
khóra in the previous chapter it is clear that the movement of différance,
which is infinite in the sense that it never stops (it has infinite energy), is
however, limited by the greater infinity, an infinite space, which is khóra. The
desire and energy of différance is a love of the unknown. However, it is not a
desire to dominate but a desire to love wisely. For deconstruction this entails
an ethical reading, for "when one is reading, one is reading 'some-thing.' For
'deconstruction,' however, 'the thing' that one is reading is the 'heart of the
matter' allegorised in the text" (Cornell, 1992; 81).
Discretion resides in the realisation that judgements have a sublime and
aporetic character and that meaning is distributed" throughout the system.
But, a system, legal or otherwise, in order to operate "is a system only to the
degree that it is operationally closed" (Cornell, 1992; 122). A judge with
ethical discretion knows that he has to consult. Whether it is the sources of
law or other judges. He has to take someone into confidence, he realises
that he is part of a complex system. The system is not mechanical or
automatic but do have machinelike qualities such as a need for expediency.
Derrida (1992a; 22-26) summarises three aporia's of judgement as follows:
• First aporia: époké of the rule. "If the act simply consists of applying a
rule, of enacting a program or effecting a calculation, we might say that it
is legal, that it conforms to law, and perhaps, by metaphor, that it is just,
but we would be wrong to say that the decision was just"
• Second aporia: the ghost of the undecideable: "The undecideable is not
merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the
experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of
the calculable and the rule, is still obliged - it is obligation that we must
speak - to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of
law and rules"
• Third aporia: the urgency that obstructs the horison of knowledge. "A just
decision is always required immediately, 'right away'. ... the moment of
decision as such, always remains a finite moment of urgency and
percipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effect of this
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theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation,
since it always marks the interruption of the juridico- or ethico- or politico-
cognitive deliberation that precedes it, that must precede it".
In terms of the frame of this thesis, the judge is an example of the tragic hero,
the one who suffers with the indifference of the world and the moral stupidity
that surrounds him. He also suffers because it is at all necessary to have
such a thing as law. It would have been much better if everyone just knew
what was right and good and could realise that if they stick to it their "life-
world" would be a better place. In many aspects every individual ic(entifies
with this heroic and tragic struggle on a daily basis, trying to do the right
thing. Ethically speaking one can never just accept that one is a good person
and always in the right. "Sittlichkeit, the collective ethics of modernity"
(Cornell, 1992; 62) has to be forever vigilant.
6.5 ETHICSOF FRIENDSHIP
An ethics that has as its original moment, its beginning, the meeting of a face
by another face, as we have seen Levinas describe, finds its most favourable
manifestation in the trials and tribulations of friendship. It is often said that a
man is judged by the company he keeps. This seems easy enough but it is
not at all adequate. Friendship is a complex relation unlike family bonds that
can always be reduced to genetic ties. Friendship cannot be reduced to a
simple formula. We only have to mention the example of Judas, who kept
excellent company, to see that judging a man's character by the company he
keeps is not the most reliable of judgements.
For Derrida the political aspect of friendship can be traced in the Marxist
spirit of criticizing institutions that treat people as replaceable parts in a big
machine whether that machine is the State or the Law. This political
friendship is not an organisation but an ethical awareness of human
responsibility. Derrida writes:
The name of New International is given here to what calls to the
friendship of an alliance without institution among those who, even
if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist
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international, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-
eschatological role of the universal union of the proletarians of all
lands, continue to be inspired by at least one of the spirits of Marx
or of Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in
order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if
this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or of a workers'
international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the
theoretical and practical critique of the state of international law,
the concepts of State and nation, and so forth (Derrida, 1994; 86).
By counter-conjuration Derrida has in mind another sort of capital. There can
be no thinking or progress without rationality and calculation, but Derrida has
in mind a rationality that does not stop at calculating money or other abstract
symbols of wealth. The friendship of the new international, it must also
include a critique of globalisation, has as its subjects those who can write
(make a mark, signify) and disseminate a critique of ethics. Sharing insights,
responses and experiences of problems adds value to the lives of people by
presenting solutions that cannot be found in solitude. These problems
cannot be overcome by solitary thinkers because they are concrete
manifestations of community and need to be dealt with by participation and
interaction. For Derrida this participation, specifically through writing,
constitutes at the same time the singular subject and a community of
subjects. He says:
As an identifiable, bordered, posed subject, the one who writes
and his or her writing never give anything without calculating,
consciously or unconsciously, its reappropriation, its exchange, or
its circular return - and by definition this means reappropriation
with surplus-value, a certain capitalisation. We will even venture
to say that this is the very definition of the subject as such. One
cannot discern the subject except as the subject of this operation
of capital (Derrida, 1992b; 101).
This writing and its dissemination has the task of creating a general economy
of value in which that which escapes the circular movement of the limited or
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money economy is re-capitalized as ethical currency. It is not a value or
capital that can be calculated in the smallest degree in order to deliver a
balance of debits and credits. It is rather the free flow of communication, the
telegram, the distress signal etc. sent out without hope or guarantee that it
will be answered or that it will find a market. "Friendship is never a given in
the present; it belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise, or of
commitment. Its discourse is that of prayer and at issue there is that which
responsibility opens to the future" (Derrida, 1988; 636).
Poststructural ethics does not base itself on the confessions of friendship
given in the corridor or at graduation ceremonies with a slap on the back.
Friendship is that which answers the call in the time of need and celebration
appropriate to the specific instance. It keeps its name silent and is merely
there at the right place at the right time. Derrida tries to illustrate this
discretion of friendship by invoking a paradox of which, so it is said, Aristotle
and Montaigne were very fond. Thus, Derrida uses a quote from the outset.
He depends on his two "friends" to help him illustrate his point. It goes
without saying that he would not have been able to depend on them had they
not written this utterance down. The paradoxical quote in question is "0 my
friends, there is no friend" (Derrida, 1988; 632).
Behind the logical game of contradiction or paradox, perhaps the
"0 my friends, there is no friend" signifies first and last this
surpassing of the present by the undeniable future anterior which
would be the very movement and time of friendship. Undeniable
future anterior, the absolute of an unpresentable past as well as
future, which is to say of traces that one can only ever deny by
summoning them into the light of phenomenal presence. A
temporal torsion thus knots up the predicative proposition ("there
is no friend") within the apostrophe ("0 my friends"). The torsion of
this asymmetry envelops the theoretical determination or the
knowledge within the performativity of a prayer that will never
exhaust. This asymmetry leads us back to what I ... call the
question of the response (Derrida, 1988; 638).
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The "question of the response" is acutely interested in who or what is
responding? It is also interested in the ability of the response. Someone
may take up the call to respond but lack the ability to do so and thus fail in
the attempt. However, one always answers for oneself, for what one is, says,
or does. This answer also takes place beyond the simple present.
The "oneself' or "myself' supposes the unity, in other words the memory, of
the one responding. This is often called the unity of the subject, but one can
conceive such a synthesis of memory without necessarily having recourse to
the concept of subject. This unity of memory or the subject is never secured
in itself as an empirical synthesis. Thus, the recognition of this identity is
entrusted to the instance of the name. "I" am held responsible for "myself,"
which is to say, for everything that can be imputed to that which bears my
name. What is called a "proper name" is not necessarily limited to the
phenomenon of the legal name, the patronymic, or the nickname, although
these phenomena are, most frequently, its determining manifestation
(Derrida, 1988; 639). As an example of a manifestation other than those
mentioned one could imagine that a proper name has come to signify purely
in the distinctive features of repeated graffiti on city walls for instance. In
such a case it would suffice to say that the one responsible for the distinction
is held responsible.
But, by whom is one held to account? Derrida says that "[o]ne answers first
to the question, the request, the prayer, the apostrophe, the appeal, the
greeting, or the sign of the Other" (Derrida, 1988; 639). In other words I am
held accountable by that which cannot be recognized as distinctly myself.
That which comes to me from outside my uniqueness" However, before any
answer to the other one is merely responsible for the other. One does not yet
answer for oneself and in one's own name, hence, one is also responsible
before [devant] the question, request, challenge, "instance," or "insistance" of
the Other. It is this awareness of responsibility for the other that moves the
proper name into position. The proper name structures the "answering for
oneself' and is in itself a gift of identification for the Other. It implies the
Other in the very act of naming, in its origin, its finality and its use. Thus,
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"[r]esponding always supposes the Other in the relation to oneself; it
preserves the sense of this asymmetrical 'anteriority' even within the
seemingly most inward and solitary autonomy of reserve [quant a so/1, of
one's heart of hearts, and of the moral conscience jealous of its
independence - another word for freedom" (Derrida, 1988; 639).
Derrida makes a "note in passing" about the fact that response plays upon
the voice and of speaking. Although his discussion of ethics follows that set
out by Levinas and hence favours a response that cuts across vision he does
link it up with "respect" and a more visual sensibility of the look (regard)
(Derrida, 1988; 640). Hence, for Derrida, unlike Levinas, there is a return to
the rationality of the discerning glance and the calculation of vision because
unlike Levinas, Derrida establishes writing as superior to speech and, hence
one has to read the words. Writing like friendship does not produce
happiness but "[Kant says that] although friendship does not produce
happiness, the two feelings [respect and responsibility] that compose it
envelop the dignity of being happy" (Derrida, 1988; 640).
It seems very cynical of Derrida to say that friendship does not produce
happiness. There is, however, also a history of friendship that opens upon a
glaring problematic and, from a poststructural perspective, can be the very
reason why friendship and happiness does not seem to go together. Derrida
writes that: "[this 'history of friendship' maintains a] 'double exclusion' that can
be seen at work in all the great ethico-politico-philosophical discourses on
friendship, namely, on the one hand, the exclusion of friendship between
woman, and, on the other hand, the exclusion of friendship between man and
woman" (Derrida, 1988; 642). In Hegel's case for instance the difference
between the role and function of men and woman in society differ as much as
night and day and if it is a difficult enterprise to imagine friendship among
men it is impossible to imagine woman entering the equation. "The tension
here is within politics itself. It would be necessary to analyse all discourses
that reserve politics and public space for man, domestic and private space for
woman." (Derrida, 1988; 642). Although it might be politically formidable it
cannot be that the same impossibility presents itself to ethics. In the face-to-
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face relation of ethics there can be no doubt that a woman's face interrupts
the categories of the same as forcefully as does a man's. In Levinas' sense
of face, and we must read a certain correction into his work at this point, the
face transcends any features that might distinguish it as anything other than
that of the call to responsibility. On this point Derrida makes an ally of
Nietzsche when he writes: "Here is the 'Oh my friends, there is no friend' of
Zarathustra: 'Woman is not yet capable of friendship. But tell me, men, who
among you is capable of friendship? ... There is camaraderie: may there be
friendship!' " (Derrida, 1988; 643). Thus, for poststructuralist ethics the
question goes out equally to men and woman, who indeed among them are
capable of friendship?
But, the other and my responsibility for her also teaches me the greatest
value of ethics. In an uncanny and un-guaranteed return, friendship with the
other can lead to "that state of profound friendship where a man abandoned,
abandoned by all his friends, meets up in life with the one who will
accompany him beyond life, himself without life, capable of free friendship,
detached from any ties" (Derrida, 1988; 643). Although poststructural ethics
can have no objection against the solitude the hermit seeks out in order to
establish contact with the friend beyond life it would always insist that solitude
must not be sought too soon.
6.6 A LOGICAL END
Freud (1989; 94) explains in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis:
We have no way of conveying knowledge of a complicated set of
simultaneous events except by describing them successively; and
thus it happens that all our accounts are at fault to begin with
owing to one-sided simplification and must wait till they can be
supplemented, built on to, and so set right.
What poststructural ethics seeks most keenly is that special failure of the
limiting act to make complete the circumscription and leaving an opening, or
breakthrough, occurring within closure, violating its vows and breaching its
barriers, delivering the promise of a new beginning.
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Deconstruction's aversion for closing a debate by ottering conclusions,
solutions, or decisions confirming a commitment to not close down the
process of comprehension and description (Derrida, 1993d; 154). This has
the implication of not accepting speculation about the conclusion of
philosophy as a closed system or structure. For Derrida, "the idea of truth -
that is, the idea of philosophy - is an infinite idea, or 'Idea in the Kantian
sense' [and that] as such, no finite totality or cloture can account for the
infinite ouverture to truth, to philosophy" (Critchley,1993; 64). The concept
(idea in the Kantian sense) of closure designates a finite totality which is
continually breached by a movement of infinitisation. Philosophy generates
the radical freedom of the theoretical attitude which permits the "overcoming"
of finite knowledge based on sensible data. The overcoming of the finite is
achieved through the conception of philosophy as an infinite task. The
"phenomenological consciousness is indicated every time that Husserl
speaks of the Idea in the Kantian sense" (Derrida, 1993d; 167).
The example of Gëdel's (Hofstadter, 1979; 17) IncompletenessTheorem, that
rejects the notion of the possibility of mathematical closure, shows that the
infinite task of philosophy (Hofstadter, 1979; 696) is even present in the most
precise of sciences, namely mathematics. The theorem states that:
meta-logical statements concerning the completeness or closure of
axiom systems can neither be demonstrated nor refuted within
those axiom systems. This entails that there is an undecidable
statement within each axiom system which refutes [any notion] of
an 'axiom of completeness' and by implication, the Husserlian
conception of ... mathematics, and geometry as closed, or definite
systems (Critchley, 1993; 67).
This moment of undecidability that Gëdel opens up undermines the
conception of exact science, in the Modernist sense, and provides us with a
description of rigorous sciences, such as phenomenology, that is able to
produce accurate results without having to claim that they are precise, perfect
or absolutely final.
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An exact science is characterised by the possibility of closure. On the other
hand, a rigorous science like phenomenology possesses the structural
impossibility of closure. Phenomenology's novelty lies in the
transcendentality of an opening or overflowing which exceeds the borders of
the closure and "deconstructs" the very possibility of structuralism.
The problem from a postsructural point of view, however, is that
phenomenology cops out to a metaphysical level, setting up the structural
impossibility of closure as the final word, in order to overcome closure finally.
A similar suspicion to that with which Derrida views Levinas's ready
acceptance of the negativity in the sublime, rears its head with the ready
acceptance by phenomenology of the impossibility of closure.
Derrida breaks with and at the same time continues the project of Husserl by
acknowledging the impossibility of completely breaking out of the language of
metaphysics (Derrida, 1993d; 166). Thus, Derrida's project of deconstructing
the logocentric, reason bound, metaphysics, wrapped in the "word" as it is
stated in Genesis, continues as a double gesture that hinges on the notion of
limit.
The deconstruction of logocentrism continues by showing how the limit, or
closure, of a logocentric text is irreducibly flawed. The closure with which a
text's dominant interpretation surrounds itself is shown to posses certain
faults, or breaks, which are the marks of an alterity, an overwhelming
otherness, which the text is unable to successfully reduce or expel.
Deconstructive reading exposes the logocentric text as a scarred, flawed
body which is unable to demarcate its inside from its outside and which is
divided within itself between belonging and not belonging to the logocentric
tradition. Thus, deconstruction slips past the structural impossibility of
closure, by quoting, or mourning the loss of the limit. The notion of closure
divides metaphysics along the irreconcilable yet inseparable axes of
transgression and restoration, of belonging and not belonging, of the break
and the continuation.
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Hence, Derrida is able to give a non-nihilistic reading to the notion of 'end' in
Heidegger. Heidegger points out that his use of the notion 'end of
philosophy' leads to many misunderstandinqs". This not withstanding, we
can note that for Heidegger the end of philosophy does not entail the
disappearance of philosophy but a completion of metaphysics. In other
words, the thinking through to the end of all eschatological and teleological
metaphysics that postulate a logical apocalyptic finish to the project of
philosophy. Derrida takes up this challenge and suggests a thinking that
radicalises the thinking through of metaphysics and takes the thinking of an
end right through to the thinking also of the end of the end, which holds the
promise, if nothing else, of a certain beginning.
C/ótural reading of a text is then defined as the production of a dislocation
within a text, dividing the latter along the inseparable yet irreconcilable axes
of belonging and not belonging to the metaphysical or logocentric tradition.
At this axes, in between belonging and not belonging, at the line where the
opposition cannot be heard any longer a si/ence announces a possibility. As
Derrida says: "... but within [thinking], today, is sheltered and encapsulated
an unbreachable dignity and duty of decision. An unbreachable
responsibility" (Derrida, 1993f; 80). This silence, this pause, establishes the
moment in which the greatest test must be confronted as having to make a
decision in the face of the impossibility of making it. The questions have to
be asked, even if at the outset they seem to have no answer, questions like:
"what is a legally legitimate tradition and community, a question that cannot
be absolutely seperated from certain further questions such as what is
morally acceptable and which forms of life would we like to see promoted in
our community" (Cornell, 1992; 6).
Derrida is confident that a pause or hesitation is enough to establish an
ethical community in which asking questions, reminding one another of our
responsibilities, and also searching for what has gone missing, can be
established. It is an appeal to the promise of reconciliation, the promise of
translations, and not an already achieved reality. But, a "promise is not
nothing" (Cornell, 1992; 59). Derrida calls it:
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A community of the question, therefore, within that fragile moment
when the question is not yet determined enough for the hypocrisy
of an answer to have already initiated itself beneath the mask of
the question, and not yet determined enough for its voice to have
been already and fraudulently articulated within the very syntax of
the question. A community of decision, of initiative, of absolute
initiallity, but also a threatened community, in which the question
has not yet found the language it has decided to seek, is not yet
sure of its own possibility within the community. A community of
the question of the possibility of the question. This is very little -
almost nothing ... (Derrida, 1993f; 80).
6.6 CONCLUSIONS
In terms of the aims set out in the Introduction three main conclusions about
the generality or rules of ethics can be summarised:
• Ethics seen as rules of conduct, must always include the participation, in
formulating them, of those for whom these rules are meant.
• Rules cannot be forced on anyone without becoming itself unethical and
has to develop through influence and over time.
• For rules to remain ethical they have to be able to change.
Modernity did not allow the participation, in rule making, of the vast majority
of people for whom the rules of conduct where intended. Big theories and
lists where arbitrarily distributed and the expectation was that they should be
followed and enforced to the letter. This approach does not bode well for the
formation of any lasting democratic order.
On the other hand the postmodern approach of letting the crowd run wild, so
to speak, does not present us with a participatory solution. Instead all rules
are gradually abandoned in favour of a nihilistic anarchism in which the
individual abandons all attempts at ethics and settles for self gratification.
But, rules cannot be enforced for any length of time without resistance
developing. Thus it is imperative to realise that reason, well understood as
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discretion, dictates that rules will be followed if they are seen to be beneficial
to the individual who realises his singular dependence on the health of a
broader community. Deconstruction attempts to combine education and
experience in order to foster an ethical awareness that includes both care of
the self and care for the other. Hence, it promotes a situation in which the
community at large and its representatives are placed in conversation with
each other while at the same time creating a space of free communication
between citizens. From this interaction a democracy might arise that is as yet
unfathomable.
Looking ahead, I propose that poststructural ethics can be further developed
in three ways, but do not close it there:
• In terms of the history of philosophy a reading of Hegel's notion of the
corporation can be built out to address the challenges of a changing
economic environment. Derrida has already made a start by providing the
text Glas which is a reading of Jean Genet into Hegel. An interesting
substitute for Genet might be George Bataille.
• What has recently become popular under the name "African Renaissance"
can be read through the challenges of system, reason, law, multicultural
society, global politics and economy. Especially the politics of
representation may provide a golden opportunity to build out the notion of
poststructural ethics in a uniquely African context.
• An ongoing debate that can benefit from a poststructural approach is the
one concerning technology. The equitable distribution of technology, the
need for it, and especially the rights of those who have access and those
who have not, are a few of the questions that need to be answered. Does
technology create jobs, if so, for who and at what cost? This will not only
concern the cost incurred by companies and their shareholders but has to
include all stakeholders, such as communities. The debate around
technology has to consider, most urgently, how it can address poverty.
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NOTES
1 As Derrida says: 'There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; il n'y
a pas de hors-texte]" (Derrida, 1976; 158). What this means is that deconstruction
never takes place outside, cannot take place outside the "various networks -social,
historical, linguistic, political, sexual networks (the list goes on nowadays to include
electronic networks, worldwide webs) - various horizons or pre-suppositions, which
is what Derrida means by the 'general text' or 'archi-text' or 'textuality' or, here, just
'text' " (Caputo, 1997; 79-80)
2 Agency entails the full sense of a body in the world that has to act and re-act,
whether it is to get out of the way of an oncoming bus or to help someone cross the
street.
3 "The capacity for self-organisation is a property of complex systems which enables
them to develop or change internal structure spontaneously and adaptively in order
to cope with, or manipulate, their environment" (Cilliers, 1998; 90).
4 On the Bob Dylan album Desire released 1976; re-released 1987 on Audio CD /
Sony/Columbia, ASIN: B00000255X
5 These terms relate to Freud's theory of the "drives" and can be studied in his
essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1991; 218-268).
6 "The structure of the system cannot consist of a random collection of elements;
they must have some meaning ...Meaning is the result of a process, and this
process is dialectical - involving elements from inside and outside - as well as
historical, in the sense that previous states of the system is vitally important. ...the
elements of the system have no meaning by themselves, but only in terms of
patterns of relationships with many other elements" (Cilliers, 1998; 11).
7 Freud would call the ego that which is uniquely self. The super-ego is that
mechanism which holds the ego to account for what it allows the id to get away with.
The super-ego has been thought to arise due to strict parenting or social
conditioning. However, research has also shown that a person may develop a strict
and even neurotic super-ego by merely imagining rules and regulations that should
pertain to the ego. Hence, through imagination a person can create an "outside"
within himself. In the worst cases this conscience does not reflect any of the
demands of a real world.
S When Heidegger attempts to clarify his notion of end and totality in Being and
Time (1995) he gives a glimpse of the problems he foresees when describing
something's end or totality without knowing the thing's, be it philosophy or Oasein,
limitations at the outset. Hence, one has to speculate about the limits of philosophy
or Dasein running the risk of perpetuating a self fulfilling prophecy that necessarily
contains an apocalyptic vision of the end. As Heidegger (1995; 285) writes:
The task of carrying out in an appropriate way the ontological analysis
of end and totality breaks down not only because the theme is so far-
reaching, but because there is a difficulty in principle: to master this
task successfully, we must presuppose that precisely what we are
seeking in this investigation - the meaning of Being in general - is
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something which we have found already and with which we are quite
familiar.
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